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1 Introduction
Alliances and enmities among armed actors – be they rooted in history or in mere tactical consid-
erations – are part and parcel of warfare. In many episodes, especially in civil conflicts, they are
shallow links that are not sanctioned by formal treaties or war declarations. Even allied groups
retain separate agendas and pursue self-interested goals in competition with each other. Under-
standing the role of informal networks of military alliances and enmities is important, not only for
predicting outcomes, but also for designing and implementing policies to contain or put an end
to violence. Yet, with only few exceptions, the existing political and economic theories of conflict
restrict attention to a small number of players, and do not consider network aspects. In this paper,
we construct a stylized theory of conflict that captures the effect of informal networks of alliances
and enmities, and apply it to the empirical study of the Second Congo War and its aftermath.
The theoretical benchmark is a contest success function, henceforth CSF, in the vein of Tullock
(1980). In a standard CSF, the share of the prize accruing to a group is determined by the effort
(fighting effort) that this group commits to the conflict relative to its contenders. In our model,
the network of alliances and enmities modifies the sharing rule of the CSF by introducing novel
externalities. More precisely, we assume that the share of the prize accruing to group i is determined
by the group’s relative strength, which we label operational performance. In turn, this is determined
by group i’s own fighting effort and by the fighting effort of its allied and enemy groups. The fighting
effort of group i’s allies increases group i’s operational performance, whereas the fighting effort of
its enemies decreases it. Each group decides its effort non-cooperatively. Since the cost of fighting
is borne individually by each group, a motive for strategic behavior arises among both enemies and
allies. The complex externality web affects the optimal fighting effort of all groups.
We provide an analytical solution for the Nash equilibrium of the game. The model can be used
to predict how the network structure of alliances and rivalries affects the overall conflict intensity,
given by the sum of the fighting efforts of all contenders, which is our measure of the welfare loss.
Network externalities are a driver of the escalation or containment of violence.
The empirical analysis, which is based on the structural equations of the model, focuses on the
Second Congo War, a large-scale conflict involving a rich network of informal alliances and rivalries
that started in 1998 in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). To identify the network, we use
information from a variety of expert and data sources. The estimated network features numerous
intransitivities, showing that this conflict cannot be described as the clash between two unitary
camps (see Figure 2 below).
Our estimation strategy exploits panel variations in the yearly number of clashes involving
80 armed groups in 1998–2010, as measured by the Armed Conflict Location Event Database
(ACLED). A group’s fighting effort is proxied by the number of clashes in which it is involved.
Controlling for group fixed effects, we regress each group’s fighting effort on the total fighting
efforts of its degree-one allies and enemies, respectively. Since these efforts are endogenous and
subject to a reflection problem, we adopt an instrumental variable (IV) strategy similar to that
used by Acemoglu et al. (2015). Our identification strategy exploits the exogenous variation in
the average weather conditions facing, respectively, the set of allies and of enemies of each group.
The focus on weather shocks is motivated by the recent literature documenting that these have
important effects on fighting intensity (see Dell 2012, Hidalgo et al. 2010, Hsiang et al. 2013,
Miguel et al. 2004, and Vanden Eynde 2017). Without imposing any restriction, we find that the
two estimated externalities have the opposite sign pattern which aligns with the predictions of the
theory. Moreover, we find no external effect from neutral groups, which is also in line with the
theoretical predictions.
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After estimating the network externalities, we perform a variety of counterfactual policy experi-
ments. First, we consider targeted policies that either induce some groups to drop out of the conflict
or increase their marginal cost of fighting (e.g., arms embargoes). The analysis singles out armed
groups whose decommissioning or weakening is most effective for scaling down conflict. Second,
we study the effect of pacification policies aimed at reducing the hostility between enemy groups,
e.g., through bringing selected actors to the negotiating table. Since enmities tend to increase the
conflict intensity, bilateral or multilateral pacifications tend to reduce violence. We find that the
gains from pacification policies can be large. At instances, the reduction in the level of armed
activity is well in excess of the amount of fighting between the groups whose bilateral hostilities
were placated.
The results highlight the key role of Rwanda and Uganda in the conflict, although some smaller
guerrilla groups such as the Lord Resistance Army (LRA) are also important drivers of violence.
Arms embargoes that increase the fighting cost of groups without inducing them to demobilize
are generally ineffective because the reduction in the targeted groups’ activity is typically offset
by an increase in the activity of the other groups. In contrast, targeted bilateral or multilateral
pacification policies can be highly effective.
In most of the paper, we maintain the assumption of an exogenous network. This assumption
is relaxed in an extension, where we allow the network to adjust endogenously to policy shocks,
based on the predictions of a random utility model. The recomposition of the network magnifies
the effect of interventions targeting foreign groups. Removing all foreign groups reduces the conflict
by 41%, significantly more than in the case of an exogenous network (27%). These results are in
line with the narrative that foreign intervention is an important driver of the DRC conflict.
Our contribution is related to various strands of the existing literature. It is linked to the growing
literature on the economics of networks (e.g., Bramoulle´ et al. 2014, Jackson 2008). Franke and
O¨ztu¨rk (2015) and Huremovic (2014) study strategic interactions of multiple agents in conflict
networks. Two recent papers by Hiller (2017) and Jackson and Nei (2014) study the endogenous
formation of networks in conflict models. None of these papers endogenizes the choice of fighting
effort. Also, while these articles are theoretical, our study provides a quantification of the theory
by estimating the key network externalities based on the structural equations of the theory. The
empirical strategy is related to Acemoglu et al. (2015), who estimate a political economy model
of public goods provision using a network of Colombian municipalities. Further, one of our policy
experiments is an application of the key player analysis in Ballester et al. (2006).
Our study is broadly related to the growing politico-economic literature on conflict. The papers
in this literature typically focus on two groups confronting each other (see, e.g., Rohner et al.
2013). A number of studies use a CSF (see, e.g., Grossman and Kim 1995, Hirshleifer 1989, and
Skaperdas 1996), while Esteban and Ray (2001) consider collective action problems across multiple
groups. Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) consider free riding problems in alliances. Bates et al. (2002)
distinguish between fighting and arming, which is related to our analysis of the effects of arms
embargoes. Bloch (2012) and Konrad (2011) provide excellent surveys of the literature.
Finally, our paper is related to the empirical literature on civil war, and in particular to the
recent literature that studies conflict using very disaggregated micro-data on geolocalized fighting
events, such as for example Cassar et al. (2013), Dube and Vargas (2013), La Ferrara and Harari
(2012), Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013), Rohner et al. (2013b), and (specifically on the
DRC conflict) Sanchez de la Sierra (2016).
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the theory; Section 3 discusses the context
of the Second Congo War and the data; Section 4 presents the estimation results. Section 5 per-
forms policy counterfactual analyses; Section 6 proposes an extension where the network structure
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responds to policy shocks. Appendixes A–B contain technical and empirical details, respectively.
Appendix C (available from the authors’ webpages) contains additional material.
2 Theory
2.1 Environment
We consider a population of n ∈ N agents (henceforth, groups) whose interactions are captured by
a network G ∈ Gn, where Gn denotes the class of graphs on n nodes. Each pair of groups can be in
one of three states: alliance, enmity, or neutrality. We represent the set of bilateral states by the
signed adjacency matrix A = (aij)1≤i,j≤n associated with the network G, where, for all i 6= j,
aij =

1, if i and j are allies,
−1, if i and j are enemies,
0, if i and j are in a neutral relationship.
We conventionally set aii = 0 and define the number of group i’s allies and enemies as d
+
i ≡
∑n
j=1 a
+
ij
and d−i ≡
∑n
j=1 a
−
ij , respectively, where a
+
ij = 1 if aij = 1, and a
+
ij = 0 otherwise, and similarly
a−ij = 1 if aij = −1, and a−ij = 0 otherwise.
The n groups compete for a divisible prize denoted by V , which can be interpreted as the control
over territories and natural resources. We assume payoffs to be determined by a generalized Tullock
CSF, which maps the groups’ relative fighting intensities into shares of the prize. More formally,
we postulate a payoff function πi : Gn × Rn → R given by
πi (G,x) =

ϕi(G,x)∑n
j=1 max{0,ϕj(G,x)}
V − xi, if ϕi (G,x) ≥ 0,
−D, if ϕi (G,x) < 0.
(1)
The vector x ∈ Rn describes the fighting effort of each group (the choice variable), whereas ϕi ∈ R
is group i’s operational performance (OP). The parameter D ≥ 0 is the defeat cost that groups
suffer when their OP falls below zero (as discussed below). Group i’s OP is assumed to depend on
group i’s fighting effort xi, as well as on its allies’ and enemies’ efforts. More formally, we assume
that
ϕi(G,x) = xi + β
n∑
j=1
(1− 1D(j)) a+ijxj − γ
n∑
j=1
(1− 1D(j)) a−ijxj , (2)
where β, γ ∈ [0, 1] are linear spillover effects from allies’ and enemies’ fighting efforts, respectively.
1D(j) ∈ {0, 1} is an indicator function that takes the unit value for groups accepting defeat and
paying the cost D – these groups are assumed to exert no externality. For simplicity, with a slight
abuse of notation, we henceforth set xj = 0 in equation (2) when group j accepts defeat, and omit
the indicator function. The assumption that the spillovers enter linearly into the expression of ϕi
allows us to obtain a closed-form solution. It entails some important limitations insofar as it rules
out complementarities (e.g., in the effort of different allied groups) that can be important in reality.
Equation (2) postulates that each active group’s OP is an increasing (decreasing) function of the
total effort exerted by its allies (enemies). These externalities compound with the one embedded
in the standard CSF, which equation (2) nests as a particular case when a+ij = a
−
ij = 0 for all i and
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j.1 In the rest of the paper, we normalize V to unity.2
Consider, finally, the defeat option. When the OP turns negative (for instance, because the
enemies exert high effort), a group waves the white flag and suffers the defeat cost D.3 This is a
natural assumption: too low an OP exposes groups to other armed groups’ looting and ransacking.
2.2 Nash Equilibrium
Each group chooses effort, xi, non-cooperatively so as to maximize πi (G, [xi,x−i]), given x−i. The
Nash equilibrium is a fixed point of the effort vector.
Consider a candidate equilibrium where nˆ ≤ n groups participate actively in the contest. A
necessary and sufficient condition for the optimal effort choice to be a concave problem is that, for
i = 1, 2, . . . , nˆ,
∂
∂xi
nˆ∑
j=1
ϕj = 1 + βd
+
i − γd−i > 0. (3)
In the empirical analysis below, we check that this condition holds in the empirical network for our
estimates of β and γ. When condition (3) holds, the optimal effort choice of participants satisfies a
system of First-Order Conditions (FOCs). Using equations (1)-(2), one obtains:
∂πi (G,x)
∂xi
= 0⇐⇒ ϕi =
1
1 + βd+i − γd−i
1− nˆ∑
j=1
ϕj
 nˆ∑
j=1
ϕj.
Rearranging terms allows us to obtain a simple expression for the equilibrium OP level
ϕ∗i (G) = Λ
β,γ (G)
(
1− Λβ,γ (G)
)
Γβ,γi (G) , (4)
and for the equilibrium share of the prize,
ϕ∗i (G)∑nˆ
j=1 ϕ
∗
j (G)
=
Γβ,γi (G)∑nˆ
j=1 Γ
β,γ
j (G)
, (5)
where
Γβ,γi (G) ≡
1
1 + βd+i − γd−i
> 0 and Λβ,γ (G) ≡ 1− 1∑nˆ
i=1 Γ
β,γ
i (G)
. (6)
The term Γβ,γi (G) > 0 is a measure of the local hostility level capturing the externalities associated
with group i’s first-degree alliance and enmity links. One can show that 0 < Λβ,γ (G) < 1, implying
that ϕ∗i (G) > 0. Moreover, both Γ
β,γ
i (G) and Λ
β,γ(G) are decreasing with β and increasing with
γ. Equation (5) implies that the share of the prize accruing to group i increases in the number of
its allies and decreases in the number of its enemies.
The next proposition (proof in Appendix A.1) characterizes the equilibrium.
1Consider, for example, an alliance link, akk′ = 1. Then, an increase in the effort of k
′ affects the payoff of k via
two channels: (i) the standard negative externality working through the denominator; (ii) the positive externality
working through the numerator. Thus, holding efforts constant, an alliance between two groups increases the share of
the prize jointly accruing to them, at the expense of the remaining groups. To the opposite, enmity links strengthen
the negative externality of the standard CSF.
2Note that, in equilibrium, both xi and pii are proportional to V .
3Note that we do not impose any non-negativity constraint on xi. Given the linearity of the payoff function, the
zero effort level is a matter of normalization.
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Proposition 1. Let A+ = (a+ij)1≤i,j≤n and A
− = (a−ij)1≤i,j≤n, implying that A = A
+ −A−, and
denote the corresponding subgraphs as G+ and G−, respectively, so that G = G+⊕G−. Assume that
β+γ < 1/max{λmax(G+), d−max}, where λmax (G) denotes the largest eigenvalue associated with the
adjacency matrix of the network G, and that condition (3) holds true for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Then,
∃D < ∞ such that, ∀D > D, there exists an interior Nash equilibrium such that, ∀i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
the equilibrium effort levels and OPs are given by
x∗i (G) = Λ
β,γ (G)
(
1− Λβ,γ (G)
)
cβ,γi (G) , (7)
and ϕi = ϕ
∗
i (G) ≥ 0 as given by equation (4), for nˆ = n. Here, Γβ,γi (G) and Λβ,γ (G) are defined
by equation (6), and
cβ,γ (G) ≡ (In + βA+ − γA−)−1Γβ,γ (G) (8)
is a centrality vector whose generic element cβ,γi (G) describes group i’s centrality in the network
G. Finally, the equilibrium payoffs are given by
π∗i (G) = (1− Λβ,γ(G))
(
Γβ,γi (G)− Λβ,γ (G) cβ,γi (G)
)
> −D. (9)
If, in addition, Γ0,γi > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n, then, ∃D (where D ≤ D <∞) such that, ∀D > D, the
equilibrium is unique.
The first part of the proposition yields an existence result. Condition (i) is a sufficient con-
dition for the matrix in (8) to be invertible. Equation (7) follows from the set of FOCs. For a
sufficiently large D, an equilibrium exists where all groups participate in the contest.4 Figure A.1
in the appendix provides an illustration of the existence result by displaying the payoff function
πi
(
G, [xi,x
∗
−i]
)
at the equilibrium strategy profile.
The second part of the proposition establishes that, under a stronger set of conditions, the Nash
equilibrium where all agents participate is unique. In this case, setting D sufficiently high rules out
equilibrium configurations in which a partition of groups takes the defeat option. For lower values
of D, equilibria in which some groups accept defeat may instead exist, and multiple equilibria are
possible.
2.3 Centrality and Welfare
The centrality measure cβ,γi (G) plays a key role in Proposition 1. In particular, the ratio between
the fighting efforts of any two groups equals the ratio between the respective centralities in the
network:
x∗i (G)
x∗j (G)
=
cβ,γi (G)
cβ,γj (G)
.
In Appendix A.2, we relate our centrality measure to the Katz-Bonacich centrality. Moreover,
we show that for networks in which the spillover parameters β and γ are small, each group’s fighting
effort increases, and each group’s equilibrium payoff decreases in the weighted difference between
the number of enmities (weighted by γ) and of alliances (weighted by β), i.e., d−i γ−d+i β. Intuitively,
a group with many enemies tends to fight harder and to appropriate a smaller share of the prize,
whereas a group with many allies tends to fight less and to appropriate a large share of the prize.
4The focus on an equilibrium in which all groups are active is without loss of generality. The results are identical
if there are n˜ ≤ n groups waving the white flag. In our model, inactive groups exert no externality, and can therefore
be ignored.
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To discuss normative implications of the theory, we define the total rent dissipation associated
with the conflict:
RDβ,γ(G) ≡
n∑
i=1
x∗i (G) = Λ
β,γ(G)(1 − Λβ,γ(G))
n∑
i=1
cβ,γi (G). (10)
Clearly, minimizing rent dissipation is equivalent to maximizing welfare.
In Appendix C, we also provide a simple illustration of the role of alliances and enmities for
conflict escalation in the particular case of regular networks. Regular networks have the property
that every group i has d+i = k
+ alliances and d−i = k
− enmities, namely, all groups have the same
centrality. In this case, one can show easily that effort and rent dissipation decrease (increase) in
the number of alliances (enmities).
2.4 Heterogeneous Fighting Technologies
So far, we have maintained that all groups have access to the same OP technology. This was
useful for focusing sharply on the network structure. In reality, armed groups typically differ in
size, wealth, access to arms, leadership, etc. In this section, we generalize our model by allowing
fighting technologies to differ across groups. We restrict attention to additive heterogeneity, since
this is crucial for achieving identification in the econometric model presented below. Suppose that
group i’s OP is given by:
ϕi(G,x) = ϕ˜i + xi + β
n∑
j=1
a+ijxj − γ
n∑
j=1
a−ijxj, (11)
where ϕ˜i is a group-specific shifter affecting the OP. Equation (11) will be the basis of our econo-
metric analysis, where we introduce both observable and unobservable sources of heterogeneity.
In Appendix A.3, we show that the equilibrium OP is unchanged, and continues to be given
by equation (4). Likewise, equation (5) continues to characterize the share of the prize appro-
priated by each group. Somewhat surprising, the share of resources appropriated by group i,
ϕ∗i (G)/
∑n
j=1ϕ
∗
j(G), is independent of ϕ˜i. However, ϕ˜i affects the equilibrium effort exerted by
group i and its payoff. In particular, the vector of the equilibrium fighting efforts is now given by
x∗ = (In + βA
+ − γA−)−1(Λβ,γ(G)(1 − Λβ,γ(G))Γβ,γ(G)− ϕ˜), (12)
where ϕ˜ = (ϕ˜i)1≤i≤n is the vector of group-specific shifters, and the definitions of Λ
β,γ(G) and
Γβ,γ(G) are unchanged (see Proposition 2).
3 Empirical Application - The Second Congo War
In the rest of the paper, we focus on the recent civil conflict in the DRC with the goal of providing
a quantitative evaluation of the theory. More specifically, we estimate the externality parameters
β and γ from the structural equation (11) characterizing the Nash equilibrium of the model. Then,
we perform counterfactual policy experiments and assess their effectiveness in scaling down conflict.
We start by discussing the historical context of the Second Congo War, the data sources, and the
network structure.
3.1 Historical Context
The DRC is the largest Sub-Saharan African country in terms of area, and is populated by about
75 million inhabitants. It is a failed state. After gaining independence from Belgium in 1960, it
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experienced recurrent political instability and wars that turned it into one of the poorest countries
in the world, in spite of the abundance of natural resources. The DRC is a ethnically fragmented
country with over 200 ethnic groups. The Congo conflict involves many inter-connected domestic
and foreign actors: three Congolese rebel movements, 14 foreign armed groups, and a countless
number of militias (Autesserre 2008).
The war in Congo is intertwined with the ethnic conflicts in neighboring Rwanda and Uganda.
In 1994, Hutu radicals took control of the Rwandan government and allowed ethnic militias to
perpetrate the mass killing of nearly a million Tutsis and moderate Hutus in less than one hundred
days. After losing power to the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front, over a million Hutus fled
Rwanda and found refuge in the DRC, ruled at that time by the dictator Mobutu Sese Seko.
The refugee camps hosted, along with civilians, former militiamen and genocidaires who clashed
regularly with the local Tutsi population, most notably in the Kivu region (Seybolt 2000).
As ethnic tensions mounted, a large coalition of African countries centered on Uganda and
Rwanda supported an anti-Mobutu rebellion led by Laurent-De´sire´ Kabila. The First Congo War
(1996-97) ended with Kabila’s victory. However, his relationship with his former sponsors soon
turned sour. Resenting the enormous political influence exerted by the two neighbors, Kabila first
dismissed his Rwandan chief of staff, James Kabarebe, and then ordered all Rwandan and Ugandan
troops to leave the country. New ethnic clashes soon erupted in Eastern Congo. The crisis escalated
into outright war. Rwanda and Uganda mobilized the local Tutsi population and armed a well-
organized rebel group, the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD), that took control of Eastern
Congo. The main Hutu military organization, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda
(FDLR), sided with Kabila, who also received the international support of Angola, Chad, Namibia,
Sudan, and Zimbabwe, and of the local Mayi-Mayi militias.
Officially, the Second Congo War ended in July 2003. In reality, stable peace was never achieved
(Stearns 2011), and fighting is still going on today. The conflict is highly fragmented. In Prunier’s
words, “the continent was fractured, not only for or against Kabila, but within each of the two
camps” (Prunier 2011: 187). Similarly, there was in-fighting among different pro-government
paramilitary groups, such as the Mayi-Mayi militias. The DRC army (FARDC) themselves were
notoriously prone to internal fights and mutinies, spurred by the fact that its units are segregated
along ethnic lines and often correspond to former ethnic militias or paramilitaries that got inte-
grated into the national army. In summary, far from being a war between two unitary camps, the
conflict engaged a complex web of informal alliances and enmities with many non-transitive links.
After a major reshuﬄing at the end of the First Congo War, the web of alliances and enmities
between the main armies and rebel groups has remained fairly stable in the period 1998-2010
(see Prunier 2011: 187ff). Yet, there were some notable exceptions. The relationship between
Uganda and Rwanda cracked soon after the start of the conflict, culminating in a series of armed
confrontations in the Kisangani area in the second half of 1999 and in 2000 that caused the death
of over 600 civilians (see Turner 2007: 200). The crisis spilled over to the local proxy of the
two countries: the RCD split into the Uganda-backed RCD-Kisangani (RCD-K) and the Rwanda-
backed RCD-Goma (RCD-G). After 2000, the relationship between Uganda and Rwanda lived in a
knife-edge equilibrium where recurrent tensions and skirmishes were prevented from spiraling into
a full-scale conflict (McKnight 2015).
The relationship between the FARDC and the FDLR is also troubled. In the earlier stage
of the conflict, they were allies. Things changed after Laurent Kabila was assassinated in 2001.
In 2002, a peace agreement signed at Sun City in South Africa allowed Joseph Kabila, Laurent’s
son, to remain in power in exchange for his commitment to end the support for anti-Rwandan
rebel armies in Congo. As a result, the relations with the FARDC became volatile. The FDLR
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kept engaging Tutsi forces in the Kivu region, raising concern for a new full-fledged intervention
of Rwanda. In 2009, the FDLR attacked civilians in some Kivu villages, prompting a major joint
military operation of the FARDC and Rwanda against them.5
Finally, there were numerous local rebellions which led to the formation of new groups and
break-away mutinies of pre-existing militias. An example is the 2002 revolt of the Banyamulenge,
a Congolese Tutsi group, originating from a mutiny led by Patrick Masunzu that the mainstream
Rwanda-backed RCD-G troops failed to crush.
3.2 Data
We use a panel of annual observations for the period 1998–2010 drawing on a variety of data
sources.6 The unit of analysis is at the group×year level. The summary statistics are displayed
in Table B.1. In the rest of this section, we provide a summary description of the dataset. More
details about the data construction can be found in Appendix C.
Groups – The main data source for the fighting effort and geolocalization of groups is ACLED
(www.acleddata.com).7 This dataset contains 4676 geolocalized violent events taking place in the
DRC involving on the whole 80 groups: 4 Congolese state army groups, 47 domestic Congolese
non-state militias, 11 foreign government armies, and 18 foreign non-state militias.8 A complete
list of the groups is provided in Appendix C.
Our classification of groups strictly follows ACLED. The cases of the FARDC and of Rwanda
deserve a special mention. ACLED codes each of these two actors as split into two groups by
the period of activity: “FARDC (1997-2001) (Kabila, L.)” (henceforth, FARDC-LK) and “FARDC
(2001-) (Kabila, J.)” (henceforth, FARDC-JK); “Rwanda (1994-1999)” (henceforth, Rwanda-I) and
“Rwanda (1999-)” (henceforth, Rwanda-II). In the case of the FARDC, the split is determined by
the assassination of Laurent Kabila, followed by the peace agreement of 2002 that marks the official
end of the Second Congo War. In the case of Rwanda, the threshold coincides with the deterioration
of the relationships between Uganda and Rwanda. In our baseline estimation, we do not merge
these groups since the discontinuities reflect genuine political breaking points. However, we also
consider robustness checks in which these groups are merged.
Fighting events – For each event, ACLED provides information on the location, date, and
identity of the groups involved on the same and on opposite sides. ACLED draws primarily on
three types of sources: information from local, regional, national, and continental media, reviewed
on a daily basis; NGO reports; Africa-focused news reports and analyses. ACLED data is subject
to measurement error in two dimensions. First, many events go unreported (see Van der Windt
and Humphreys 2016, discussed in more detail in Appendix C). Second, the precision of the ge-
olocalization of ACLED events has been questioned (Eck 2012).9 To address the geolocalization
issue, we supplement the information in ACLED with the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset
5See BBC News, 13 May 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8049105.stm.
6The main reason why our sample ends in 2010 is that, after this date, the intensity of conflict decreases significantly
(in 2010 there were 301 events, while in 2011 only 89), and there was some reshuﬄing of alliances. In addition, the
version of the rainfall data we use is only available until 2010.
7Recent papers using ACLED data include, among others, Berman et al. (2014), Cassar et al. (2013), Michalopou-
los and Papaioannou (2013), and Rohner et al. (2013b).
8We only include organized armed groups in the dataset and exclude other actors such as civilians. While we
start out with 100 fighting groups in the raw data, we drop all non-bilateral fighting events where no armed group
is involved in one of the two camps (e.g., events where an armed group attacks civilians). This leaves us with 80
fighting groups in the final sample.
9In a case study of Algeria 1997, she documents that 30% of events contain inaccurate geolocalization information,
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(GED) (Sundberg and Melander 2013). This dataset contains detailed georeferenced information
on conflict events, but contrary to ACLED the GED dataset only reports one armed group involved
for each side of the conflict. In addition, there are much fewer events (i.e., ca. one third) in GED
than in ACLED.
Our main dependent variable is group i’s yearly Fighting Effort, xit. This is measured as the sum
over all ACLED fighting events involving group i in year t. In the robustness section, we construct
alternative fighting effort measures by restricting the count to the more conspicuous events such as
those classified by ACLED as battles or those involving fatalities.
Rainfall – For the purpose of our IV strategy, we build the yearly average of rainfall in
each group’s homeland. We use a gauge-based rainfall measure from the Global Precipitation
Climatology Centre (GPCC, version 6, see Schneider et al. 2011), at a spatial resolution of 0.5◦×0.5◦
grid-cells. A group’s homeland corresponds to the spatial zone of its military operations (i.e., the
convex hull containing all geolocalized ACLED events involving that group at any time during
the period 1998-2010). Then, for each year t, we compute the average rainfall in the grid-cell of
the homeland centroid. Figure 1 displays the fighting intensity and average climate conditions for
different ethnic homelands in the DRC. Weather conditions vary considerably both across regions
and over time.
In the robustness section, we also consider satellite-based rainfall measures. These use atmo-
spheric parameters (e.g., cloud coverage, light intensity) as indirect measures of rainfall, blended
with some information from local gauges. The first comes from the Global Precipitation Climatol-
ogy Project (GPCP) from NOAA. The second dataset is the Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mission
(TRMM) from NASA.
Covariates – Given the large number of groups and years, we can control for time-varying
shocks affecting groups with common characteristics. To this aim, we interact time dummies with
three group-specific dummies. The first is a dummy for Government Organization that switches on
for groups that are officially affiliated to a domestic or foreign government. This dummy covers 15
groups. The second is a dummy labelled Foreign that switches on for 29 groups which are coded
as foreign actors. The third is a dummy labelled Large that switches on for groups that have at
least 10 enmity links (this corresponds to the 90th percentile of groups with non-zero numbers of
enemies). Since some results are sensitive to the definition of this variable, we also show results
with the alternative variable Large 6 that switches on for groups that have at least 6 enmity links
(this corresponds to the 85th percentile of groups with non-zero numbers of enemies).
3.3 The Network
Our primary sources of information to infer the network of enmities and alliances are: (i) the
Yearbook of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI (Seybolt 2000), (ii) “Non-
State Actor Data” (Cunningham et al. 2013), (iii) Briefing on the Congo War by the International
Crisis Group (1998), and (iv) Williams (2013). The four sources are mutually consistent and
complementary. Groups are classified as allies or enemies not only on the basis of ground fighting,
but also on that of political and logistical support (in particular, they include actors operating
in different parts of the country). The four expert sources allow us to code 80 alliances and 24
6% of events are double-counted, and 2% missing. However, the precision is higher in a case study of Burundi 2000.
There, she finds 9% of observations to have inaccurate longitude/latitude information, and 2% of observations to be
double-counted, with no events missing.
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Figure 1: Map of the DRC with average rainfall data from GPCC at a spatial resolution of 0.5◦×0.5◦ grid-cells, and number of violent
events from ACLED. Warmer colors (i.e., red) mean less rain, colder colors (i.e., blue) mean more rain. Larger circles mean more
fighting events.
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Figure 2: The figure displays the network of alliances and enmities between 80 fighting groups active in the
DRC over the 1998-2010 period.
enmities.10
The main limitation of the expert coding is that it does not cover small armed groups and
militias. For this reason, we complement its information with that inferred from the battlefield
behavior in ACLED – where ACLED is strictly subordinate to the four expert sources. In particular,
we consider two groups (i, j) as enemies if they have been observed fighting on opposite sides on at
least two occasions, and they have never been observed fighting as brothers in arms. Conversely,
we code two groups as allies if they have been observed fighting on the same side in at least one
occasion during the sample period, and if, in addition, they do not reach the enmity threshold
of two clashes against each other. We code all other dyads as neutral. A concern might be that
the construction of the network relies in part on the same ACLED data that we use to measure
the outcome variable. In this respect, one must emphasize two important features. First, for
constructing the network we exploit the bilateral information which is not used to construct the
outcome variable. Second, the network is assumed to be time-invariant (at least in the baseline
specification), whereas our econometric identification exploits the time variations in fighting efforts,
controlling for group fixed effects, as discussed in more detail below.
Altogether, we code 192 dyads as allies and 236 dyads as enemies. The remaining 5892 dyads
are classified as neutral. Figure 2 illustrates the network of alliances and rivalries in the DRC. Not
surprisingly, the FARDC have the highest centrality. In line with the narrative, the other groups
with a high centrality are Rwanda, Uganda, and the main branches of the RCD. On average, a
group has 2.95 enemies and 2.4 allies (see Table B.1).
10For the 15 actors with the greatest level of fighting involvement over the sample period, expert coding allows us
to code 43 alliances (out of 101) and 13 enmities (out of 145).
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In our baseline specification, we assume a time-invariant network, although we relax it in an
extension. As discussed above, the system of alliances underwent major changes at the end of the
First Congo War, while remaining relatively stable thereafter. The two main instances of changing
relationships discussed in Section 3.1 involve the FARDC and Rwanda. Recall that ACLED splits
the coding of Rwanda before and after 1999, and of the FARDC under Laurent and Joseph Kabila.
This distinction is useful as it provides us with some flexibility in coding the two most important
changes in the system of alliances. In particular, Rwanda-I is coded as an ally of Uganda and the
RCD, while Rwanda-II is coded as an enemy of Uganda and of the RCD-K, and as an ally of the
RCD-G. Similarly, we code the FARDC-LK and the FDLR as allies, and the FARDC-JK and the
FDLR as neutral.11 We test the robustness of the results to alternative assumptions (including
merging Rwanda and the FARDC into two unified groups).
For the other dyads, we search for patterns in ACLED that may be suggestive of an inconsistent
behavior, i.e., sometimes fighting together and sometimes against each other (see Appendix C for
details). We detect eight such cases, and among them only two suggest the possibility of a switch
in the nature of the link.12 We deal with the problematic cases in the robustness analysis. While
switching links appear to be rare, many groups are active only in few periods, and occasionally
new groups are formed out of scissions of pre-existing groups. For this reason, in Section 4.2.1 we
exploit an unbalanced sample where we allow for entry and exit of groups.
4 Econometric Model
Our empirical analysis is based on the model of Section 2.4 which allows for exogenous sources
of heterogeneity in the OP of groups. Equation (11) can be estimated econometrically if one
assumes that the individual shocks ϕ˜i comprise both observable and unobservable components.
More formally, we assume that ϕ˜i = z
′
iα + ǫi, where zi is a vector of group-specific observable
characteristics, and ǫi is an unobserved shifter. Replacing xi and ϕi by their respective equilibrium
values yields the following structural equation:
x∗i = ϕ
∗
i (G)− β
n∑
j=1
a+ijx
∗
j + γ
n∑
j=1
a−ijx
∗
j − z′iα− ǫi, (13)
where we recall that ϕ∗i is a function of the structural parameters β and γ and of the time-invariant
network structure, while being independent of the realizations of individual shocks (zj , ǫj) (see
equation (4) and the analysis in Section 2.4). Our goal is to estimate the network parameters β
and γ. The estimation is subject to a simultaneity or reflection problem, a common challenge in the
estimation of network externalities. In this class of models, it is usually difficult to separate contex-
tual effects, i.e., the influence of players’ characteristics, from endogenous effects, i.e., the effect of
outcome variables via network externalities. In our model, one might worry that omitted variables
affecting x∗i be spatially correlated, implying that one cannot safely assume spatial independence
of ǫi. Ignoring this problem would yield inconsistent estimates of the spillover parameters.
We tackle the problem through an IV strategy similar to Acemoglu et al. (2015). They study
public good provision in a network of Colombian municipalities using historical characteristics
11This accords with our coding rule (no expert coding, multiple fights on the same and opposite camps). It is
also consistent with the narrative that the FARDC has fought the FLDR more for tactical reason (i.e., to prevent
Rwanda’s direct intervention) than because of a deep hostility.
12In the other cases, there is no time pattern, and the volatile behavior appears to be the outcome of tactical
fighting. This suggests a bilateral relation that is neither an alliance nor an enmity. Hence, coding the link as neutral
seems accurate.
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of local municipalities as instruments. In our case, it is difficult to find time-invariant group
characteristics that affect the fighting efforts of a group’s allies or enemies without invalidating
the exclusion restriction. For instance, cultural or ethnic characteristics of group i are likely to
be shared by its allies. For this reason, we identify the model out of exogenous time-varying
shifters affecting the fighting intensity of allies and enemies over time. This panel approach has
the advantage that we can difference out any time-invariant heterogeneity, thereby eliminating the
problem of correlated effects.
Panel Specification – We maintain the assumption of an exogenous time-invariant network,
and assume the conflict to repeat itself over several years. We abstract from reputational effects,
and regard each period as a one-shot game. These are strong assumptions which are necessary to
make the empirical implementation feasible. The variation in conflict intensity over time is driven
by the realization of group- and time-specific shocks, amplified or offset by the endogenous response
of the groups, which, in turn, hinges on the network structure. More formally, we allow both x∗i
and ϕ˜i to be time-varying. x
∗
it corresponds to the annual number of ACLED events involving i in
year t, and
ϕ˜it = z
′
itα+ ei + ǫit. (14)
Here, zit is a vector of observable shocks with coefficients α, ei is an unobservable time-invariant
group-specific shifter, and ǫit is an i.i.d., zero-mean unobservable shock. Rainfall measures are
examples of observable shifters zit that will be key for identification. The panel analogue of equation
(13) can then be written as:
FIGHTit = FEi − β ×TFAit + γ ×TFEit − z′itα− ǫit, (15)
where FIGHTit = x
∗
it is group i
′s fighting effort at t, TFAit =
∑n
j=1 a
+
ijx
∗
jt is the total fighting
effort of group i’s allies, TFEit =
∑n
j=1 a
−
ijx
∗
jt is the total fighting effort of group i’s enemies, and
FEi = +ϕ
∗
i (G)−ei is a group fixed effect capturing both the equilibrium OP level and unobservable
time-invariant heterogeneity. This heterogeneity can be filtered out by including group fixed effects.
However, the two covariates TFA and TFE are correlated with the error terms. Thus, OLS estimates
are inconsistent due to an endogeneity bias.
Instrumental variables (IV) – The problem can be addressed by a panel IV strategy. Identi-
fication requires exogenous sources of variation in the fighting efforts of group i’s allies and enemies
that do not influence group i’s fighting effort directly. To this aim, we use time-varying climatic
shocks (rainfall) impacting the homelands of armed groups. In line with the empirical litera-
ture and historical case studies (Dell 2012), we focus on local rainfall as a time-varying shifter
of OP, and hence the fighting effort of allies and enemies. More formally, our instruments are
RAit =
∑n
j=1 a
+
ij×RAIN∗jt and REit =
∑n
j=1 a
−
ij×RAINjt, where RAINjt denotes the rainfall in
group j’s territory. Take TFE, for instance. Above-average rainfall in the homelands of group i’s
enemies (reit) reduces the enemy groups’ propensity to fighting because it increases agricultural
productivity, thereby pushing up the reservation wages of local workers to be recruited by enemy
armed groups. In other words, rainfall increases the opportunity cost of fighting. In addition, high
rainfall could pose an obstacle to war activities (e.g., through mud roads), reinforcing the oppor-
tunity cost effect. These channels linking rainfall to conflict are in line with earlier studies (e.g.,
Miguel et al. 2004). There also potential offsetting effects: rainfall can increase revenues available
to armed groups if agriculture is used as a source of taxation (see Fearon 2008). Our estimates
below suggest that in our data this effect is dominated by the others.
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To be a valid instrument, rainfall in the homelands of the allies (enemies) must be correlated
with the allies’ (enemies’) fighting efforts. We document below that this is so in the data. In
addition, rainfall must satisfy the exclusion restriction that rainfall in the homelands of group i’s
allies and enemies has no direct effect on group i’s fighting effort. A first concern is that rainfall
is spatially correlated, due to the proximity of the homelands of allied or enemy groups. However,
this problem is addressed by controlling for the rainfall in group i’s homeland in the second-stage
regression. For instance, suppose that group i has a single enemy, group k, and that the two groups
live in adjacent homelands. Rainfall in k’s homeland is correlated with rainfall in i’s homeland.
However, rainfall in k’s homeland is a valid instrument for k’s fighting effort, as long as rainfall
in i’s homeland is included as a non-excluded instrument. A potential issue arises if rainfall is
measured with error, and measurement error has a non-classical nature. We tackle this issue below
in the robustness analysis.
Two additional threats to the exclusion restriction come from internal trade and migration.
Rainfall may affect terms of trade. For instance, a drought destroying crops in Western Congo
could cause an increases in the price of agricultural products throughout the entire DRC, thereby
affecting fighting in the Eastern part of the country. Such a channel may be important in a well-
integrated country with large domestic trade. However, inter-regional trade is limited in a very
poor country like the DRC with a disintegrating government, very lacunary transport infrastructure,
and a disastrous security situation. The war itself contributed to the collapse of internal trade, as
documented by Zeender and Rothing (2010). The result is a very localized economy dominated by
subsistence farming where spillovers through trade are likely to be negligible.
Weather shocks could trigger migration and refugee flows. For instance, an averse weather
shock hitting the homeland of one of group i’s enemies (say, group k) could induces people to
move from k’s to i’s homeland. The mass of displaced people could cause tensions and ultimately
increase group i’s fighting for reasons other than changes in the fighting effort of k with a violation
of the exclusion restriction. While we have no geolocalized statistical information to rule out this
possibility, the aggregate evidence suggests that this is an unlikely issue. According to White
(2014), the quasi-totality of migration movements in the DRC in the last decades have been caused
by armed conflicts and concerns about security rather than by economic factors. For instance,
only 0.7% of migrants indicate fleeing from natural catastrophes as the motivation for fleeing their
homeland, while almost all refugees indicate that their movements are conflict- or security-related.
It therefore appears very rare in the DRC that people are induced to migrate because of the scarcity
of rain.13 Similarly, rainfall could affect the activity of bandit groups. Yet, the boundaries between
the activity of militias and bandit groups are thin in the DRC, so the activity of bandits is hardly
a separate competing factor.
Spatial Autocorrelation – Since both violent events and climatic shocks are clustered in
space, it is important to take into account spatial dependence in our data. For this reason, we
estimate standard errors with a spatial HAC correction allowing for both cross-sectional spatial
correlation and location-specific serial correlation, following Conley (1999 and 2008). However,
there is no off-the-shelf application of these methods to panel IV regressions.14 Therefore, we
13In addition, even people who are forced to move because of fighting “reportedly try to stay close to home so that
they can monitor their lands and track the local security situation.” (White 2014: 6). This means that even people
seeking shelter are unlikely to travel far away and penetrate zones of activity of other groups. An extended discussion
of migration within the DRC can be found in Appendix C.
14See Vogelsang (2011) for an asymptotic theory for test statistics in linear panel models that are robust to
heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation, and/or spatial correlation. Hsiang et al. (2011) provide a useful STATA code
to calculate spatially correlated standard errors in panel regressions. Also, IV regressions are dealt with by Jeanty
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program a STATA code that allows us to estimate Conley standard errors in a flexible fashion.15 In
the spatial dimension, we retain a radius of 150 km for the spatial kernel – corresponding to the 11th
percentile of the observed distribution of bilateral distance between groups. More specifically, the
weights in the covariance matrix are assumed to decay linearly with the distance from the central
point of a group’s homeland, reaching zero after 150 km. We impose no constraint on the temporal
decay for the Newey-West/Bartlett kernel that governs serial correlation across time periods. In
other words, observations within the spatial radius can be correlated over time without any decay
pattern. Robustness to alternative spatial and temporal kernels is explored in Appendix C.
A related challenge has been to adapt to our environment the test for weak instruments proposed
by Kleinbergen and Paap (2006), henceforth, KP. KP is a rank test of the first-stage VCE matrix
that is standardly used with 2SLS estimators and cluster robust standard errors. The statistic is
valid under general assumptions, and the main requirement is that the first-stage estimates have
a well-defined asymptotic VCE. To the best of our knowledge, the test had not been implemented
in panel IV regressions with spatial HAC correction. We tackle a similar issue for the Hansen J
overidentification test.
4.1 Estimates of the Externalities
In this section, we estimate the regression equation (15) using a panel of 80 armed groups over
1998-2010. In all specifications, we include group fixed effects and year dummies, and estimate
standard errors assuming spatial and within-group correlation as discussed above. In addition,
all specifications control for current and lagged rainfall at the centroid of the group’s homeland,
allowing for both a linear and a quadratic term.16
Table 1 displays the estimates of −β and +γ from second-stage regressions. Column 1 is an OLS
specification. An increase in the enemies’ fighting effort (TFE) is associated with a higher fighting
effort, consistent with the theory, whereas an increase in the allies’ fighting effort (TFA) has no
significant effect. Since the OLS estimates are subject to an endogeneity bias, in the remaining
columns we run a set of IV regressions. Column 2 replicates the specification of column 1 in a
2SLS setup using the lagged fighting efforts of each group’s set of enemies and allies as excluded
instruments. In accordance with the predictions of the theory, the estimated coefficients of TFE
and TFA are positive (0.13) and negative (-0.22), respectively, and statistically significant at the
5% level.
The associated first-stage regressions are reported in the corresponding columns of Table 2,
where, for presentational purposes, only the coefficients of the excluded instruments are displayed.
It is reassuring that the lagged rainfall in the enemies’ homelands has a negative effect on the
enemies’ (while not on the allies’) fighting effort, whereas the lagged rainfall in the allies’ homelands
has a negative effect on the allies’ (while not on the enemies’) fighting effort. This pattern, which
conforms with the theoretical predictions, is confirmed in all specifications of Table 2. The KP-stat
of 10.6 raises a (mild) concern about weak instruments, an issue to which we return below.
In the parsimonious specification of column 2, the coefficients of interest may be affected by some
time-varying shocks that affect asymmetrically the armed groups’ incentives to fight. For instance,
(2012). However, neither routine handles spatial correlation in panel IV regressions.
15We owe a special thanks to Rafael Lalive for his generous help in this task.
16As discussed in Section 3.2, following the ACLED coding, the FARDC and Rwanda are each split in two groups
according to the period of activity. When a group is inactive (e.g., the FARDC-JK during 1997-2001), its fighting
effort is set equal to zero. To avoid that these artificial zero observations affect the estimates of the structural
parameters β and γ, we always include in the regressions a group dummy interacted with a full set of year dummies
for the period of inactivity. In Section 4.2, we show that the estimates are robust to merging Rwanda and the FARDC
into a unique group each.
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Table 1: Baseline regressions (second stage).
Dependent variable: Total fighting
OLS
Reduced Full
Neutrals Battles
(d−, d+) GED GED
IV IV ≥ 1 coord. union
Total Fight. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Enemies (TFE) 0.066*** 0.130** 0.066*** 0.083*** 0.081*** 0.091*** 0.084*** 0.125***
(0.016) (0.057) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.022) (0.019) (0.039)
Allies (TFA) 0.001 -0.218** -0.117*** -0.114*** -0.117*** -0.157*** -0.112*** -0.117***
(0.017) (0.086) (0.035) (0.033) (0.037) (0.058) (0.032) (0.036)
Neutrals (TFN) 0.004 0.004 0.013 0.004 0.006
(0.004) (0.005) (0.013) (0.004) (0.004)
Add. controls Reduced Reduced Full Full Full Full Full Full
Estimator OLS IV IV IV IV IV IV IV
Instrum. Var. n.a. Restricted Full Full Full Full Full Full
Kleibergen-Paap n.a. 10.6 19.5 22.5 20.6 17.8 22.1 10.4
Hansen J n.a. 0.16 0.68 0.58 0.53 0.66 0.58 0.69
Observations 1040 1040 1040 1040 988 598 1040 1781
R-squared 0.510 0.265 0.579 0.568 0.567 0.537 0.569 0.516
Note: The unit of observation is an armed group in a given year. The panel contains 80 armed groups between 1998
and 2010. All regressions include group fixed effects and control for rainfall in the group’s homeland. Columns 1–3
include time fixed effects. Robust standard errors corrected for spatial HAC in parentheses. Significance levels are
indicated by * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table 2: Baseline regressions (first stage).
IV regress. of col. (2) IV regress. of col. (3) IV regress. of col. (4)
Dep. Variable: TFE TFA TFE TFA TFE TFA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rain (t− 1) Enem. -1.595*** -0.019 -1.354*** 0.277* -1.327*** 0.291**
(0.297) (0.141) (0.332) (0.156) (0.322) (0.139)
Sq. Rain (t− 1) Enem. 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** -0.000 0.000*** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Rain (t− 1) All. 0.126 -0.929*** 0.028 -0.588*** 0.089 -0.571**
(0.283) (0.155) (0.222) (0.192) (0.219) (0.225)
Sq. Rain (t− 1) All. -0.000 0.000*** -0.000 0.000*** -0.000 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Current Rain Enem. -1.125*** 0.131 -0.936*** 0.073
(0.243) (0.102) (0.257) (0.108)
Sq. Curr. Rain Enem. 0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000* -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Current Rain All. -0.461** -0.366*** -0.414** -0.448***
(0.204) (0.123) (0.210) (0.164)
Sq. Curr. Rain All. 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 10.6 10.6 19.5 19.5 22.5 22.5
Hansen J (p-value) 0.16 0.16 0.68 0.68 0.58 0.58
Observations 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040
Note: The unit of observation is an armed group in a given year. The panel contains 80 armed groups between
1998 and 2010. All regressions include group fixed effects and control for rainfall in the group’s homeland.
Columns 1-4 contain time fixed effects. Robust standard errors corrected for spatial HAC in parentheses.
Significance levels are indicated by * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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global economic or political shocks may change the pressure from international organizations, which
in turn affects mainly the war activity of foreign armies, government organizations, or more generally
of large combatant groups. To filter out such time-varying heterogeneity, in columns 3–8 we control
for three time-invariant characteristics (Government Organization, Foreign, and Large) interacted
with a full set of year dummies.17 The description of these three variables can be found in Section
3.2 above. Together with adding control variables, we expand the set of excluded instruments (i.e.,
the rainfall measures), in order to improve the predictive power of the first-stage regression.18 The
expanded set of instruments now comprises current-year and lagged-year rainfall (with a linear
and a quadratic term) of allies and enemies, as well as current and lagged rainfall of degree-two
neighbors (i.e., enemies’ enemies and allies’ enemies), both with a linear and a quadratic term.19
The estimated coefficients in column 3 continue to feature the alternate sign pattern predicted
by the theory. Their magnitude is smaller than in column 2, but the coefficients are estimated
more precisely, being statistically significant at the 1% level. In column 4, we add to the vector
of regressors TFN (Total Fighting of Neutrals), which is defined in analogy with TFA and TFE.
Hence, we now also add to the set of instruments the current and lagged rainfall in the territories of
neutral groups (both as a linear and quadratic term). Since the theory predicts that the exogenous
variation in TFN should have no effect on the dependent variable, this is a useful test of the
theoretical predictions. The prediction is borne out in the data: the point estimate of TFN is very
close to zero and statistically insignificant. The first-stage regressions yield large KP-stats (19.5 in
column 3 and 22.5 in column 4), suggesting no weak instrument problem. Column 4 is our preferred
specification and will be the basis of our robustness checks in the following sections below.
Our measure of fighting intensity is coarse insofar as it does not weigh events by the amount of
military force involved. Ideally, we would like to have information about the number of casualties
or other measures of physical destruction. However, this information is available only for very few
events. This raises the concern that the results may be driven by small events (e.g., local riots or
minor skirmishes). As discussed in Section 3.2, ACLED distinguishes between different categories
of events. In column 5, we measure fighting effort in a more restrictive fashion, by only counting
events that are classified in ACLED as battles. This addresses two issues: first, battles are less
likely to get unreported by media; second, it would be reassuring to see that the estimates of β and
γ are robust to excluding small events that represent a share of 42% of total events. The estimated
coefficients are indeed very similar when we use only information on battles, with no evidence of
weak instruments (KP=20.6).20
A related concern is that many of the 80 groups are involved only in a small number of events.
Although heterogeneity in group size is controlled for by fixed effects, one might be concerned that
the estimation of the externalities hinges on the occasional operation of small groups. In lack of a
direct measure of group size, in column 6 we restrict the analysis to the 46 groups that have at least
one friend and one enemy, proxying for being relatively important actors. This restriction reduces
17In Section 4.2.3 below, we find that some results are sensitive to the threshold used to construct the dummy
variable Large. For this reason, in Table B.2 we replicate Table 1 when Large is replaced by Large 6 (see Section
3.2). The results are robust.
18We also run the specification of column 2 with the expanded set of instruments. The estimated coefficients of
interest are 0.15 for TFE (s.e. 0.05) and -0.15 for TFA (s.e. 0.06). The KP-test yields the value 19.7.
19When we use the current and past average rainfall in enemies’ and allies’ homelands as instruments, we also
control for the current and past average rainfall in the group’s homeland in the second-stage regression. This is
important, since the rainfall in enemies’ and allies’ homelands is correlated with the rainfall in the group’s homeland.
Omitting the latter would lead to a violation of the exclusion restriction. The results are robust to including further
instruments, for instance, the allies’ allies and the enemies’ allies.
20The number of observation falls to 988, as 4 of the 80 groups drop out of the sample for never being involved in
any battles.
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the network size, causing a 40% drop in the number of observations. Reassuringly, the estimated
externalities are larger than in column 4 (β = 0.16 and γ = 0.09). The KP-stat is 17.8.
The accuracy of the geolocalization in ACLED has been questioned, as discussed in Section
3.2 above. For this reason, we integrate ACLED with information from the GED, which has
been argued to be more accurate in this respect. We cannot simply replace ACLED with GED
data because (i) the number of observations would drop by two thirds, aggravating underreporting
concerns; (ii) for each event, GED lists at most one group on each side of the clash. However, in
1090 cases it is possible to match events in GED and ACLED beyond reasonable doubt. In these
cases, we use the geolocalization in GED to identify the groups’ homelands. For the events that
cannot be matched, we continue to use the geolocalization in ACLED. The results, provided in
column 7, are indistinguishable from those in column 4 (with KP=22.1).
In addition, we use the union set of the events in GED and ACLED, i.e., we construct a larger
dataset that merges the matched events with all unmatched events in either dataset. By this
procedure, the number of fighting events increases from 4676 to 5078.21 There is also a larger
number of armed groups, 137 instead of 80. This procedure involves some heroic assumptions, and
is subject to the risk that our algorithm fails to match some events that are in fact reported by
both datasets, thereby causing an artificial duplication of events. With this caveat in mind, we find
the estimates of TFE, TFA, and TFN to be, respectively, positive, negative, and insignificant, in
accordance with the theory. The order of magnitude of the coefficients is comparable with those
in column 4, and the point estimates are in fact larger in absolute value. However, the KP-stat is
now lower (10.4). The details of the constructions of the merged dataset are in Appendix C.
The externalities are quantitatively large. Consider the estimates in column 4. The average
number of yearly events in which a group is involved is 6, and its standard deviation is 25. Hence,
a one standard deviation increase in TFE (i.e., 110 events) translates into a 0.37 increase in total
fighting (i.e., 9 events). A one standard deviation increase in TFA (i.e., 86 events) translates into
a 0.39 decrease in total fighting (i.e., 10 events). An estimate of the global effect of the network
externalities is provided in Section 5.3 below.
We have also checked that, conditional on the estimates of β and γ, condition (3) holds true for
all groups in conflict in all IV specifications of Table 2. Finally, the null hypothesis of the Hansen J
test is not rejected in any specification, indicating that the overidentification restrictions are valid.
4.2 Robustness Analysis
We run a large battery of robustness checks. here, we summarize the most important ones.
4.2.1 Variation over Time in the Network Structure
In our dataset, many groups are not active in all periods. We also observe new groups entering the
conflict at a later stage, and a few groups which stop fighting. While in the analysis of Section 4.1
we interpret zero fighting events as a low fighting effort, the absence of armed engagements could
alternatively indicate that a group does not take part in the conflict in a particular subperiod. For
this reason, in the first robustness check we address this concern by recognizing that the number
of groups that are in the network can change over time.
21In particular, of the 1641 groups in GED, 402 are very likely missing in ACLED, 1090 can be accurately matched
with very high probability to ACLED events, while 149 events are likely to refer to given events already in ACLED but
for which the match cannot be proven with high enough probability. Hence, in column 8 we follow the conservative
approach of only adding the GED events missing with very high probability in ACLED (i.e., 402 additional events)
to avoid double counting.
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Table 3: Time-varying network.
Dependent variable: Total fighting
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Total Fight. Enemies (TFE) 0.085*** 0.074*** 0.088*** 0.138*** 0.075 0.068** 0.211***
(0.022) (0.023) (0.024) (0.031) (0.048) (0.030) (0.047)
Total Fight. Allies (TFA) -0.115*** -0.097*** -0.106*** -0.212*** -0.143** -0.128*** -0.251***
(0.031) (0.025) (0.030) (0.065) (0.065) (0.041) (0.070)
Total Fight. Neutrals (TFN) 0.006 0.003 0.002 0.048** 0.022 0.006 -0.022**
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.023) (0.021) (0.010) (0.009)
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 27.1 8.7 11.7 9.2 5.5 15.3 n.a.
Hansen J (p-value) 0.61 0.48 0.60 0.71 0.74 0.51 n.a.
Observations 1040 1040 1040 469 322 637 1040
R-squared 0.603 0.634 0.594 0.501 0.627 0.594 0.179
Note: An observation is a given armed group in a given year. The panel contains 80 armed groups between 1998 and
2010. All regressions include group fixed effects and the full set of controls and instruments (like in baseline column
4 of Table 2). Columns 1-3 define windows of activity and include a group-specific dummy for periods when a group
is inactive. In column 1, inactivity is defined by expert coding combined with ACLED information. In column 2,
inactivity is defined based on ACLED information only. In column 3, inactivity is based on ACLED information +
or - 3 years. Columns 4-6 implement an ILLE estimator on the unbalanced sample of active groups only using the
same windows of activity as in columns 1-3. Column 7 performs an instrumented Tobit based on a control function
approach. Cluster robust standard errors are corrected for spatial HAC in columns 1–6 and are bootstrapped in column
7. Significance levels are indicated by * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
We use a variety of expert sources to check when each group started its activity, and when,
if at all, it ceased to be militarily active. We could gather information for 38 groups (many of
them being active in the entire period). However, no official date of establishment or disbandment
is available for informal organizations such as ethnic militias. For these groups, we construct a
window [S − ω, T + ω], where S and T are, respectively, the first and last year in which we see the
group being active (i.e., xit > 0). We add a window of ω ≥ 0 since the groups might have existed
prior to their first or after their last recorded engagement. The details of the construction of the
dataset are provided in Appendix C.
We estimate the model by the following three strategies:
1. We add to the baseline specification a set of group-specific dummies switching on in all periods
in which the group is suspected to be inactive.
2. We adjust, in addition, the estimation procedure to make it fully consistent with the structural
model. To see why, consider equations (4)–(6). When the number of groups in the network
changes over time, one must replace ϕ∗i (G) by a time-varying analogue given by
ϕ∗i,t (G;β, γ) =
(
1− 1∑n,t
i=1 Γ
β,γ
i,t (G)
)(
1∑n
i=1 Γ
β,γ
i,t (G)
)
Γβ,γi,t (G) ,
where Γβ,γi,t (G) = 1/
(
1 + βd+i,t − γd−i,t
)
. When ϕ∗i,t is time-varying, it is no longer absorbed
by the group fixed effects. However, the model can still be estimated. In particular, one can
then estimate the following regression equation:
FIGHTit = FEi + ϕ
∗
i,t (G;β, γ)− β ×TFAit + γ ×TFEit − z′itα− ǫit. (16)
Here, ϕ∗i,t can be estimated conditional on a prior for β and γ, as d
+
i,t and d
−
i,t are observable for
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all i and t. Thus, we implement the Iterated Linear Least-square Estimator (ILLE) developed
by Blundell and Robin (1999).22
3. We estimate the model using instrumented Tobit based on a control function approach.
Table 3 displays the results. All columns report analogues of column 4 in Table 1. Columns
1–3 correspond to the first approach. In column 1, the time window is set to ω = 0; in column
3, we set ω = 3; in column 2, we code as a period of possible inactivity any consecutive spell of
zeros at the beginning or at the end of the sample, using only the information from ACLED. The
estimates of β and γ are similar to those in column 4 in Table 1. The KP-stats are 25.3, 8.7, and
11.7, respectively. Columns 4–6 correspond to the second approach. In spite of a drastic sample
size reduction, the coefficients continue to have the same order of magnitude as in the baseline
table. In column 4, the coefficients are larger in absolute value, and the coefficient of TFN turns
significant, while remaining much smaller than those of TFE and TFA. In column 5, the coefficient
of TFE turns insignificant. In column 6, the results are very similar to column 4 in Table 1. The
KP-stats are 6.5, 5.5, and 15.3, respectively. The weak instruments in columns 4 and 5 are not
surprising, since the number of observations is, respectively, one third and one half of that in the
full sample. Also, this specification is very demanding, since in many cases no reported involvement
in ACLED events may indicate a low level of fighting activity rather than an outright withdrawal
from the conflict. Column 7 is based on Tobit with a control function approach for the two-stage
instrumentation. The estimated coefficients have the usual alternate sign pattern, but are now
much larger in absolute value. Overall, we find these results reassuring.
4.2.2 Alternative Specifications
In this section, we consider three sets of robustness checks. All regression tables can be found in
Appendix B.
Second-Degree IV, Salient Events, and Alternative Network Construction: A mis-
cellany of important robustness checks is summarized in Table B.3. In column 1, we use only the
rainfall in the homeland of degree-two neighbors (e.g., the rain of enemies’ enemies and of allies’
enemies) as excluded instruments, following Bramoulle´ et al. (2009).23 ,24 In column 2, we use the
information for the subperiod 1998-2002 to estimate the network links, and the panel for 2003-10
to estimate the spillover coefficients. In columns 3-4, we restrict attention to salient episodes for
which measurement error is likely to be less important. In column 3, we drop all events with
zero fatalities (while keeping events for which the number is unknown). In column 4, we restrict
22We start by guessing (β0, γ0) and ϕ
∗
i,t (G;β0, γ0) . Then, we obtain a first set of estimates (βˆ1, γˆ1) conditional on
the guess, update ϕ∗i,t(βˆ1, γˆ1), and re-estimate the model iteratively until we converge to a fixed point. Computa-
tionally, we stop the iteration as soon as ‖ (βˆn, γˆn) − (βˆn−1, γˆn−1) ‖< 0.0001 (i.e., two orders of magnitude smaller
than the estimated standard errors). While Blundell and Robin (1999) address the issue of endogenous regressors
with a control function approach (i.e., first stage estimated residuals included as regressors in the second stage), we
iterate on our 2SLS estimator that accommodates spatially clustered robust standard errors. We checked that the
control function-ILLE and 2SLS-ILLE yield identical point estimates.
23In particular, we continue to treat as excluded instruments the rainfall in the enemies’ enemies’ homelands, the
rainfall in the allies’ enemies’ homelands, and the rainfall in the neutrals’ homelands. However, the rainfall in the
enemies’ homelands and the rainfall in the allies’ homelands are treated as control variables. For all rainfall measures,
we take the linear and square term and the current rain, first lag, and second lag.
24Note that, contrary to their model, in our theory there is no reason why an instrumentation based on first-order
links should yield inconsistent estimates. As discussed above, the case for our regressions to be contaminated by
contextual effects is weak in our panel regression.
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attention to battles, riots, and violent events. In column 5, we exclude all events involving group
i when computing the total fighting efforts of allies and enemies of group i. For example, if the
LRA’s enemies are involved in 10 clashes in the year 2000, and 3 of them involve the LRA, then
the measure of TFE used in the regression would take the value of 7. In column 6, we control for
the lagged total fighting effort of both enemies and allies. In columns 7-8, we test the robustness
of the results to different definitions of enmities and alliances: in column 7, we code two groups as
enemies if they have been observed clashing on at least one occasion, and if they have never been
observed co-fighting on the same side; in column 8, we only code two groups as allied if they have
been observed co-fighting on at least two occasions during the sample period and if they have had
less than two clashes, while analogously we code them as enemies if they have fought on at least
two occasions against each other, while having had less than two co-fighting incidents. Further, in
column 9, we instrument the network links with dyadic characteristics (co-ethnicity, spatial prox-
imity of group centroids, etc.). The observed links are replaced by probabilities of link formation
as predicted by a random utility model discussed in Section 6.2 below. Finally, in column 10 we
include in the second stage regression the cubic terms of past and current rain.
In terms of results, the coefficient of TFE is always positive, highly significant, and stable.
Likewise, the coefficient of TFA is always negative and significant with the exception of column 2.
In most cases, the KP-stat is above 20. The coefficient of TFN is always very close to zero and
insignificant.
Group Definition (FARDC, Rwanda, & Others): In our benchmark analysis, we have
followed the rule of treating groups as separate entities whenever they are classified as such by
ACLED. This agnostic way of proceeding has the advantage of not requiring any discretional
coding decision. We check the robustness of our results in this dimension.25 In Table B.4, we show
that the results are robust to (i) treating the FARDC-LK and FARDC-JK as one single actor;
(ii) merging all local Mayi-Mayi militia branches into one single actor; (iii) merging Rwanda-I and
Rwanda-II into a single group; (iv) treating both the FARDC and Rwanda as two single actors.
Ambiguous Network Links: Table B.5 deals with ambiguous network links, i.e., links where
the narrative might suggest different coding than the one we used. First, we consider the fragile
relationship between Uganda and Rwanda (see Section 3.1 for historical background). In our
baseline regression, our coding rule classifies Rwanda-I and Uganda as allies (until 1999), whereas
Rwanda-II and Uganda are coded as enemies (after 1999). In columns 1 and 2, we code Rwanda
and Uganda as always neutral and always allies, respectively. In column 3, instead, we code them
as allies until 1999, and as neutral thereafter. Next, we consider another ambiguous relationship,
i.e., the FARDC vs. the FDLR. In the baseline estimates, they are first allies (until 2001), and
then neutral. Here, we assume that they are enemies after 2001 (column 4), or neutral throughout
the entire period (column 5). Other ambiguous network links are discussed in Appendix B. The
results are robust.
4.2.3 Alternative Rainfall Data
A concern with our IV strategy is that the rainfall variable may be subject to measurement error.
The GPCC data are based on interpolation on information coming from a limited number of gauges
in the DRC and neighboring countries. The ensuing classical measurement error could attenuate the
power of the rainfall instruments. A potentially more severe problem might arise if the gauge-based
25In all the robustness checks of Table B.4, we re-estimate the network for each of the different specifications.
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measure systematically underreports precipitations in war zones, e.g., because fighting destroys
gauges.
To address this concern, we turn to satellite-based rainfall estimates (tables are in the appendix).
These are not affected by the dynamics of conflict although they are typically noisier than gauge-
based measures, especially when one look at the within-cell variation over time.26 We consider two
satellite-based data series: GPCP and TRMM. GPCP is a well-established data source which has
been used in several existing studies (e.g., Miguel et al. 2004, and Bru¨ckner and Ciccone 2011.)
However, it is only available at a 2.5×2.5 resolution, which is considerably more aggregate than
GPCC. TRMM has a finer (0.25×0.25) resolution but the data quality is more controversial (see
Appendix C), especially in the within-cell time variation, which is our source of identification.
Given these premises, we make a twofold use of the satellite data. First, we use them to assess
whether gauge-based measures are biased and suffer from non-classical measurement error. Second,
we run regressions directly on GPCP and TRMM data. For the first purpose, consider the following
simple model:
RAINsatct = ψ
sat
c +RAINct + v
sat
ct ,
RAINgauct = ψ
gau
c +RAINct + v˜
gau
ct , (17)
where c denotes the grid-cell at which rainfall is measured, RAINct is the true (unobservable)
rainfall, and vsatct and v˜
gau
ct are the measurement errors. v
sat
ct is assumed to be i.i.d. The error term
of the gauge measure is potentially subject to violence-driven measurement error. This possibility
is allowed by letting v˜gauct = ξ×VIOLENCEct + vgauct , where vgauct is an i.i.d. error term. One can
eliminate rainct from the previous system of equations and obtain:
RAINgauct = ψc +RAIN
sat
ct + ξ ×VIOLENCEct + νct, (18)
where ψc = ψ
gau
c − ψsatc and νct = vgauct − vsatct are, respectively, a grid-cell fixed effect and an i.i.d.
disturbance. Our null hypothesis is that ξ = 0. If ξ 6= 0, the gauge-based measure suffers with
non-classical measurement error.
We run a regression based on equation (18), measuring violence by the number of conflicts in
ACLED. Table B.7 summarizes the results. Columns 1–4 report the results when satellite-based
rainfall measures are retrieved from TRMM. Column 1 is a cross-sectional specification; column
2 includes grid-cell fixed effects – consistent with equation (18). In columns 3 and 4, we consider
a log-linear specification where the two rainfall measures are log-scaled; this corresponds to a
multiplicatively separable specification of model (17). Finally, we replicate the same set of four
specifications in columns 5–8 with the GPCP satellite measure. Year dummies are included in all
regressions. Standard errors are clustered at the grid-cell level.27
As expected, there is a highly significant correlation between the gauge- and the satellite-
based rainfall measures. Interestingly, the within-cell correlation between GPCC and satellite data
(65% with GPCP and 61% with TRMM) is significantly smaller than the overall correlation. The
correlation between GPCP and TRMM (52%) is even lower. In no case are the estimates of ξ
different from zero, with point estimates switching signs across specifications. The hypothesis
26In a recent survey on the new climate-economy literature, Dell et al. (2014, p.750) write: ”Satellite data are note
necessarily a panacea... [they] do not directly measure temperatures or precipitation, but rather make inferences from
electromagnetic reflectivity in various wave lenght bands. A satellite-based series is not drawn from a single satellite,
but rather from a series of satellite. Sensors have changed subtly over the years and, within a particular satellite,
corrections are needed due to subtle changes in the satellite’s orbit over time and other factors.”
27Recall that the GPCP satellite measure is only available at the 2.5×2.5 degree level, i.e., for larger cells than the
two other measures that are at the 0.5×0.5 degree level. In this case, we cluster at the 2.5×2.5 cell level.
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that ξ is negative due to the destruction of gauges in battlefields is strongly rejected, especially in
specifications with grid-cell fixed effects. We conclude that there is no evidence that the gauge-based
GPCC precipitation data are subject to non-classical measurement error in the DRC.
Next, we run the main specification in Table 1 using satellite rainfall data instead of GPCC data
as instruments. Table B.8 shows the results. Since the point estimates are sensitive to the inclusion
and the definition of the control variable Large, we present six columns for each data source. Each
pair of columns corresponds to Columns 4–5 in Table 1, with the following differences: Columns
1–2 uses Large, Columns 3–4 uses Large 6, and Columns 5–6 exclude Large altogether from the
set of control variables. We aggregate the TRMM data at the 0.5 level and replace the missing
observation for 1998 with the corresponding observation from the GPCP. Panel a shows the results.
The coefficients in this panel follow the pattern of columns 4–5 in Table 1. They have the expected
alternate sign, and are in most cases statistically significant, although some are smaller in absolute
value. Panel b shows the results using GPCP. All coefficients have the expected signs but the
coefficients of TFE are in some cases small and insignificant. The low KP-Stats suggest a potential
weak instrument problem. This is not unexpected given the higher level of aggregation of the
GPCP. Finally, panel c shows the result of regressions where we include both TRMM and GPCP
rainfall data as instruments. This is a reasonable choice, since the time-series correlation between
the two series is rather low, implying that there is signal in including both measures. The effects
are consistent with those in panels a–b, although they are more precisely estimated.
In summary, the regressions using satellite data as instruments broadly confirm those from
GPCC but are more fragile. We suspect that this is due to the coarser aggregation in the GPCP
data, and to the noisier nature of the within-cell variation of TRMM, in line with the meteorology
literature discussed in Appendix C.
4.2.4 Measurement Error
Another concern here is that the network may be measured with error. Chandrasekhar and Lewis
(2016) show that measurement error of network links can give rise to inconsistent estimates. More-
over, the bias can work in different directions, and there is no general recipe to correct it. To address
this issue, we follow a Monte Carlo approach based on rewiring links in the observed network at
random, and measuring the robustness of our estimates in such perturbed networks. We consider
different assumptions about the extent and nature of measurement error of the network. All tables
are in the appendix.
In our first exercise, we postulate a data generating process, and then we introduce a model
of mismeasurement of network links. Then, we estimate the model as if the econometrician did
not know the true network, but had to infer it from data measured with error. This procedure is
generated for 1,000 realizations of measurement error. The results are reported in Table B.9 and the
procedure is explained in more detail in Appendix C. The general lesson from this exercise is twofold.
First, the Monte Carlo-generated measurement error in the links leads to an attenuation bias.
Thus, if some information about existing links is missing, our regression analysis underestimates
the spillover effects. Second, the extent of the bias is quantitatively modest. A measurement
error of the order of 10% (which we regard as fairly large) yields an underestimate of the spillover
parameters of 12% for β and 23% for γ.
In our second exercise, instead of assuming that some network links are missed, we bootstrap
the entire analysis. In each Monte Carlo trial, first, we sample the ACLED events with replacement;
then, we construct fake networks based on expert coding supplemented with the ACLED resampled
events; then, we rebuild our main outcome variable, FIGHTit, the explanatory variables TFAit and
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TFEit, and the related rainfall measures; finally we estimate all the specifications of the baseline
Table 1 and store the relevant point estimates. This procedure is repeated 1,000 times in order to
get the sampling distribution of each coefficient of interest. Table B.10 displays the results. The
rows report the mean/standard errors of the sampling distribution for each coefficient of interest
across the columns of Table 1. Visual inspection confirms that the bootstrap results are very similar
to the baseline ones.
Finally, we check the effect of measurement error that is correlated with the group size. In
particular, ACLED could systematically underreport events involving small groups. Although
events involving small groups are also likely to be less significant, it is useful to study this possibility.
We proceed by removing from the ACLED dataset events involving small groups (i.e., with a total
number of enemies and allies strictly below the median) with a given binomial probability that is
constant across Monte Carlo trials. Then, we operate as above by considering the fake ACLED
dataset for coding the network, the IVs, etc. Table B.11 shows that there is a very mild attenuation
bias. Even when 50% of times the participation of small groups goes unrecorded, the estimated
coefficients of TFA, TFE, and TFN are very close to our baseline (col. 4 of Table 1) estimates. We
conclude that under measurement of events involving small groups is not a major problem.
5 Policy Interventions
In this section, we perform counterfactual policy experiments. First, we consider interventions that
selectively induce some fighting groups to exit the contest. Next, we consider policies (such as an
arms embargo) that increase the marginal cost of fighting for selected groups. Finally, we study
the effect of pacification policies, where enmity links are selectively turned into neutral ones.
The analysis is based on the simulation of counterfactual equilibria. To this aim, let Gb denote
the benchmark network in which all groups fight. We maintain V = 1, and set the externality
parameters equal to their baseline point estimates βˆ ≈ 0.083 and γˆ ≈ 0.114 (column 4, Table 1).28
Since the parameters are estimated with error, and the point estimates vary to some extent across
specifications, the results must be taken with a grain of salt. We view the analysis as a useful
illustration of the quantitative predictions of the theory as well as a tentative indication of the
effects of alternative policy interventions in the Congo conflict.
The equations (6) and (13)–(15) allow us to estimate ei, the time-invariant unobserved hetero-
geneity. More formally:
eˆi = −F̂Ei + Λβˆ,γˆ(Gb)
(
1− Λβˆ,γˆ(Gb)
)
Γβˆ,γˆi (G
b), (19)
where F̂Ei is the estimated group fixed effect, Γ
βˆ,γˆ
i (G
b) = 1/(1 + βˆd+i − γˆd−i ), and Λβˆ,γˆ(Gb) =
1−1/(∑j Γβˆ,γˆj (Gb)). We collapse the vector of time-varying shifters zit (rainfall, etc.) to its sample
average, z¯i =
∑2010
t=1998
zit
13 , and denote by Z¯ = {z¯i} the estimated matrix of shifters. In other words,
we compare an average year of conflict in the benchmark model to its corresponding counterfactual.
We consistently set the time-varying i.i.d. shocks ǫit to zero for all groups.
Following the analysis in Section 2.4, the vector of (Nash) equilibrium fighting efforts is obtained
by inverting the system of equilibrium conditions implied by equations (13) and (14). In matrix
form, this yields:
x∗(Gb) = (I+ βˆA+(Gb)− γˆA−(Gb))−1
[
Λβˆ,γˆ(Gb)(1− Λβˆ,γˆ(Gb))Γβˆ,γˆ(Gb)− (Z¯α̂+ ê)
]
. (20)
28All second-order conditions (cf. equation (3)) continue to hold for all groups in the counterfactual experiments
in which one player is removed.
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Based on this equilibrium, we evaluate the effects of unanticipated policy shocks that affect
either the network Gb or some exogenous parameters. We measure the welfare effects by the
counterfactual changes in rent dissipation as defined in equation (10).
5.1 Removing Armed Groups
Consider a policy intervention that induces some groups to leave the contest. Formally, this corre-
sponds to a targeted exogenous subsidy to exit that decreases group i’s exit cost from D to D−Wi.
This intervention can entail both the stick and the carrot. On the one hand, targeted military
operations from international peace-keeping forces may increase the cost of staying in the contest.
On the other hand, the promise of impunity to militia commanders or the prospective integration
in the political process of the DRC may increase the attractiveness of leaving the contest. We
assume the policy treatment to be sufficiently strong to induce the targeted groups to leave, and
study which intervention would be most effective in reducing rent dissipation.
The analysis bears a close similarity with the key-player analysis in Ballester et al. (2006).
In their language, a key player is the agent whose removal triggers the largest reduction in rent
dissipation. Proposition 3 in Appendix C establishes formally that in our model the identity of the
key player is related to our centrality measure defined in equation (8).29
We start with policies targeting single groups. We exclude the FARDC and the DRC police
from the set of potential targets (although we retain mutinies), because we do not view removing
local government organizations as a policy-relevant option.30 Table 4 summarizes the results for the
15 groups whose removal yields the largest reduction in rent dissipation at the baseline estimates of
column 4 in Table 1. These groups include the most important actors in the conflict. If we exclude
the activity of the FARDC, they jointly account for 82% of the total fighting. A complete list of
the groups is provided in Table C.1. For each group, we report the number of its enemies and
allies, the observed share in total fighting x∗k
(
Gb
)
/
∑n
i=1 x
∗
i
(
Gb
)
, the reduction in rent dissipation
(−∆RDβˆ,γˆK ) associated with its removal, and a multiplier defined as the ratio between the reduction
in rent dissipation and the share in total fighting. The multiplier is a useful measure of the impact
of the policy weighted by the importance of the group being removed. The fourth and fifth columns
are evaluated at the baseline estimates of β and γ of column 4 in Table 1. In the last two columns,
we report intervals centered on the baseline estimates with the range of plus and minus one standard
deviation. More precisely, we set (βˆ, γˆ) ≈ (0.085, 0.063) and (βˆ, γˆ) ≈ (0.142, 0.103). This yields a
range of variation of the effects as the externality parameters change.
Two findings are noteworthy. First, although there is a high correlation between the observed
contribution of each group to total fighting and the reduction in total fighting associated with its
removal, the correlation is significantly below unity for the most active groups. For instance, this
correlation is 83% in the subsample of the ten most active groups. Second, there is heterogeneity in
the multipliers. Rwanda-backed RCD-G, the most active armed group, accounts for less than 9%
of the total military activity in the data. Its removal would reduce aggregate fighting by over 15%,
with a multiplier of 1.7. Likewise, Uganda-backed RCD-K accounts for 6% of military activity.
29More formally, let K denote a vector comprising a subset of cardinality k of the n groups (where 1 ≤ k < n). We
denote by Gb\{K} the network after removing the subset K. The vector of equilibrium fighting efforts is given by
equations which are analogous to equation (20) except that the dimension of the system is reduced by k, the adjacency
matrix is A(Gb\{K}), and the parameters attached to the network structure are replaced by Λβˆ,γˆ(Gb\{K}) and
Γβˆ,γˆ(Gb\{K}). We compute the rent dissipation before and after the removal of the subgroup K. The change in rent
dissipation equals ∆RDβˆ,γˆK ≡ RD
βˆ,γˆ
(
Gb\{K}
)
− RDβˆ,γˆ
(
Gb
)
, where RDβˆ,γˆ
(
Gb\{K}
)
≡
∑k
i=1 x
∗
i
(
Gb\{K}
)
.
30In addition, we consider the Rwandan army as a single entity, namely, we always simultaneously remove the two
separate groups associated by ACLED to Rwanda.
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Table 4: Welfare effects of removing individual armed groups.
Group # Enmities # Allies Share fight. −∆RD Multipl.
−∆RD Multipl.
(± 1 SD) (± 1 SD)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
RCD-G 14 4 0.087 0.151 1.7 [0.125, 0.181] [1.4, 2.1]
RCD-K 13 5 0.060 0.094 1.6 [0.070, 0.151] [1.2, 2.5]
Rwanda 17 9 0.053 0.066 1.2 [0.053, 0.109] [1.0, 2.0]
LRA 6 1 0.041 0.056 1.4 [0.038, 0.115] [0.9, 2.8]
FDLR 5 6 0.066 0.055 0.8 [0.059, 0.044] [0.9, 0.7]
Mayi-Mayi 6 7 0.057 0.046 0.8 [0.054, 0.022] [1.0, 0.4]
Uganda 13 9 0.043 0.043 1.0 [0.038, 0.048] [0.9, 1.1]
CNDP 3 2 0.043 0.041 0.9 [0.041, 0.040] [0.9, 0.9]
MLC 7 4 0.031 0.039 1.3 [0.026, 0.074] [0.8, 2.4]
UPC 5 1 0.022 0.030 1.4 [0.018, 0.057] [0.8, 2.6]
Lendu Ethnic Mil. 6 3 0.024 0.022 0.9 [0.039, -0.012] [1.6, 0.5]
Mutiny FARDC 3 2 0.016 0.016 1.0 [0.009, 0.045] [0.6, 2.8]
Interahamwe 7 5 0.014 0.014 1.0 [0.024, -0.017] [1.7, 1.2]
ADF 3 4 0.013 0.012 0.9 [0.011, 0.017] [0.8, 1.3]
FRPI 2 1 0.009 0.010 1.1 [0.003, 0.031] [0.4, 3.7]
Note: The computation of the counterfactual equilibrium is based on the baseline point estimates of column 4
in Table 1. For each group, we report the number of its enemies and allies (cols. 1-2); the observed share of total
fighting involving this group (col. 3); the counterfactual reduction in rent dissipation associated with its removal
(col. 4); a multiplier defined as the ratio of col. 4 over col. 3 (col. 5); the reduction in RD and its associated
multiplier for a set of parameters equal to the baseline estimates ±1 SD (cols. 6-7).
Its removal would reduce fighting by more than 9%, with a multiplier of 1.6. Removing the LRA
would reduce rent dissipation by 6%, a larger effect than that from removing more active groups
such as the FDLR, the Mayi-Mayi militia, and the CNDP.
In Tables C.8 and C.9, we consider the effect of a simultaneous removal of two and three
groups, respectively. For instance, we find that removing Rwanda and its closest ally, the RCD-G,
yields a 24% reduction in fighting activity, significantly larger than their 14% contribution to total
violence. There is some complementarity in the joint intervention: the effect of their joint removal
is 12% larger than the sum of the individual effects. In the case of three groups, the most effective
intervention is the removal of Rwanda in combination with the RCD-G and the CNDP (-29.5%,
with a multiplier of 1.6), two of Rwanda’s allies.
Finally, consider the effect of targeting selected subsets of armed groups that have particular
connections with each other. The upper panel of Table 5 summarizes the results. At the baseline
estimates, removing the 29 groups with a foreign affiliation reduces rent dissipation by 27%, in
line with their share in total fighting. We show below that the effect of this intervention increases
significantly when we allow an endogenous adjustment of the network. Removing the 11 groups
involved in the Ituri conflict causes a reduction in rent dissipation of 9%.31 Removing the 6 groups
associated with the Hutu exodus of Rwanda scales down conflict by a mere 9% (lower than the
observed activity of these groups). Removing Uganda, Rwanda, and all their associates reduces
fighting by 46%, significantly more than the contribution of these groups to conflict in the data.
Finally, removing the 16 groups with more than five enemies reduces fighting by 68%. This is a
31Ituri is a province of north-eastern DRC that has witnessed a long-lasting conflict between the agriculturalist
Lendu and pastoralist Hema ethnic groups. The apex of the conflict was in 1999-2003, although it continues at a
lower level until the current days. The groups involved in this conflict for which we have information include: Front
for Patriotic Resistance of Ituri, Hema Ethnic Militia, Lendu Ethnic Militia, Nationalist and Integrationist Front,
Ngiti Ethnic Militia, Party for the Unity and Safekeeping of Congo’s Integrity, Popular Front for Justice in Congo,
Revolutionary Movement of Congo, Union of Congolese Patriots.
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Table 5: Welfare effects of removing selected subsets of armed groups.
Set of Groups
# Sh.
−∆RD Multiplier MAD
New enm. & all. Regression coeffs.
groups fight. (at the median) [enmities,alliances]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
EXOGENOUS NETWORK
Foreign Groups 29 0.280 0.268 1.0 – – –
Ituri 9 0.086 0.094 1.1 – – –
Out of Rwanda 6 0.092 0.087 0.9 – – –
Rwa&Uga&ass. 10 0.336 0.456 1.4 – – –
Large Groups 16 0.802 0.677 0.8 – – –
WITH ENDOGENOUS NETWORK RECOMPOSITION
Foreign Groups 29 0.280 0.412 1.5 0.029 [-11, +8] [-0.010, +0.008]
Ituri 9 0.086 0.094 1.1 0 [+0, +0] [-0.003, +0.011]
Out of Rwanda 6 0.092 0.117 1.3 0.031 [0, +2] [-0.009, +0.011]
Rwa&Uga&ass. 10 0.336 0.332 1.0 0.044 [+3, -6] [-0.011, +0.011]
Large Groups 16 0.802 0.719 0.9 0.008 [0, +9] [-0.003, +0.002]
Note: The computation of the counterfactual equilibrium is based on the baseline point estimates of column 4
in Table 1. For each policy experiment, we display the results with an exogenous network (top panel) and the
results with an endogenous network recomposition based on 1,000 Monte Carlo simulations (bottom panel).
For each experiment, we report the set of removed groups (col. 1); the number of removed groups (col. 2);
the observed share of total fighting involving this set of groups (col. 3); the counterfactual reduction (or its
median in the bottom panel) in rent dissipation associated with their removal (col. 4); a multiplier defined
as the ratio of col. 4 over col. 3 (col. 5); the Median Absolute Deviation in reduction in RD (col. 6); the
post-recomposition number of new enmities and alliances at the median Monte Carlo draw (col. 7); the OLS
coefficients of enmities and alliances of a regression across Monte Carlo draws of post-recomposition reduction
in RD on reduction in RD (exogenous network) and the post-recomposition numbers of new enmities and
alliances (col. 8).
large share, though lower than the 80% share of total fighting they account for in the data. In
this case, the model predicts some crowding-in of violence from the surviving groups. Overall,
these findings confirm the wisdom that the fragmentation in the DRC conflict makes it difficult for
international organizations to deliver a single decisive blow.
5.2 Arms Embargo
Forcing armed groups out of the contest may be very costly or even politically infeasible. In this
section, we study the effect of a less radical policy that increases the marginal cost of fighting
for targeted groups without removing them from the contest. We interpret this intervention as
targeted sanctions such as an arms embargo, which constrains the stock of arms and ammunitions
at the target groups’ disposal, or force them to acquire extra equipment at higher prices in the
black market. Formally, we increase the fighting cost in equation (1) from −xi to − (1 + si) xi,
where si is the policy parameter capturing the size of the intervention. We continue to measure
total rent dissipation as the sum of the fighting efforts of all groups, ignoring the additional cost
suffered by the armed groups per unit of fighting. A formal analysis of the equilibrium conditions
is provided in Appendix C.
Consider policies targeting individual groups. Figure 3 summarizes the results of a tenfold
increase in the marginal cost (i.e., si = 9). The most significant gains accrue from targeting the
two RCD factions, followed by Rwanda and by the LRA. Interestingly, the effects are never large.
An embargo on the RCD-G or one on the RCD-K cause, respectively, a 3% and 2% reduction in
total fighting. The interventions have a sizeable effect on the group targeted, typically inducing
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Figure 3: The figure shows the decrease in rent dissipation (relative to the baseline equilibrium) associated
with an arms embargo policy targeting each individual group (except the FARDC) separately by setting si =
9. Groups are rank-ordered from the largest to the smallest decrease in rent dissipation. A negative number
means that targeting a particular group yields an increase in rent dissipation relative to the benchmark.
a reduction in their fighting activity by 40-60%. However, the non-targeted groups typically fight
more, resulting in modest welfare gains. In some cases, embargoes are even counterproductive.
We also consider simultaneously removing multiple groups. Surprisingly, it is never optimal to
target many groups. For low levels of si, it is optimal to set an embargo on six groups. However,
as we increase si, the cardinality of the optimal number of groups falls. For si ≥ 16, it becomes
optimal target only a single group.32
In summary, the welfare gains of policies that increase fighting costs are small. This result is
in line with the skeptical conclusions of studies on the impact of arms embargoes such as Tierney
(2005). Recall that in this section we have maintained a prohibitive cost of decommissioning, and
only focused on the effect of the policy on an intensive margin. To the extent to which an arms
embargo induces a group to drop out of the conflict, the results of Section 5.1 apply.
5.3 Pacification Policies
In this section, we study the effect of pacification policies aimed at reducing bilateral (or multi-
lateral) ethnic and political hostility between groups. More formally, we turn some enmities into
neutral links. We view this analysis as especially policy relevant. International organizations may
decide to invest in bringing hostile groups to the negotiating table or in de-escalating specific parts
of the conflict, subject to limited economic or diplomatic resources (see Hoerner et al. 2015). The
analysis casts light on which interventions would be most effective.
To provide a benchmark for the potential scope of pacification policies, consider first a drastic
counterfactual in which all enmity links are rewired into neutral ones. The effect is large: aggregate
fighting is reduced by 65% at the baseline estimates of β and γ. Since wiping out all enmities in
the DRC would be utopian, we consider more realistic interventions targeting specific links.
We first consider the effect of pacifying enmity links vis-a-vis the FARDC and the DRC police.
Table 6 summarizes the results for the 15 groups whose pacification yields the largest reduction in
rent dissipation at the baseline estimates. These 15 groups account for 71% of the conflict with the
32To see why, consider the case in which si = 25 and the RCD-G is subject to an arms embargo. Consider a policy
which also targets a second group, the CNDP. Relative to the optimal policy, the fighting effort of the CNDP falls
by a fourth. However, the gain is offset by a generalized increase in the fighting of the other groups, and by some
bouncing back of the RCD-G effort. Overall, the net effect is more rent dissipation than if the RCD-G were targeted
alone. This example is representative of the typical effect of targeting several groups.
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Table 6: Welfare effects of pacifying individual armed groups with the FARDC.
Group
Sh. Sh. bilat.
−∆RD Multiplier
−∆RD Mutipl.
fight. fight. (± 1 SD) (± 1 SD)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rwanda 0.053 0.010 0.063 6.0 [0.040, 0.140] [3.8, 13.5]
RCD-G 0.087 0.030 0.056 1.9 [0.033, 0.132] [1.1, 4.4]
RCD-K 0.060 0.030 0.050 1.6 [0.028, 0.125] [0.9, 4.1]
LRA 0.041 0.023 0.037 1.6 [0.022, 0.088] [1.0, 3.9]
MLC 0.031 0.019 0.034 1.8 [0.020, 0.086] [1.1, 4.6]
Uganda 0.043 0.006 0.031 5.7 [0.020, 0.062] [3.7, 11.2]
UPC 0.022 0.002 0.024 11.2 [0.014, 0.053] [6.6, 24.9]
Mutiny FARDC 0.016 0.015 0.023 1.6 [0.015, 0.054] [1.0, 3.6]
CNDP 0.043 0.038 0.019 0.5 [0.013, 0.033] [0.4, 0.9]
Lobala Mil. 0.001 0.000 0.017 52.7 [0.011, 0.039] [32.8, 119.7]
FPJC 0.006 0.006 0.017 2.6 [0.010, 0.037] [1.7, 5.8]
FRPI 0.009 0.007 0.017 2.4 [0.010, 0.037] [1.5, 5.3]
BDK 0.002 0.002 0.016 8.1 [0.010, 0.036] [5.2, 18.3]
Enyele Ethnic Mil. 0.001 0.001 0.016 24.2 [0.010, 0.035] [15.3, 54.6]
Munzaya Ethnic Mil. 0.001 0.000 0.016 32.3 [0.010, 0.035] [20.4, 72.7]
Note: The computation of the counterfactual equilibrium is based on the baseline point estimates
of column 4 in Table 1. For each group, we report the observed share of total fighting involving
this group (col. 1); the observed share of total fighting involving this group against the FARDC
(col. 2); the counterfactual reduction in rent dissipation associated with its pacification (col. 3); a
multiplier defined as the ratio of col. 3 over col. 2 (col. 4); the reduction in RD and its associated
multiplier for a set of parameters equal to the baseline estimates ±1 SD (cols. 5-6).
FARDC (and for 70% of the total fighting in the DRC excluding the activity of the FARDC). A
complete list is provided in Appendix C.
For each group, we report the observed share in total fighting, the share of total bilateral fighting
involving this group and the FARDC, the change in rent dissipation associated with pacifying the
link between this group and all factions of the FARDC, and a multiplier, defined as the ratio
between the third and second columns. Here, the multiplier measures the impact of the policy
relative to the size of the conflict between the targeted group and the FARDC. A multiplier of one
then means that the pacification yields a mere suppression of the bilateral conflict between two
groups. Interestingly, with the exception of the CNDP, all multipliers are well above one, and in
some cases are very large. This indicates that pacification induces important spillovers through the
network.
The largest absolute gain stems from pacifying the FARDC with Rwanda (6% reduction in
fighting), despite the fact that direct military operations between the two armies account for only
1% of total violence. The multiplier of 6 is similar to that of Uganda. Pacifying the FARDC with
the two main branches of the RCD is also important. The analysis also identifies a set of small
ethnic militias whose pacification with the FARDC would be very effective. In Appendix C, we
show the effect of the simultaneous pacification of multiple groups.
We also study the effect of pacifying the same subconflicts discussed in Table 5 above. Here,
the policy treatment consists of reconciling all enmities both vis-a-vis the FARDC and between
the actors in each subconflict. The reconciliation of all foreign groups yields a reduction in rent
dissipation of 18%. Interestingly, the reconciliation of the Ituri conflict reduces rent dissipation by
10% – a larger effect than that of wiping out all groups in Table 5. The reconciliation of all groups
associated with Uganda and Rwanda yields a 24% reduction in violence.
Finally, we study the effect of pacifying inter- and intra-ethnic conflicts between Hutu- and
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Tutsi-affiliated groups.33 First, we consider rewiring all inter- or intra-Hutu-Tutsi enmities to
neutrality. The effect is a reduction in conflict of 9%. The effect becomes much larger if one rewires
all bilateral Hutu-Tutsi links to neutrality and all Hutu-Tutsi co-ethnic links to friendships. In this
case, the conflict is reduced by 21%.
6 Endogenous Network Recomposition
In the analysis thus far, we have maintained the assumption of an exogenous network structure,
implicitly assuming that alliances and enmities can be traced back to historical relations among
groups that are not affected by the warfare dynamics. In some cases (e.g., the historical tensions
between Hutus and Tutsis), this is a reasonable assumption. In other cases, such as the alliances
forged during the First Congo War, relationships are more malleable. The exogenous network is
problematic when we run counterfactual policy experiments. For instance, removing Rwanda or
Uganda would likely affect the system of alliances within the DRC.
Ideally, one would like to model a fully endogenous network. There are two main difficulties
in our environment. First, for many pairs information is scant, limiting our ability to predict the
nature of the link. Second, enmities are by design difficult to rationalize in terms of payoffs, as they
often harm both parties involved. Therefore, in a model of endogenous network formation it would
be natural to dissolve such links. Since these disadvantageous links exist and persist in the data,
they must stem from (often unobservable) historical factors such as grievances over past conflicts.
In this section, we construct a model of semi-endogenous network formation that predicts the
resilience of network links to exogenous policy shocks. We postulate a discrete choice Random
Utility Model (RUM) where each pair of groups selects the bilateral link (either enmity, alliance, or
neutrality) in order to maximize utility. We make the strong assumption that the formation of the
link {i, j} depends on the characteristics of i and j, including their position in the network, being
otherwise independent of all other links. The assumption of conditional independence could be
violated in microfounded models where each group rationally decides which links to add or break,
and spillovers across different decisions arise.
Our approach is close in spirit to Fafchamps and Gubert (2007), although in their papers
interactions between groups have a binary nature. It is also close to Leskovec et al. (2010), who
use a logistic regression to estimate signed networks, and to Jiang (2015), who studies a stochastic
block model for signed graphs.
6.1 Random Utility Model
We estimate a choice model of link formation that is based on the following RUM:
Uij(a) = α× CSFij(a) +Xij × ξ(a)+Zij × ζ(a)+FEi(a) + FEj(a) + u˜ij(a), (21)
where a ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, and Uij is the joint utility of dyad ij associated with the alternative a.
Each dyad chooses the link that maximizes its surplus, a∗ij = argmaxUij(a). We abstract from
distributional issues by assuming that each dyad makes the efficient choice and can then arrange
within-dyad transfers so as to ensure that the choice is acceptable to both parties. The utility of
each of the three alternatives depends on observable and unobservable factors comprising:
1. CSFij(a), the equilibrium joint payoff of the dyad ij in the second stage CSF game (equation
1) where the network structure has alternative a for link {i, j}, the other network links being
33We code Tutsi and Hutu affiliation following the ethnic group data from Cederman et al. (2009). In our sample,
14 groups are ethnical Tutsis, and 11 are ethnical Hutus.
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unchanged. CSFij can be inferred from our structural equation (20) once the parameters β
and γ are known and the network structure G is adjusted for alternative a.
2. Xij , a vector of dyad-specific characteristics including the spatial distance between the cen-
troids of i and j, and categorical variables capturing the fact that they are affiliated to the
same ethnic group (from Cederman et al. 2009), and whether they have a common or oppo-
site Tutsi-Hutu background, whether at least one of them is a foreign army, whether at least
one of them is a government actor. These characteristics are likely predictors of patterns of
alliance or enmity. For instance, the Hutu-Tutsi antagonism is expected to increase the utility
associated with a = −1.
3. Zij , network-dependent characteristics, in the spirit of Leskovec et al. (2010) that are likely
to have a systematic effect on the nature of the link. These comprise the number of common
allies and common enemies of i and j, and the number of common conflicting neighbors
(namely, i’s enemies that are j’s allies, or vice versa).
4. Alternative-dependent group fixed effects FEi(a) that capture the unconditional propensity
of i to form the alternative a.
5. u˜ij(a), random utility shocks assumed to have a type I extreme value distribution.
This model is estimated by maximum likelihood as a standard conditional logit estimator. We
run an alternative-specific conditional logit for aij = +1 (alliance) and aij = −1 (enmity), setting
neutrality as the reference state. This yields an estimated probability that the link {i, j} is an
alliance, resp. an enmity, relative to neutrality. The estimation results are reported in Appendix
Table B.12.
The coefficient α – the only coefficient that is not alternative-specific – is insignificant, implying
that conflict-specific payoffs under the different alternatives have very low predictive power. This
finding is reassuring, being consistent with our assumption that the network structure is exogenous
to our baseline CSF game. In contrast, both Xij and Zij have significant explanatory power, with
signs broadly in line with prior expectations. In particular, if i is Hutu and j is Tutsi (or vice versa)
the probability that i and j are enemies is significantly higher than that they are allies or have a
neutral relationship. As expected, spatial proximity is a strong positive predictor of both alliances
and enmities. Moving to network-dependent characteristics, if i and j have common enemies, it
is more likely that they are allies and less likely that they are enemies (both effects being highly
significant). Similarly, if they have relationships of opposite sign with a third group (e.g., i is an
enemy of k, while j is an ally of k), then, i and j are more likely to be enemies and less likely to be
allies. More surprisingly, common alliances decrease the probability for the two groups to be allied
– the effect on being enemies being close to zero. This is in line with the narrative that many links
are non-transitive. The model fits the data well. Appendix B provides details about the goodness
of fit.
6.2 Re-estimating the Model using the Network Structure Predicted by the RUM
The main goal is to use the RUM to predict the changes in the network structure induced by
policy shocks. Before turning to that, we take a brief de-tour to re-estimate the model using the
network structure predicted by the RUM as an instrument for the observed network. Consider
the regression equation (15), and in particular the IV regression where TFEit and TFAit are
instrumented by the rainfall in allies’ and enemies’ territories. Here, we replace REit and RAit by
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R̂Eit =
∑n
j=1 pˆ
−
ij×RAINjt and R̂Ait =
∑n
j=1 pˆ
+
ij×RAINjt, where pˆ−ij ∈ [0, 1] and pˆ+ij ∈ [0, 1] are the
probabilities that groups i and j are allies and enemies as predicted by the RUM.34 Relative to the
baseline estimation, pˆ−ij and pˆ
+
ij replace the (observed) links, a
+
ij and a
−
ij , in the construction of the
instruments for the 2SLS estimator. Thus, the exogenous source of variation is the rainfall shocks
in other groups’ territories and the set of dyadic characteristics (ethnicity, spatial proximity, etc.)
and network-specific covariates in equation (21). Note that the results are robust to restricting the
RUM to the set of dyadic characteristics only.
The results are shown in column 9 of Table B.3, which displays the analogue of the baseline
estimation in column 4 of Table 1.35 The coefficients are in the ball park of the baseline estimates.
The coefficients of TFE and TFA are, respectively, 0.11 (s.e. 0.03) and -0.11 (s.e. 0.05). In spite
of the low KP-stat of 4 indicating a weak instrument problem, we find the results reassuring, given
the challenge of estimating a complex network like the one in the DRC war.
6.3 Endogenous Network Adjustments After Policy Shocks
In this section, we use our estimated choice model of link formation to predict the changes in the
network structure triggered by policy shocks. This intervention affects both CSFij(a) and Zij in
equation (21), which in turn affects the prediction of the RUM. We allow for post-intervention net-
work recomposition and quantify the impact of the policy on fighting in the recomposed network.36
Since the conditional logit model does not yield estimates of the unobserved random utility
shocks u˜ij(a) in equation (21), our analysis must rely on Monte Carlo simulations. More precisely,
for each policy experiment, we perform Monte Carlo simulations of the network recomposition and
obtain a counterfactual distribution of fighting efforts. In the tables below, we focus on the effects
at the median realization, although in some cases we show the entire distribution.
For a given policy experiment, we iterate the following algorithm 1,000 times:
1. We draw a vector of random utility shocks u˜ij for each dyad ij from a truncated multivariate
type I extreme value distribution with unconditional mean and variance being, respectively,
0.577 (the Euler-Mascheroni constant) and
√
π/6. The support of the distribution corresponds
to the domain of u˜ij that is compatible with the link observed in the data. This ensures that,
in the absence of policy intervention, there is no network recomposition.37
34The prediction of the observed component of utility in equation (21) is given by
Vˆij(a|G,Xij ,Zij) = αˆ× CSFij(a) +Xij × ξˆ(a)+Zij × ζˆ(a)+F̂Ei(a) + F̂Ej(a)
with the normalization ξ(0) = ζ(0) =FEi(0) = FEj(0) = 0. In turn, the predicted conditional probabilities
are given by the standard formula Pij (a|G,Xij ,Zij) = e
Vij(a)/(eVij(−1) + eVij (0) + eVij(+1)). Henceforth, pˆ−ij ≡
Pij (a = −1|G,Xij ,Zij) and pˆ
+
ij ≡ Pij (a = +1|G,Xij ,Zij) .
35The results are also robust when we consider a time-varying network as in Section 4.2.1. Appendix Table B.13
shows the set of main results for the benchmark specifications in Tables 1 and 3.
36Note that removing groups and pacification policies affect both CSF and Z. In contrast, embargoes only affect
CSF. Since, as we show below, the estimated effect of CSF is small, embargoes do not trigger network recomposition
in our model.
37Our sampling procedure for drawing the random utility shocks from a truncated multivariate distribution follows
a standard accept-reject algorithm (see Train 2003, Chapter 9), where the definition of the acceptance domain u˜ij
follows from the RUM. We first draw a candidate triplet u˜ij from the unconditional density. Denoting by Vij(a)
the observed utility in equation (21), we retain the draw if it is compatible with the observed link aobsij , namely
Vij(a
obs
ij ) + u˜ij(a
obs
ij ) = max
a∈{−1,0,+1}
Vij(a) + u˜ij(a). If the triplet does not satisfy the previous condition, we reject this
draw and we draw a new triplet. The procedure stops when 1,000 accepted draws have been obtained for each dyad
ij.
This conditional approach implies that the simulated network recompositions are entirely driven by the policy-
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2. For each dyad ij, we compute the post-policy values of CSFij and Zij (the other covariates
in equation (21) are not affected). Given these and the estimated parameters, we compute
the after-policy observable component of utility V postij (a).
3. For each Monte Carlo draw, we compute the post-policy optimal link: apostij = argmax
a∈{−1,0,+1}
V postij (a)+
u˜ij(a). Rewiring occurs when a
obs
ij 6= apostij . This yields the post-policy network Gpost.
4. The counterfactual equilibrium vector of fighting efforts is obtained from the structural equa-
tion (20) and Gpost.
Typically, allowing for network recomposition in response to policy shocks increases (decreases)
rent dissipation relative to the exogenous network benchmark whenever the policy shock triggers
an increase (reduction) in the number of enmities and a reduction (increase) in the number of
alliances. Note that a policy may affect both the number of alliances and enmities in the same
direction, causing ambiguous net effects.
6.3.1 Removing Armed Groups
In this section, we study the effect of removing one or more groups from the conflict (cf. Section
5.1) when endogenous network adjustments are allowed. Consider Figure 4 (more details can be
found in Appendix Table B.14). The left panel shows the reduction in rent dissipation with and
without network recomposition for the top 15 groups (all but three groups remain in the top 15 even
after allowing for network recomposition). The correlation is high (81%), implying that the short-
run effects of Section 5.1 are overall robust to network recomposition. Among the groups whose
removal causes the largest network recomposition, we find the armies of Rwanda and Uganda.
Recall that removing Rwanda causes a reduction in rent dissipation of 6.6% when the network is
exogenous. The adjustment of the network causes a further 3.7% reduction, lifting the median
total effect of removing Rwanda to 10.3% (more than twice as large as its observed fighting share).
This additional effect is due to five enmities switching to neutral links. Similarly, removing Uganda
triggers some network recomposition (four enmities destroyed, four alliances formed). Two groups
whose removal is especially consequential for the network structure are the Lendu Ethnic Militia
and the ADF. In both cases, the indirect effect of removing them from the contest exceeds the
direct effect of the policy under an exogenous network.
Consider, next, the effect of removing selected subgroups of armed groups. The results are
reported in the lower panel of Table 5. The most remarkable new result is in the experiment
where we remove all groups with a foreign affiliation. In this case, the reduction in rent dissipation
increases from 27% (exogenous network) to 41%. The effect is estimated precisely, with a median
absolute deviation (MAD) of 4.1%. The large extra reduction in fighting efforts accrue from both a
reduction in the number of enmities (nine at the median) and an increase in the number of friendly
links (six at the median).
The effect of removing the groups associated with the Hutu exodus is also magnified significantly
by the network recomposition (from 8.7% to 12.2%). The same is true for the set of large groups.
In other cases, the recomposition of the network has an attenuating effect or no effect.
driven changes in CSFij(a) and Zij and not by re-sampling of the unobserved utility shocks.
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Figure 4: (Left panel) This figure displays the reduction in rent dissipation with and without network
recomposition following the removal of each of the top 15 groups. (Right panel) This figure displays the
Monte Carlo distribution of the reduction in rent dissipation following the removal of 24 foreign groups (1,000
simulated network recompositions).
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we construct a theory of conflict in which different groups compete over a fixed amount
of resources. We introduce a network of alliances and enmities that we model as externalities in
a Tullock contest success function. Alliances are beneficial to each member, but are not unitary
coalitions. Rather, each group acts strategically vis-a-vis both allies and enemies. We view our
theory as especially useful in conflicts characterized by high fragmentation, non-transitive relations,
and decentralized military commands, all common features of civil conflicts.
We apply the theory to the analysis of the Second Congo War. Our estimation of the network
externalities tackles a reflection problem through an instrumental variable strategy. The signs of
the estimated coefficients conform with the prediction of the theory. Each group’s fighting effort is
increasing in the total fighting of its enemies and decreasing in the total fighting of its allies. We then
use our structural model to quantify the effect of different pacification policies. In an extension, we
allow not only the groups’ fighting effort but also the network of alliances and enmities to respond
endogenously to policy interventions.
Informal alliances and enmities and intransitive links are not unique to the Congo. Rather,
they are common in many contemporary conflicts such as Afghanistan, Somalia, Iraq, Sudan, and
Syria. While the results of the various policy experiments cannot be mechanically generalized to
other conflicts, our analysis provides new methodological tools to study how webs of alliances and
enmities can lead to escalation or containment of conflict. Future work can build on this to propose
a full-fledged model of endogenous network formation. In work in progress, we are extending the
analysis to other fragmented conflicts such as the recent civil war in Syria.
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Appendix of “Networks in Conflict: Theory and Evidence from the Great War of Africa”
A Theory Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We first establish the existence of a Nash Equilibrium in which all groups participate in the contest (an
interior equilibrium). Let x∗ = (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n)
⊤ ∈ Rn denote the candidate equilibrium effort vector that
satisfies the FOCs; let x∗−i ∈ Rn−1 denote the same vector without the i’th component. Let πi(G;xi,x∗−i) =
ϕi(G;xi,x
∗
−i)/
∑n
j=1 ϕj(G;xi,x
∗
−i)−xi denote the payoff function of a deviation from the equilibrium effort,
in the range where ϕi ≥ 0.
The FOCs of the profit maximization problem yields:
0 =
∂πi(G;x
∗
i ,x
∗
−i)
∂xi
=
∑n
j=1 ϕ
∗
j − ϕ∗i (1 + βd+i − γd−i )(∑n
j=1 ϕ
∗
j
)2 − 1. (22)
Here we have used the fact that ∂ϕ∗j (G;xi,x
∗
−i)/∂xi = δij + βa
+
ij − γa−ij (where δij = 0 if i 6= j and δii = 1),
consequently,
∑n
j=1 ∂ϕ
∗
j/∂xi = 1 + βd
+
i − γd−i . Standard algebra yields:
ϕ∗i =
1
1 + βd+i − γd−i
1− n∑
j=1
ϕ∗j
 n∑
j=1
ϕ∗j . (23)
Next, define Γβ,γi (G) ≡
(
1 + βd+i − γd−i
)−1
> 0 and Λβ,γ(G) ≡ 1−
(∑n
i=1 Γ
β,γ
i (G)
)−1
, where the inequality
follows from (3). Summing over i’s in equation (23) implies that
ϕ∗i = Λ
β,γ(G)(1 − Λβ,γ(G))Γβ,γi (G) > 0. (24)
The inequality hinges on establishing that Λβ,γ(G) > 0, or equivalently
∑n
i=1 Γ
β,γ
i (G) > 1. Observe that∑n
i=1 Γ
β,γ
i (G) =
∑n
i=1
1
1+βd+i −γd
−
i
≥ ∑ni=1 11+βd+i ≥ n1+βd+max > 1. The last inequality holds true if and
only if β < n−1
d+max
, which is in turn is necessarily true if β < 1. This, in turn, follows from the assumption
that β + γ < 1/max{λmax(G+), d−max} that implies that β + γ < 1/max{λmax(G+), λmax(G−)}, since
λmax(G
−) < d−max (Cvetkovic et al. 1995). Moreover, for any non-empty graph G, λmax(G) ≥ 1, because
for any graph G, λmax(G) ≥ maxi=1,...,n
√
di (Cvetkovic et al. 1995), and maxi=1,...,n di ≥ 1when G is not
empty. Thus, β ≤ β + γ < 1. This establishes that ϕ∗i ≥ 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n.
Next, we compute x∗. Combining (2) with (24) yields:
x∗i + β
n∑
j=1
a+ijx
∗
j − γ
n∑
j=1
a−ijx
∗
j = Λ
n,β(G)(1 − Λn,β(G))Γβ,γi (G). (25)
Denoting by Γβ,γ(G) ≡ (Γβ,γ1 (G), . . . ,Γβ,γn (G))⊤, we can write this system in matrix form as
(In + βA
+ − γA−)x∗ = Λβ,γ(G)(1 − Λβ,γ(G))Γβ,γ(G). (26)
The fact that β + γ < 1/max{λmax(G+), λmax(G−)} also ensures that the matrix In + βA+ − γA− is
invertible.38 Then, (26) yields the effort levels:
x∗ = Λβ,γ(G)(1 − Λβ,γ(G))cβ,γ(G), (27)
38This follows from Weyl’s Theorem. The determinant of a matrix of the form In−
∑p
j=1 αjWj is strictly positive
if
∑p
j=1 |αj | < 1/maxj=1,...,p ‖Wj‖, where ‖Wj‖ is any matrix norm, including the spectral norm, which corresponds
to the largest eigenvalue of Wj .
1
-D
x∗i
πi
(
G, [x∗i ,x
∗
−i]
)
xi
πi
(
G, [xi,x
∗
−i]
)
Figure A.1: The figures shows the function πi
(
G, [xi,x
∗
−i]
)
for different values of xi.
where cβ,γ(G) is the centrality measure defined by equation (8)). Equation (27) is the matrix-form version
of equation (7) in the proposition. Evaluating πi(G,x) at x = x
∗yields equation (9) in the proposition.
Thus far, we have established that x∗ and ϕ∗ satisfy the FOCs. In order to prove that the FOCs
pin down a Nash equilibrium, we must establish that, for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n, x∗i is a global maximum of
πi(G;xi,x
∗
−i) for all xi ∈ R. To prove the result, we split the horizontal line at the cutoff value xˆi, uniquely
defined by the condition ϕi(G, xˆi,x
∗
−i) = 0. For xi < xˆi, πi(G;xi,x
∗
−i) = −D. For xi ≥ xˆi, standard algebra
establishes that
(
∂2πi/∂x
2
i
)
(G;xi,x
∗
−i) = −2/(Γβ,γi (G) × Λβ,γ(G)) < 0, where the inequality follows from
the facts, established above, that Γβ,γi (G) > 0 and Λ
β,γ(G) > 0. Thus, πi(G, xi,x
∗
−i) is strictly concave in xi
in the subdomain xi ≥ xˆi. Moreover, equation (4) establishes that ϕ∗i > 0 = ϕi(G, xˆi,x∗−i). This, together
with the fact that ϕi is increasing in xi, establishes that x
∗
i > xˆi. The facts that (i) πi(G, xi,x
∗
−i) is strictly
concave in xi, and (ii) x
∗
i > xˆi jointly imply that πi(G, x
∗
i ,x
∗
−i) is a global maximum of the πi function in the
subdomain xi ≥ xˆi. It is immediate that πi(G, x∗i ,x∗−i) < ∞. Define D = maxi−πi(G, x∗i ,x∗−i). Then, for
all D > D, we have that πi(G, x
∗
i ,x
∗
−i) > −D, namely, defeat is not a profitable deviation. This completes
the proof of existence of an interior Nash Equilibrium.
Next, we prove uniqueness. We assume that, contrary to the statement of the proposition, for all D <∞,
there exists an equilibrium where n− nˆ > 0 groups take the defeat option. Then, we show that this induces
a contradiction. Since we have proved that when all n groups participate in the contest there exists a unique
equilibrium, this establishes global uniqueness.
The condition that Γ0,γi > 0, ∀i = 1, 2, . . . , n, ensures that, in a candidate equilibrium in which only
nˆ < n groups participate in the contest, all such nˆ groups choose a finite effort level (this follows immediately
from the analysis of the case where all n groups participate). The effort level of participants is x∗nˆ =
Λβ,γ(Gnˆ)(1 − Λβ,γ(Gnˆ))cβ,γ(Gnˆ) where the graph Gnˆ only includes the participating groups. Consider a
non-participating group ν. For this group, in the assumed equilibrium, πν = −D. Suppose group ν deviates
and chooses, instead, xν = x
0
ν , where x
0
ν is the unique threshold such that ϕν(Gnˆ+1, x
0
ν , xˆ
∗
−ν) = 0. The payoff
of this deviation is πν(Gnˆ+1, x
0
ν , xˆ
∗
−ν) = −x0ν > −∞. Thus, for any D > x0ν , this deviation is profitable.
Repeating the argument for all partitions establishes that there exists D <∞ such that, for all D > D, any
candidate equilibrium where n− nˆ > 0 groups take the defeat option is susceptible to a profitable deviation
(hence, it is not an equilibrium). Thus, the only equilibrium is interior, completing the proof.
Remark: Figure A.1 (referred to in the text) shows the payoff function πi
(
G, [xi,x
∗
−i]
)
at the equilibrium
strategy profile. Group i’s payoff function is constant (πi = −D) for all xi below the threshold that guarantees
the non-negativity of ϕi. At the threshold, the function is discontinuous, capturing the fact that when ϕi ≥ 0
no defeat cost is due. To the right of the threshold, condition (3) ensures that πi
(
G, [xi,x
∗
−i]
)
is strictly
concave in xi. Moreover, the payoff function is hump shaped and reaches a maximum at ϕ
∗
i > 0.
2
A.2 The Case of Small Externalities
The centrality measure cβ,γi (G) in equation (8) depends, in general, on the entire network structure. However,
it is instructive to consider networks in which the spillover parameters β and γ are small. In this case, our
centrality measure can be approximated by the the sum of (i) the Katz-Bonacich centrality related to the
network of enmities, G−, (ii) the (negative-parameter) Katz-Bonacich centrality related to the network of
alliances, G+, and (iii) the local hostility vector, Γβ,γ(G).39
Lemma 1. Assume that the conditions of Proposition 1 are satisfied. Then, as β → 0 and γ → 0, the
centrality measure defined in equation (8) can be written as
cβ,γ(G) = b·(γ,G
−) + b·(−β,G+)− Γβ,γ(G) +O (βγ) ,
where O (βγ) involves second and higher order terms, and the (weighted) Katz-Bonacich centrality with
parameter α is defined as b·(α,G) ≡ bΓβ,γ(G)(α,G) = (In − αA)−1Γβ,γ(G) assuming that α is smaller than
the inverse of the largest eigenvalue of A.
Lemma 3 states that the centrality cβ,γ(G) can be expressed as a linear combination of the weighted
Katz-Bonacich centralities b·(γ,G
−), b·(−β,G+) and the vector Γβ,γ(G). Each Katz-Bonacich centrality
gauges the network multiplier effect attached to the system of enmities and alliances, respectively. In the
case of weak network externalities (i.e. when β → 0 and γ → 0), the following approximation holds true:
b·,i
(
γ,G−
)
= Γβ,γi (G) + γ
n∑
j=1
a−ijΓ
β,γ
j (G) + γ
2
n∑
j=1
a−ij
n∑
k=1
a−jkΓ
β,γ
k (G) +O
(
γ3
)
, (28)
b·,i(−β,G+) = Γβ,γi (G) + (−β)
n∑
j=1
a+ijΓ
β,γ
j (G) + (−β)2
n∑
j=1
a+ij
n∑
k=1
a+jkΓ
β,γ
k (G) +O
(
β3
)
. (29)
Thus, Lemma 3 suggests that, when higher order terms can be neglected, our centrality measure is increasing
in γ and in the number of first- and second-degree enmities, whereas it is decreasing in β and in the number
of first-degree alliances. Second-degree alliances have instead a positive effect on the centrality measure. An
illustration of this result in the case of a path graph is provided in Appendix C.
We can also obtain a simple approximate expression for the equilibrium efforts and the payoffs in Propo-
sition 1.40
Lemma 2. As β → 0 and γ → 0, the equilibrium effort and payoff of group i in network G can be written
as
x∗i (G) = A
β,γ
1 (G)−B1
(
βd+i − γd−i
)
+O (βγ) ,
π∗i (G) = A
β,γ
2 (G) +B2
(
βd+i − γd−i
)
+O (βγ) ,
where Aβ,γ1 (G), B1, A
β,γ
2 (G) and B2 are positive constants with A
β,γ
1 (G) and A
β,γ
2 (G) being of the order of
O(β) +O(γ).
Lemma 4 shows that, when network externalities are small, a group’s fighting effort increases in the
weighted difference between the number of enmities (weighted by γ) and alliances (weighted by β), i.e. the
net local externalities d−i γ − d+i β. The opposite is true for the equilibrium payoff, which is increasing in
d+i β − d−i γ. Thus, ceteris paribus, an increase in the spillover from alliances (enmities), parameterized by
β (γ), and an increase in the number of allies (enemies) decreases (increases) group i’s fighting effort and
39See Appendix C for a formal definition of the Katz-Bonacich centrality and for proofs of Lemmas 1- 2.
40See the proof of Lemma 4 for the explicit expressions for the constants Aβ,γ(G), B,Cβ,γ(G) and D.
It is useful to note that, when β = γ = 0, then Λβ,γ(G) = 1− 1
n
, and cβ,γi (G) = 1. Then, the equilibrium expressions
in Proposition 1 simplify to x∗i (G) = (n− 1)/n
2 and pi∗i (G) = 1/n
2 which are the standard solutions in the Tullock
CSF.
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increases (reduces) its payoff. Intuitively, a group with many enemies tends to fight harder and to appropriate
a smaller share of the prize, whereas a group with many friends tends to fight less and to appropriate a large
size of the prize. One must remember, however, that this simple result hinges on β and γ being small; in
general, higher-degree links have sizeable effects.
A.3 Appendix to Section 2.4 (heterogeneity)
In the following we provide a complete equilibrium characterization of the extension of our model that we
have introduced in Section 2.4. When the fighting strength ϕi of group i depends on an idiosyncratic shifter
ϕ˜i as in equation (11) then the following proposition characterizes the corresponding Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 2. Let Γβ,γi (G) and Λ
β,γ (G) be defined as in equation (6), and let
cβ,γ
µ
(G) ≡ (In + βA+ − γA−)−1 µ (30)
be a centrality vector, whose generic element cβ,γ
µ,i (G) describes the centrality of group i in the network for
some vector µ ∈ Rn, and assume that the same parameter restrictions on β and γ hold as in Proposition
1. Then for the cost of defeat, D, large enough there exists a unique Nash equilibrium of the n–player
simultaneous move game with payoffs given by equation (1), groups’ OPs in equation (11) and strategy space
R
n, where the equilibrium effort levels are given by
x∗i (G) = Λ
β,γ (G)
(
1− Λβ,γ (G)) cβ,γ
Γβ,γ(G),i
(G)− cβ,γ
ϕ˜,i (G), (31)
for all i = 1, . . . , n. Moreover, the aggregate and individual equilibrium OPs are, respectively,
n∑
i=1
ϕi = Λ
β,γ(G), (32)
ϕi = Λ
β,γ(G)(1 − Λβ,γ(G))Γβ,γi (G), (33)
and the equilibrium payoffs are given by
π∗i (G) ≡ πi (x∗, G) = (1 − Λβ,γ(G))
(
Γβ,γi (G)− Λβ,γ (G) cβ,γΓβ,γ(G),i (G)
)
+ cβ,γ
ϕ˜,i (G). (34)
Proof of Proposition 2. We start by considering an equilibrium in which all groups participate in the
contest (i.e. an interior equilibrium). With equation (11) we can write group i’s payoff as follows
πi(G,x) =
ϕi∑n
j=1 ϕj
− xi
=
xi + β
∑n
j=1 a
+
ijxj − γ
∑n
j=1 a
−
ijxj + ϕ˜i∑n
j=1
(
xj + β
∑n
k=1 a
+
jkxk − γ
∑n
k=1 a
−
jkxk + ϕ˜j
) − xi. (35)
The partial derivatives are given by
∂πi
∂xi
=
∂ϕi
∂xi
∑n
j=1 ϕj − ϕi
∑n
j=1
∂ϕj
∂xi(∑n
j=1 ϕj
)2 − 1
=
∑n
j=1 ϕj − ϕi(1 + βd+i − γd−i )(∑n
j=1 ϕj
)2 − 1, (36)
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where we have used the fact that
∂ϕj
∂xi
= δij +βa
+
ij − γa−ij and consequently
∑n
j=1
∂ϕj
∂xi
= 1+βd+i − γd−i . The
FOCs are then given by ∂pii∂xi = 0. From the partial derivative in equation (36) the FOC for group i can be
written as follows
∂πi
∂xi
=
∑n
j=1 ϕj − ϕi(1 + βd+i − γd−i )(∑n
j=1 ϕj
)2 − 1 = 0,
from which we get
ϕi =
1
1 + βd+i − γd−i
1− n∑
j=1
ϕj
 n∑
j=1
ϕj .
Summation over i gives
n∑
i=1
ϕi =
1− 1∑n
i=1
1
1+βd+i −γd
−
i
 .
With Γβ,γi (G) and Λ
β,γ(G) as in equation (6) we can write the aggregate operational performance as
n∑
i=1
ϕi = Λ
β,γ(G),
which is equivalent to equation (32). The individual operational performance can be written as
ϕi(G,x) = Λ
β,γ(G)(1 − Λβ,γ(G))Γβ,γi (G), (37)
which is equivalent to equation (32). We then get
ϕi(G,x) = xi + β
n∑
j=1
a+ijxj − γ
n∑
j=1
a−ijxj + ϕ˜i = Λ
n,β(G)(1 − Λn,β(G))Γβ,γi (G). (38)
We can write
xi + β
n∑
j=1
a+ijxj − γ
n∑
j=1
a−ijxj = ϕi − ϕ˜i = Λn,β(G)(1 − Λn,β(G))Γβ,γi (G) − ϕ˜i.
Denoting by Γβ,γ(G) ≡ (Γβ,γ1 (G), . . . ,Γβ,γn (G))⊤, we can write this in vector-matrix form as
(In + βA
+ − γA−)x = Λβ,γ(G)(1 − Λβ,γ(G))Γβ,γ(G) − ϕ˜.
When the matrix In + βA
+ − γA− is invertible, we obtain a unique solution given by
x = Λβ,γ(G)(1 − Λβ,γ(G))(In + βA+ − γA−)−1Γβ,γ(G)− (In + βA+ − γA−)−1ϕ˜. (39)
With the definition of the centrality in equation (30) we then can write equation (39) in the form of equa-
tion (31) in the proposition. Moreover, using the fact that equilibrium payoffs are given by πi(x
∗, G) =
ϕ∗i (G)∑
n
j=1 ϕ
∗
j (G)
− x∗i we obtain equation (34) in the proposition.
Next, note that from equation (36) we find that
∂2πi
∂x2i
= − 2
Λβ,γ(G)Γβ,γi (G)
= −2
∑n
j=1 Γ
β,γ
j (G)∑n
j=1 Γ
β,γ
j (G) − 1
(1 + βd+i − γd−i ), (40)
which is negative under the same parameter restrictions on β and γ as in Proposition 1. Further, as in the
proof of Proposition 1 one can then proceed to establish that there exists a unique interior Nash equilibrium
when the cost of defeat, D, is large enough.
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B Empirical Appendix
In this section, we discuss technical details related to Sections 4 (ambiguous links) and 6 (random utility
model). Then, we include the tables and figures discussed in the main text and in this appendix. Additional
tables and figures can be found in the webpage Appendix C.
B.1 Appendix to Section 4.2.2
While the large majority of bilateral links are incontrovertible, there are some that may potentially be
ambiguous, i.e. for which experts do not all reach the same clear-cut assessments or where the battleground
observations in ACLED are not fully reflected in the expert accounts. As mentioned earlier, Table B.5
checks the robustness of our results with respect to ambiguous group links. The columns 1–5 of the table
have already been discussed in the main text. Here, we discuss columns 6–9. In column 6, we exclude the
CNDD since this group appears to have switched its relation with the Mayi-Mayi militia. Next, we classify
Uganda and the RCD-G as enemies (column 7). While this violates our coding rule (that classifies them as
neutral), it is more consistent with the narrative. Next, we code all member states of the Southern African
Development Community (SADC) as allies of each other and of the FARDC (column 8). Finally, we define as
“governments allied to the FARDC” all governments allied to the FARDC in the baseline treatment plus all
SADC member states. Finally, we let all “governments allied to the FARDC” be (i) allied among themselves,
(ii) allied to the FARDC, and (iii) enemies to Rwanda-I and Uganda (column 9). The results are in all cases
similar to the baseline table.
In Table B.6 we investigate potentially ambiguous links on the basis of accounts in Auteserre (2008),
Prunier (2011), Sanchez de la Sierra (2017), Stearns (2011). We start by focusing in column 1 on the FARDC
links with ALIR. In the baseline regression, they are coded as enemies under Laurent Kabila and as neutral
under Joseph Kabila. The earlier link is potentially ambiguous, since the ALIR was part of the Hutu exodus
that clashed with Rwanda and Uganda (see, e.g., Prunier 2011: 234). This might suggest an alliance between
the FARDC and ALIR. However, this is in contradiction with the ACLED data where these two groups are
observed fighting against each other on fourteen occasions between 1998 and 2001, and never on the same
side as brothers in arms. Column 1 shows that the results are not sensitive if we code this dyad as an alliance
or as an enmity.
In the same vein, columns 2 and 3 run the same regressions as in columns 4 and 5 of Table B.5 where
we investigated the ambiguous links between the FARDC and FDLR, but assuming now in addition the
same links for the FARDC-Interahamwe pair as for the FARDC-FDLR pair. In particular, in our baseline
estimates the FARDC-FDLR are first allies under Laurent Kabila, and then neutral under Joseph Kabila,
whereas the FARDC-Interahamwe are allies throughout the whole period. Here, we assume that FARDC-
Interahamwe and FARDC-FDLR are in both cases allies under Laurent Kabila and enemies under Joseph
Kabila (column 2), or neutral throughout the entire period (column 3).
In column 4 we scrutinize the relationship between the FARDC-LK and ADF. In the baseline we code
them as allied, based on an expert source (see International Crisis Group, 1998). However, Prunier (2011:
177) mentions one incident where the 10th division of the FARDC attacks ADF rebels. While this appears
to be an isolated episode, in column 4 we code FARDC-LK and ADF as enemies.
In column 5, we investigate the link MLC-Hema ethnic militia. In the baseline estimations, we code
them as enemy, based on ACLED reporting them to fight five times against each other and never as brothers
in arms. Stearns (2011: 230) refers to one incident where MLC troops cooperated with the Hema ethnic
militia to attack locals. Thus, in the robustness check of column 5 we code them as allies.
Finally, the link FDLR-MayiMayi is considered in column 6. In the baseline estimations we code two
MayiMayi fractions as allied to FDLR (based on ACLED incidences), namely the Yakutumba and Pareco
fractions. In contrast, the relationship FDLR-MayiMayi is coded as neutral for all other MayiMayi fractions
(again based on ACLED). Prompted by Sanchez de la Sierra’s statement that “Mayi-Mayi groups and the
FDLR often conducted joint operations during the second Congo war” (2016: 84), we code all MayiMayi
fractions as being allied to the FDLR.
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In all columns the baseline results are virtually unchanged. The results are also robust to changing all
links simultaneously (except for column 3, since it would be incompatible with column 2).
B.2 Appendix to Section 6 (Random Utility Model)
B.2.1 Multinomial logit estimation
Table B.12 displays the results of the multinomial logit estimation. Table B.13 displays the results of the
Random Utility Model with time-varying network. Figure B.1 reports the cross-dyad distribution of predicted
probabilities for enmities (left panel) and alliances (right panel). In the left panel, the dark sample represents
the distribution for observed enmities (alliances) and the light sample represents the distribution for the other
observed links. Figure B.2 displays the observed and predicted distributions of six network statistics that
play an important role in our baseline model: degree one enemies (panel a), degree one allies (panel b),
number of degree one links (panel c), common enemies (panel d), common allies (panel e), and conflicting
neighbors (panel f ). For each statistic, the panel compares the data with the average distribution over 1000
simulated networks as predicted by the conditional logit model (plus/minus one standard deviation interval).
The figure shows that all these important moments of the data are predicted accurately. More precisely each
Monte Carlo draw consists in drawing a random utility shock u˜ij(a) for each dyad ij and alternative a from
a type I extreme value distribution with mean γ ≈ 0.577 (the Euler-Mascheroni constant), and variance,√
π/6. Using equation (21) we compute each simulated alternative-dependent joint surplus Usimij (a) and
select the predicted link for dyad ij as apreij = argmaxU
sim
ij (a). This leads to a simulated network for which
we can compute the 6 distributions of network statistics. This procedure is iterated 1000 times. Each panel
reports the average distribution (± 1 SD) across the Monte Carlo draws.
B.2.2 Effect of removing armed groups (with network rewiring)
Table B.14 summarizes the effect of removing one or more groups from the conflict when endogenous network
adjustments are allowed. We focus, for comparability, on the top 15 groups in Table 4. All but three groups
remain in the top 15 even after allowing for network recomposition.41 The UPC is especially interesting.
This is a medium-large group whose activity accounts for 2.2% of the total violence. Its removal in Table 4
yields a reduction in violence of the order of 3%, with a sizable multiplier of 1.4. However, the recomposition
of the network after its removal offsets two thirds of the gains.
Table B.1: Summary statistics.
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total Fight. 1,040 5.929 25.046 0 300
Total Fight. Enemies (TFE) 1,040 69.237 109.95 0 682
Total Fight. Allies (TFA) 1,040 48.603 85.75 0 563
Total Fight. Neutrals (TFN) 1,040 350.539 241.616 1 1042
d− (# enemies) 1,040 2.95 4.306 0 26
d+ (# allies) 1,040 2.4 3.45 0 21
Rainfall (t− 1) 1,040 125.839 26.164 59.639 195.56
Note: The sample comprises the 80 fighting groups that are involved in at least one
fighting event in ACLED during the period 1998–2010.
41The three groups that drop out of the top 15 are the UPC, Mutiny of FARC, and FRPI. The group entering
the top 15 are two branches of the RCD (the first collects all events involving ”unspecified” RCD; the second is the
group labeled RCD-National; both are likely to suffer with large measurement error) and the National Army for the
Liberation of Uganda.
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Table B.2: Benchmark second stage with unpopular 6.
Dependent variable: Total fighting
OLS Reduced IV Full IV Neutrals Battles d− ≥ 1 & d+ ≥ 1 GED coord. GED union
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Total Fight. Enemies (TFE) 0.066*** 0.130** 0.100*** 0.119*** 0.121*** 0.118*** 0.123*** 0.161***
(0.016) (0.057) (0.033) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.045)
Total Fight. Allies (TFA) 0.001 -0.218** -0.149*** -0.139*** -0.153*** -0.161*** -0.138*** -0.152***
(0.017) (0.086) (0.051) (0.047) (0.051) (0.062) (0.047) (0.050)
Total Fight. Neutrals (TFN) 0.005 0.004 0.009 0.005 0.006
(0.006) (0.006) (0.014) (0.006) (0.005)
Additional controls Reduced Reduced Full Full Full Full Full Full
Estimator OLS IV IV IV IV IV IV IV
Set of Instrument Variables n.a. Restricted Full Full Full Full Full Full
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat n.a. 10.6 15.6 15.1 17.4 14.9 15.1 17.3
Hansen J (p-value) n.a. 0.16 0.75 0.83 0.79 0.70 0.81 0.79
Observations 1040 1040 1040 1040 988 598 1040 1781
R-squared 0.510 0.265 0.474 0.459 0.446 0.462 0.455 0.389
Note: All regressions include group fixed effects and control for rainfall in the own group’s territory. Columns 1-3 include time fixed effects.
Robust standard errors corrected for Spatial HAC in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table B.3: Robustness.
Dependent variable: Total fighting
Only deg. Sample Only Batt., riots, Excl.
Lags
1 evt. 2 evts.
RUM 3d Poly.
2 split violent viol. bilateral enemy ally
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Total Fight. Enemies (TFE) 0.074*** 0.147** 0.083*** 0.083*** 0.063*** 0.090*** 0.119*** 0.089*** 0.106*** 0.082***
(0.027) (0.062) (0.019) (0.019) (0.023) (0.026) (0.029) (0.019) (0.033) (0.019)
Total Fight. Allies (TFA) -0.207** 0.002 -0.114*** -0.114*** -0.110*** -0.104*** -0.170*** -0.107*** -0.112** -0.115***
(0.083) (0.079) (0.033) (0.034) (0.033) (0.040) (0.051) (0.033) (0.050) (0.034)
Total Fight. Neutrals (TFN) 0.008 0.011 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.007 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.004
(0.006) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
Additional controls Full Full Full Full Full Full Full Full Full Full
Estimator IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV
Set of Instrument Variables Full Full Full Full Full Full Full Full Full Full
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 13.4 37.7 22.5 24.6 20.4 20.3 11.8 25.3 4.0 28.6
Hansen J (p-value) 0.28 0.84 0.58 0.58 0.54 0.69 0.51 0.51 0.62 0.58
Observations 1040 640 1040 1027 1040 960 1040 1040 1040 1040
R-squared 0.489 0.589 0.568 0.570 0.550 0.577 0.394 0.571 0.554 0.567
Note: All regressions include group fixed effects and control for rainfall in the own group’s territory. Robust standard errors corrected for Spatial HAC in
parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table B.4: Robustness: Group definition (FARDC, Rwanda & others).
Dependent variable: Total fighting
Merge FARDC MayMay Rwanda FARDC & RWA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Fight. Enemies (TFE) 0.040** 0.068*** 0.074*** 0.040**
(0.019) (0.022) (0.022) (0.020)
Total Fight Allies (TFA) -0.058* -0.084*** -0.108*** -0.066*
(0.034) (0.032) (0.032) (0.037)
Total Fight. Neutrals (TFN) -0.002 -0.000 0.003 -0.003
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Additional controls Full Full Full Full
Estimator IV IV IV IV
Set of Instrument Variables Full Full Full Full
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 34.6 15.4 19.7 29.8
Hansen J (p-value) 0.44 0.66 0.59 0.51
Observations 1027 962 1027 1014
R-squared 0.631 0.614 0.589 0.642
Note: All regressions include group fixed effects and control for rainfall in the group’s
homeland. Robust standard errors corrected for Spatial HAC in parentheses. Signifi-
cance levels are indicated by * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table B.5: Robustness: Ambiguous network links I.
Dependent variable: Total fighting
Uga-Rwa Uga-Rwa Uga-Rwa allies FARDC-FDLR FARDC-FDLR Exclude Uga-RCD-G SADC Dyadic closure
neutral allies then neutral allies then enemies neutral CNDD enemies allies main groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Total Fight. Enemies (TFE) 0.082*** 0.081*** 0.082*** 0.090*** 0.083*** 0.083*** 0.074*** 0.082*** 0.075***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020)
Total Fight Allies (TFA) -0.105*** -0.109*** -0.112*** -0.116*** -0.112*** -0.111*** -0.104*** -0.116*** -0.100***
(0.031) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.036) (0.033) (0.031) (0.035) (0.031)
Total Fight. Neutrals (TFN) 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Additional controls Full Full Full Full Full Full Full Full Full
Estimator IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV
Set of Instrument Variables Full Full Full Full Full Full Full Full Full
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 19.9 20.2 19.8 16.7 23.4 27.2 20.8 19.2 12.7
Hansen J (p-value) 0.60 0.59 0.58 0.60 0.56 0.54 0.57 0.55 0.58
Observations 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040 1027 1040 1040 1040
R-squared 0.574 0.573 0.569 0.577 0.565 0.574 0.577 0.573 0.589
Note: All regressions include group fixed effects and control for rainfall in the group’s homeland. Robust standard errors corrected for Spatial HAC in parentheses.
Significance levels are indicated by p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table B.6: Robustness: Ambiguous network links II.
Dependent variable: Total fighting
FARDC-ALIR FARDC-FDLR/Interah. FARDC-FDLR/Interah. FARDC-ADF Hema ethnic militia-MLC FDLR-MayiMayi
ally ally then enemy neutral enemy ally ally
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total Fight. Enemies (TFE) 0.087*** 0.077*** 0.078*** 0.081*** 0.085*** 0.070***
(0.020) (0.022) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.020)
Total Fight. Allies (TFA) -0.117*** -0.087*** -0.103*** -0.117*** -0.113*** -0.107***
(0.035) (0.025) (0.034) (0.036) (0.035) (0.033)
Total Fight. Neutrals (TFN) 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
Additional controls Full Full Full Full Full Full
Estimator IV IV IV IV IV IV
Set of Instrument Variables Full Full Full Full Full Full
Observations 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 21.4 10.1 25.2 25.1 20.1 28.3
Hansen J (p-value) 0.58 0.58 0.55 0.56 0.57 0.58
R-squared 0.562 0.605 0.576 0.570 0.566 0.574
Note: All regressions include group fixed effects and control for rainfall in the own group’s territory. Robust standard errors corrected for Spatial HAC in parentheses.
Significance levels are indicated by * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table B.7: Measurement error in rainfall.
Dependent variable: GPCC gauge rainfall measure
Model Linear Log-linear Linear Log-linear
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
# ACLED conflict events 0.017 0.008 0.009 0.001 -0.069 0.016 -0.016 0.005
(0.032) (0.012) (0.008) (0.003) (0.057) (0.014) (0.014) (0.004)
TRMM satellite rainfall measure 0.639*** 0.513*** 0.714*** 0.619*** – – – –
(0.018) (0.012) (0.015) (0.013) – – – –
GPCP satellite rainfall measure – – – – 0.790*** 1.073*** 0.843*** 1.233***
– – – – (0.044) (0.081) (0.055) (0.100)
(0.5 x 0.5) Grid Cell FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Annual TE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9893 9893 9893 9893 9893 9893 9893 9893
R-squared 0.578 0.667 0.604 0.684 0.555 0.601 0.541 0.587
Note: The unit of observation is a cell of resolution 0.5 x 0.5 degrees in a given year. The panel contains 761 cells covering DRC between
1998 and 2010. In Columns 3,4,5,6 all rainfall variables are in log. Robust standard errors are clustered at the (0.5 x 0.5) cell level in
Columns 1-4 and at the (2.5 x 2.5) cell level in Columns 5-8. Significance levels are indicated by * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
13
Table B.8: Alternative rainfall data.
Panel a (TRMM)
Column in baseline Table 1 4 (all evts.) 5 (battles) 4 (all evts.) 5 (battles) 4 (all evts.) 5 (battles)
Definition “large group” d− ≥ 10 d− ≥ 6 not included
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total Fight. Enemies (TFE) 0.025 0.084** 0.053* 0.102** 0.131** 0.197***
(0.029) (0.042) (0.029) (0.049) (0.060) (0.074)
Total Fight. Allies (TFA) -0.092** -0.146*** -0.142*** -0.194*** -0.126** -0.187***
(0.038) (0.047) (0.053) (0.058) (0.058) (0.066)
Total Fight. Neutrals (TFN) 0.006 0.007 0.005 0.007 0.004 0.003
(0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.010)
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 10.3 3.9 10.9 4.2 18.1 10.7
Hansen J (p-value) 0.50 0.68 0.55 0.72 0.39 0.72
Observations 1040 988 1040 988 1040 988
R-squared 0.586 0.534 0.495 0.403 0.431 0.264
Panel b (GPCP)
Column in baseline Table 1 4 (all evts.) 5 (battles) 4 (all evts.) 5 (battles) 4 (all evts.) 5 (battles)
Definition “large group” d− ≥ 10 d− ≥ 6 not included
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total Fight. Enemies (TFE) 0.017 0.023 0.060 0.064 0.138** 0.155**
(0.041) (0.041) (0.050) (0.053) (0.063) (0.062)
Total Fight. Allies (TFA) -0.068*** -0.097*** -0.130*** -0.186*** -0.106* -0.144**
(0.026) (0.036) (0.049) (0.062) (0.055) (0.064)
Total Fight. Neutrals (TFN) -0.009 -0.006 -0.010 -0.004 -0.002 0.001
(0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 7.2 7.4 6.4 11.3 10.1 10.0
Hansen J (p-value) 0.60 0.69 0.66 0.72 0.58 0.71
Observations 1040 988 1040 988 1040 988
R-squared 0.606 0.590 0.514 0.446 0.444 0.390
Panel c (TRMM & GPCP)
Column in baseline Table 1 4 (all evts.) 5 (battles) 4 (all evts.) 5 (battles) 4 (all evts.) 5 (battles)
Definition “large group” d− ≥ 10 d− ≥ 6 not included
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total Fight. Enemies (TFE) 0.035 0.060** 0.069** 0.095*** 0.128*** 0.163***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.029) (0.033) (0.049) (0.050)
Total Fight Allies (TFA) -0.063*** -0.099*** -0.108*** -0.157*** -0.087* -0.129***
(0.024) (0.028) (0.038) (0.043) (0.046) (0.050)
Total Fight. Neutrals (TFN) 0.006 0.007 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.001
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.009)
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 38.6 27.8 51.4 33.3 58.0 15.6
Hansen J (p-value) 0.89 0.93 0.93 0.94 0.85 0.87
Observations 1040 988 1040 988 1040 988
R-squared 0.609 0.586 0.528 0.464 0.471 0.398
Note: The dependent variable is total fighting. The unit of observation is an armed group in a given year. The panel
contains 80 armed groups between 1998 and 2010. All regressions include group fixed effects and control for rainfall
in the own group’s territory, as well as the same additional controls and instruments as in the columns (4) and (5)
of the baseline Table 1. Robust standard errors corrected for Spatial HAC in parentheses. Significance levels are
indicated by * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table B.9: Monte Carlo simulations testing link mismeasurement.
Probability of mismeasurement 0 0.01 0.1 0.2 0.5 1
TFA TFE TFA TFE TFA TFE TFA TFE TFA TFE TFA TFE
Enmity links only Mean 0.118 0.085 0.117 0.084 0.112 0.077 0.106 0.0713 0.102 0.046 0.119 0.002
S.D. 0.012 0.011 0.012 0.011 0.014 0.013 0.019 0.022 0.024 0.020 0.018 0.015
Alliance links only Mean 0.119 0.085 0.117 0.0843 0.107 0.075 0.095 0.066 0.059 0.055 0.000 0.083
S.D. 0.012 0.011 0.014 0.011 0.019 0.015 0.023 0.019 0.027 0.022 0.008 0.008
Alliance & Enmity links Mean 0.118 0.085 0.116 0.083 0.101 0.067 0.086 0.051 0.040 0.012 0.001 -0.001
S.D. 0.012 0.010 0.014 0.012 0.022 0.019 0.028 0.023 0.037 0.028 0.017 0.014
Note: The table reports the mean and standard deviations (S.D.) of the Monte Carlo sampling distributions (1,000 draws) of the baseline 2SLS estimates
(col. 4, Table 1) of TFE and TFA for different probabilities of network link mismeasurement. The data generating process is based on the coefficients
= 0.114 for TFA and = 0.083 for TFE.
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Table B.10: Bootstrapping ACLED Events
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TFA Mean 0.006 -0.231 -0.121 -0.114 -0.113 -0.138 -0.111 -0.132
S.D. 0.007 0.039 0.022 0.023 0.023 0.033 0.023 0.013
TFE Mean 0.065 0.131 0.067 0.088 0.086 0.087 0.089 0.135
S.D. 0.005 0.024 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.019 0.016 0.011
TFN Mean 0.003 0.003 0.013 0.004 0.005
S.D. 0.003 0.003 0.008 0.003 0.002
Note: The table reports the mean and standard deviations (S.D.) of the Monte Carlo
sampling distributions (1,000 draws) of the estimates of TFE, TFA, TFN for all speci-
fications of the baseline Table 1. In each Monte Carlo draw, the analysis is conducted
on a random sample of ACLED events drawn with replacement.
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Table B.11: Monte Carlo simulations testing ACLED event mismeasurement.
Probability of removal 0.01 0.1 0.2 0.5
TFA TFE TFA TFE TFA TFE TFA TFE
Mean -0.1139 0.0831 -0.1132 0.0836 -0.1109 0.0828 -0.1054 0.0813
S.D. 0.0009 0.0008 0.0028 0.0025 0.0044 0.0011 0.0063 0.0053
Note: The table reports the mean and standard deviations (S.D.) of the Monte Carlo sampling distri-
butions (1,000 draws) of the baseline 2SLS estimates (col. 4, Table 1) of TFE and TFA for different
probabilities of ACLED event mismeasurement for small groups. A group is defined to be small if
(d− + d+) < 3, a condition that is satisfied for 49.7 percent of the groups in the sample.
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Table B.12: Table multinominal logit.
CSF Surplus 0.000
(0.000)
Enmity link Alliance link
Common enemy -0.387** 0.425**
(0.183) (0.181)
Common allied 0.097 -0.529***
(0.194) (0.175)
Common allied and enemy 0.454*** -0.727***
(0.119) (0.161)
Geodistance -0.003*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001)
Same ethnic group 0.842 0.865
(0.595) (0.601)
Same Hutu Tutsi 0.831 0.550
(0.813) (0.787)
Different Hutu Tutsi 1.295** -0.914
(0.596) (1.148)
Zero Government -1.977*** 0.849
(0.711) (0.763)
Zero Foreign 1.514*** 0.761
(0.523) (0.576)
Number of observations 9480
Log likelihood -445.92
Note: Conditional logit estimator. The unit of observation
is a pair of fighting groups in a given year. Alternatives
correspond to Enmity (column 2), Alliance (column 3) and
Neutrality as reference. Alternative-dependent group fixed
effects are included. Standard errors in parentheses, * p <
0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
18
Table B.13: RUM with time varying network.
Dep. var.: Total Fighting
(1) (2) (3)
Total Fight. Enemies (TFE) 0.106*** 0.114*** 0.110***
(0.033) (0.035) (0.038)
Total Fight. Allies (TFA) -0.112** -0.122** -0.137**
(0.050) (0.053) (0.062)
Total Fight. Neutrals (TFN) 0.002 0.001 0.011
(0.006) (0.006) (0.023)
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 4.0 3.6 5.1
Hansen J (p-value) 0.62 0.67 0.73
Observations 1040 1040 469
R-squared 0.554 0.579 0.597
Note: An observation is a given armed group in a given year. The
panel contains 80 armed groups between 1998 and 2010. All re-
gressions include group fixed effects and control for rainfall in the
group’s homeland. Robust standard errors corrected for Spatial
HAC in parentheses. Column (1) replicates the baseline specifica-
tion of the main table (column (4), Table 1) but with RUM. Column
(2) replicates Column (1) of Table 3 but with RUM, while column
(3) replicates column (4) of Table 3 but with RUM. Significance
levels are indicated by * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Figure B.1: Predicted probabilities of enmities and alliances.
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Figure B.2: Goodness of fit statistics.
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Table B.14: Welfare effect of removing armed groups with network recomposition.
Group
Sh.
−∆RD −∆RD Multipl.
MAD
−∆RD
New enm. New all.
fight.
(exog. (end. (end. due to
at med. at med.
netw.) netw.) netw.) rewiring
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
RCD-G 0.087 0.151 0.137 1.6 0.025 -0.014 1 -2
RCD-K 0.060 0.094 0.076 1.3 0.027 -0.018 2 0
Rwanda 0.053 0.066 0.103 1.9 0.040 0.037 -5 0
LRA 0.041 0.056 0.051 1.2 0.005 -0.005 0 -1
FDLR 0.066 0.055 0.058 0.9 0.008 0.004 -1 1
Mayi-Mayi 0.057 0.046 0.083 1.5 0.024 0.037 -2 1
Uganda 0.043 0.043 0.066 1.5 0.034 0.023 -4 4
CNDP 0.043 0.041 0.041 0.9 0.011 0.000 0 0
MLC 0.031 0.039 0.054 1.7 0.018 0.015 -2 1
UPC 0.022 0.030 0.011 0.5 0.020 -0.020 0 -1
Lendu Ethnic Mil. 0.024 0.022 0.049 2.0 0.020 0.027 -3 0
Mutiny FARDC 0.016 0.016 0.016 1.0 0 0 0 0
Interahamwe 0.014 0.014 0.027 2.0 0.024 0.013 0 -1
ADF 0.013 0.012 0.036 2.7 0.012 0.024 -2 1
FRPI 0.009 0.010 0.010 1.1 0 0 0 0
Note: The computation of the counterfactual equilibrium is based on the baseline point estimates of
column 4 in Table 1. The results are based on 1,000 Monte Carlo simulations of an endogenous network
recomposition. For each group, we report the observed share of total fighting involving this group (col. 1);
the counterfactual reduction in rent dissipation associated with its removal (exogenous network) (col. 2);
the counterfactual reduction in rent dissipation associated with its removal with network recomposition
(col. 3); a multiplier defined as the ratio of col. 3 over col. 1 (col. 4); the Median Absolute Deviation
in reduction in RD across Monte Carlo draws (col. 5); the difference between col. 3 and col. 2 (col. 6);
post-rewiring number of new enmities and alliances at the median Monte Carlo draw (cols. 7-8).
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C Theory and Empirical Appendix
C.1 Appendix to Section 2.3
In this section, we discuss the relation of our theory to the Katz-Bonacich centrality due to Katz (1953) and
later extended by Bonacich (1987). We first define the notion of Katz-Bonacich centrality, and then discuss
how it relates to our results.
C.1.1 Katz-Bonacich Centrality
Let A be the symmetric n× n adjacency matrix of the network G and λmax its largest real eigenvalue. The
matrix M(G,α) = (I−αA)−1 exists and is non-negative if and only if α < 1/λmax.42 Under this condition
it can be written as
M(G,α) =
∞∑
k=0
αkAk. (41)
The vector of Katz-Bonacich centralities is then given by
bu(G,α) =M(G,α)u, (42)
where u = (1, . . . , 1)⊤ is an n-dimensional vector of ones. We can write the vector of Katz-Bonacich
centralities as
bu(G,α) = (I− αA)−1u =
∞∑
k=0
αkAku.
For the components bu,i(G,α), i = 1, . . . , n, we get
bu,i(G,α) =
∞∑
k=0
αk(Ak · u)i =
∞∑
k=0
αk
n∑
j=1
a
[k]
ij , (43)
where a
[k]
ij is the ij-th element of A
k. Because Nk,i(G) ≡
∑n
j=1 a
[k]
ij counts the number of all walks of length
k in G starting from i, the Katz-Bonacich centrality of group i, bu,i(G,α), is thus equivalent to the number
of all walks in G starting from i, where the walks of length k are weighted by a geometrically decaying factor
αk.
Further, the sum of the Katz-Bonacich centralities,
∑n
i=1 bu,i(G,α) = u
⊤bu(G,α) = u
⊤M(G,α)u, is
equivalent to walk generating function of the graph G, denoted by N(G,α) (cf. Cvetkovic 1995). To see
this, let Nk(G) ≡
∑n
i=1Nk,i(G) denote the number of walks of length k in G. Then we can write Nk(G) as
follows Nk(G) =
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1 a
[k]
ij = u
⊤Aku. The walk generating function is then defined as
N(G,α) ≡
∞∑
k=0
Nk(G)α
k = u⊤
(
∞∑
k=0
αkAk
)
u = u⊤ (In − αA)−1 u = u⊤M(G,α)u.
†Department of Economics, University of Zurich. Email: michael.koenig@econ.uzh.ch.
‡Department of Economics, University of Lausanne. Email: dominic.rohner@unil.ch.
§Department of Economics, University of Lausanne. Email: mathias.thoenig@unil.ch.
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42The proof can be found e.g. in Debreu and Herstein (1953).
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Moreover, the generating function of the number of closed walks that start and terminate at node i is given
by
Wi(G,α) ≡
∞∑
k=0
a
[k]
ii α
k. (44)
The matrix of equation (41) is also a measure of structural similarity of the groups in the network, called
regular equivalence. Blondel et al. (2004) and Leicht et al. (2006) define a similarity score bij , which is high
if nodes i and j have neighbors that themselves have high similarity, given by bij = α
∑n
k=1 aikbkj + δij . In
matrix-vector notation this reads M = αAM + In. Rearranging yields M = (In − αA)−1 =
∑∞
k=0 α
kAk,
assuming that α < 1/λmax. We hence obtain that the similarity matrix M is equivalent to the matrix
from equation (41). The average similarity of group i is 1n
∑n
j=1 bij =
1
nbu,i(G,α), where bu,i(G,α) is the
Katz-Bonacich centrality of i. It follows that the Katz-Bonacich centrality of i is proportional to the average
regular equivalence of i. Groups with a high Katz-Bonacich centrality are then the ones which also have a
high average structural similarity with the other groups in the network.
The interpretation of eingenvector-like centrality measures as a similarity index is also important in the
study of correlations between observations in principal component analysis and factor analysis (cf. Rencher
and Christensen 2012). Variables with similar factor loadings can be grouped together. This basic idea has
also been used in the economics literature on segregation (e.g. Ballester and Vorsatz 2014; Echenique and
Fryer Jr. 2007; Echenique et al. 2006).
C.1.2 The Case of Small Externalities
When the spillover parameters β and γ are small, our the centrality measure cβ,γi (G) in equation (8) can
be approximated by the the sum of (i) the Katz-Bonacich centrality related to the network of enmities, G−,
(ii) the (negative-parameter) Katz-Bonacich centrality related to the network of alliances, G+, and (iii) the
local hostility vector, Γβ,γ(G). For the reader’s convenience, we restate here Lemmas 1 and 1 for which we
herewith provide formal proofs.
Lemma 3. Assume that the conditions of Proposition 1 are satisfied. Then, as β → 0 and γ → 0, the
centrality measure defined in equation (8) can be written as
cβ,γ(G) = b·(γ,G
−) + b·(−β,G+)− Γβ,γ(G) +O (βγ) ,
where O (βγ) involves second and higher order terms, and the (weighted) Katz-Bonacich centrality with
parameter α is defined as b·(α,G) ≡ bΓβ,γ(G)(α,G) = (In − αA)−1Γβ,γ(G) assuming that α is smaller than
the inverse of the largest eigenvalue of A.
Proof of Lemma 3. The proof of the lemma builds on a first-order Taylor approximation in β and γ of the
centrality cβ,γ(G) defined in equation (8). Using the fact that In+ βA
+− γA− = (In+βA+)(In− γA−)+
βγA+A− = (In+βA
+)(In−γA−)+O(βγ), and [(In + βA+)(In − γA−)]−1 = (In−γA−)−1(In+βA+)−1,
2
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Figure C.1: The figure shows a path graph, P5, with five agents and their centralities for γ =
0.1, β = 0 (rivalries only) at the top and γ = 0, β = 0.1 (alliances only) at the bottom.
where (In − γA−)−1 =
∑∞
k=0 γ
k(A−)k and (In + βA
+)−1 =
∑∞
k=0(−1)kβk(A+)k, we can write
(In + βA
+ − γA−)−1 = (In − γA−)−1(In + βA+)−1 +O(βγ)
=
(
In + γA
− +
∞∑
k=2
γk(A−)k
)(
In − βA+ +
∞∑
k=2
(−1)kβk(A+)k
)
+O(βγ)
= In + γA
− − βA+ +
∞∑
k=2
γk(A−)k +
∞∑
k=2
(−1)kβk(A+)k + γA−
∞∑
k=2
(−1)kβk(A+)k
+
∞∑
k=2
γk(A−)kβA+ +
(
∞∑
k=2
γk(A−)k
)(
∞∑
k=2
(−1)kβk(A+)k
)
+O(βγ)
= In +
∞∑
k=1
γk(A−)k +
∞∑
k=1
(−1)kβk(A+)k +O(βγ). (45)
Hence, in leading order in β and γ the centrality in equation (8) can then be written as follows
cβ,γ(G) =
(
∞∑
k=0
γk(A−)k +
∞∑
k=0
(−1)kβk(A+)k − In
)
Γβ,γ(G) +O(βγ)
= bΓβ,γ(G)(γ,G
−) + bΓβ,γ(G)(−β,G+)− Γβ,γ(G) +O(βγ). (46)
This completes the proof.
Lemma 3 shows that, when higher order terms can be neglected, our centrality measure is increasing in
γ and in the number of first- and second-degree enmities, whereas it is decreasing in β and in the number of
first-degree alliances. Second-degree alliances have instead a positive effect on the centrality measure.43
We can provide an illustration with a simple example. Figure C.1 shows a path graph, P5, with five
agents and their centralities for γ = 0.1 and β = 0, where agents are connected through rivalries only, and
γ = 0 and β = 0.1, where agents are connected through alliances only.
In the first case, when γ = 0.1, β = 0 (rivalries only), we know from equation (46) that the agents’
centralities are determined by the Katz-Bonacich centrality b·,i (γ,G
−) of equation (28). The Katz-Bonacich
centrality measure related to the network of hostilities, b·,i (γ,G
−), measures the local hostility levels along all
walks reaching i using only hostility connections, where walks of length k are weighted by the geometrically
decaying hostility externality γk (see Section C.1.1 above). Since the discounted number of walks emanating
from a node in a path graph is the higher the more central an agent is, we find that the agent in the middle
of the path has the highest centrality, and centralities decrease moving away from the middle of the path.
43The intuition for this property is as follows. If i is allied with j and j is allied with k, an increase in the fighting
effort of k reduces the fighting effort of j and this, in turn, increases the fighting effort of i. Consider, instead, the
case in which i is an enemy of j and j is an enemy of k. Then, an increase in the fighting effort of k increases the
fighting effort of j and this, in turn, increases the fighting effort of i.
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The outcome is different for the case of β = 0.1, γ = 0 (alliances only). Equation (46) tells us that in
this case the agents’ centralities are determined by the Katz-Bonacich centrality b·,i (−β,G+). When the
parameter of the Katz-Bonacich centrality is negative, b·,i (−β,G+), then we know from equation (29) that
negative weight is given to an agent’s neighbors, but positive weight to the neighbors of the neighbors. The
peripheral agents at the ends of the path have the lowest number of direct neighbors and thus have the
highest centrality. This leads to a lower levels of centrality for the agents in the intermediate positions,
which in turn leads to a higher level of centrality for the agent in the middle of the path.
We also restate the approximate expression for the equilibrium efforts and the payoffs in Proposition 1.
Lemma 4. As β → 0 and γ → 0, the equilibrium effort and payoff of group i in network G can be written
as
x∗i (G) = A
β,γ
1 (G)−B1
(
βd+i − γd−i
)
+O (βγ) ,
π∗i (G) = A
β,γ
2 (G) +B2
(
βd+i − γd−i
)
+O (βγ) ,
where Aβ,γ1 (G), B1, A
β,γ
2 (G) and B2 are positive constants with A
β,γ
1 (G) and A
β,γ
2 (G) being of the order of
O(β) +O(γ).
Proof of Lemma 4. The proof of the lemma builds on a first-order Taylor approximation in β and γ of
the equilibrium fighting efforts x∗i (G) in equation (7) and payoffs π
∗
i (G) from equation (9). First, observe
that for β → 0 and γ → 0 we have that
Γβ,γi (G) =
1
1 + βd+i − γd−i
= 1− βd+i + γd−i +O
(
β2
)
+O
(
γ2
)
+O (βγ) ,
and
1− Λβ,γ(G) = 1∑n
i=1 Γ
β,γ
i (G)
=
1
n
+
2
n2
(
βm+ − γm−)+O (β2)+O (γ2)+O (βγ) ,
where we have denoted by m+ = 12
∑n
i=1 d
+
i and m
− = 12
∑n
i=1 d
−
i . Also, we have that
Λβ,γ(G)(1 − Λβ,γ(G)) = n− 1
n2
− 2m
−(n− 2)γ
n3
+
2m+(n− 2)β
n3
+O
(
β2
)
+O
(
γ2
)
+O (βγ) .
Moreover, from equation (45) in the proof of Lemma 3 we have that
(In + βA
+ − γA−)−1 = (In − γA−)−1(In + βA+)−1 +O (βγ)
= (In + γA
−)(In − βA+)(u+ γd+ − βd− +O
(
β2
)
+O
(
γ2
)
+O (βγ)
= In + γA
− − βA+ +O (β2)+O (γ2)+ O (βγ) .
It then follows that
(In + βA
+ − γA−)−1Γβ,γ(G) = (In + γA− − βA+)(u+ γd− − βd+) +O
(
β2
)
+O
(
γ2
)
+O (βγ)
= u+ 2γd− − 2βd+ +O (β2)+O (γ2)+O (βγ) ,
and we get for the equilibrium fighting efforts x∗i (G) that
x∗i (G) = Λ
β,γ(G)(1 − Λβ,γ(G))((In + βA+ − γA−)−1Γβ,γ(G))i
=
(
n− 1
n2
− 2m
−(n− 2)γ
n3
+
2m+(n− 2)β
n3
)
(1 + 2γd−i − 2βd+i ) +O (βγ)
=
(
n− 1
n2
− 2(n− 2)m
− − 2n(n− 1)d−i
n3
γ +
2(n− 2)m+ − 2n(n− 1)d+i
n3
β
)
+O (βγ) .
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Figure C.2: (Left panel) Illustration of a bowtie graph, where the central agent is in conflict
with all other agents and the peripheral pairs of agents are allied. Alliances are indicated with
thick lines while conflict relationships are indicated with thin lines. (Right panel) The first-order
approximation (dashed lines) used to derive the equilibrium efforts in equation (47), and the exact
value (solid lines) for the total centrality
∑n
i=1 c
β,γ
i (G) for different values of β and γ in the bowtie
graph.
Denoting by Aβ,γ1 (G) ≡ n−1n2 + β 2(n−2)n3 m+ − γ 2(n−2)n3 m− and B1 ≡ 2(n−1)n2 , we can write this as follows
x∗i (G) =
(
Aβ,γ1 (G) −B1
(
βd+i − γd−i
))
+O (βγ) . (47)
Next, note that the group i’s equilibrium payoff is given by π∗i (G) = (1 − Λβ,γ(G))Γβ,γi (G) − x∗i (G). Using
the equilibrium effort from above it then follows that the equilibrium payoff of group i is given by
π∗i (G) = (1− Λβ,γ(G))Γβ,γi (G)− x∗i (G)
=
(
1
n
− 2γm
− − 2βm+
n2
)
(1 + γd−i − βd+i )− x∗i (G) +O (βγ)
=
(
1
n2
+
4m+ + n(n− 2)d+i
n3
β − 4m
− + n(n− 2)d−i
n3
γ
)
+O (βγ) .
Denoting by Aβ,γ2 (G) ≡ 1n2 + β 4n3m+ − γ 4n3m− and B2 ≡ n−2n2 , this can be written as follows
π∗i (G) =
(
Aβ,γ2 (G) +B2
(
βd+i − γd−i
))
+O (βγ) .
This completes the proof.
Figure C.2 shows an illustration of the first-order approximation used to derive the equilibrium efforts
in equation (47), and the exact value for the total centrality
∑n
i=1 c
β,γ
i (G) for different values of β and γ for
a bowtie graph.
C.2 An Illustrative Example: From Hobbes to Rousseau
In this section, we provide a simple illustration of the role of alliances and enmities in the model with the
aid of a particular class of networks. A regular network, Gk+,k− , has the property that every group i has
d+i = k
+ alliances and d−i = k
− enmities. Thus, all groups have the same centrality. Regular graphs are
tractable and enable us to perform comparative statics with respect to the number of alliances or enmities.
Given the symmetric structure, there exists a symmetric Nash equilibrium such that all groups exercise the
same effort. Moreover, ϕ∗i = ϕ
∗ = 1/n, implying an equal division of the pie. Under the conditions of
Proposition 1, the equilibrium effort and payoff vectors are given by:
x∗
(
k+, k−
) ≡ x∗i (Gk+,k−) = ( 11 + βk+ − γk− − 1n
)
× 1
n
, (48)
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π∗
(
k+, k−
) ≡ π∗i (Gk+,k−) = 1 + (1 + n)(βk+ − γk−)n(1 + βk+ − γk−) × 1n. (49)
Standard differentiation implies that x∗ is decreasing in k+ and increasing in k−, whereas π∗ is increasing
in k+ and decreasing in k−. Intuitively, alliances (enmities) reduce (increase) effort and rent dissipation
by decreasing (increasing) the marginal return of individual fighting effort. This basic intuition must be
amended in general networks due to the asymmetries in higher-order links.
The regular graph nests three interesting particular cases. First, if β = γ = 0, we have a standard Tullock
game, with RD0,0
(
Gk+,k−
)
= (n− 1) /n. Second, consider a complete network of alliances (k+ = n − 1),
where, in addition, β → 1. Then, x∗ → 0 and RD1,γ (Gn−1,0)→ 0, i.e., there is no rent dissipation. Namely,
the society peacefully attains the equal split of the prize, as in Rousseau’s harmonious society. The crux is the
strong fighting externality across allied groups, which takes the marginal product of individual fighting effort
down to zero. Third, consider, conversely, a society in which all relationships are hostile, i.e., k− = n − 1.
Then, RDβ,γ (G0,n−1) → 1 as γ → 1/ (n− 1)2: all rents are dissipated through fierce fighting and total
destruction, as in Hobbes’ homo homini lupus pre-contractual society.
C.3 Appendix to Section 5.1
We next provide a complete characterization of the groups whose removal results in the greatest reduction
in the rent dissipation in terms of their position in the network.
Proposition 3. Let G\{i} be the network obtained from G by removing group i and assume that the
conditions in Proposition 1 hold. Then group i∗ ∈ N ≡ {1, . . . , n} ∪ ∅ whose removal results in the greatest
reduction in the rent dissipation is given by
i∗ = argmax
i∈N
{
RDβ,γ(G)− RDβ,γ(G\{i})
}
,
where
RDβ,γ(G) − RDβ,γ(G\{i})
= V Λβ,γ(G)(1 − Λβ,γ(G))

n∑
j=i
cβ,γj (G) +
∑
j 6=i
hβ,γi (G)(1 − (1− Λβ,γ(G))hβ,γi (G))
1− Λβ,γ(G)
×
n∑
k=1
[(
mβ,γjk (G)−
mβ,γij (G)m
β,γ
ik (G)
mβ,γii (G)
)
Γβ,γk (G)
(
1 + βd+k − γd−k
1 + β(d+k − 1)− γd−k
1{k∈N+i }
+
1 + βd+k − γd−k
1 + βd+k − γ(d−k − 1)
1{k∈N−i }
+ 1{k/∈(N+i ∪N
−
i )}
)]}
, (50)
and we have defined by
hβ,γi (G) ≡
1− β ∑
j∈N+i
Γβ,γj (G)(1 − Λβ,γ(G))
1 + β(d+j − 1)− γd−j
− γ
∑
j∈N−i
Γβ,γj (G)(1 − Λβ,γ(G))
1 + βd+j − γ(d−j − 1)
−1 ,
with mβ,γij (G) being the ij-th element of the matrix M
β,γ(G) = (In + βA
+ − γA−)−1.
Proof of Proposition 3. Let G\{i} be the network obtained from G by removing group i. Then the key
player i∗ ∈ N = {1, . . . , n} ∪ ∅ is given by
i∗ = argmax
i∈N
{
RDβ,γ(G)− RDβ,γ(G\{i})
}
.
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We can write the change in rent dissipation due to the removal of group i as follows
RDβ,γ(G)− RDβ,γ(G\{i}) = V Λβ,γ(G)(1 − Λβ,γ(G))
×
 n∑
j=1
cβ,γj (G)−
Λβ,γ(G\{i})(1− Λβ,γ(G\{i}))
Λβ,γ(G)(1 − Λβ,γ(G))
n∑
j=1
cβ,γj (G\{i})
 .
With
∑n
j=1 c
β,γ
j (G) =
∑n
j=1m
β,γ
jk (G)Γ
β,γ
k (G), where m
β,γ
ij (G) is the ij-th element of the matrix M
β,γ(G) =
(In + βA
+ − γA−)−1, we can write this as
RDβ,γ(G) − RDβ,γ(G\{i}) = V Λβ,γ(G)(1 − Λβ,γ(G))
cβ,γi (G) +∑
j 6=i
∑
k
(
mβ,γjk (G)Γ
β,γ
k (G)
−Λ
β,γ(G\{i})(1− Λβ,γ(G\{i}))
Λβ,γ(G)(1 − Λβ,γ(G)) m
β,γ
jk (G\{i})Γβ,γk (G\{i})
)]
.
Using the fact that (cf. Lemma 1 in Ballester et al. 2006)
mβ,γjk (G\{i}) = mβ,γjk (G)−
mβ,γij (G)m
β,γ
ik (G)
mβ,γii (G)
,
and denoting by
hβ,γi (G) ≡
Λβ,γ(G\{i})(1− Λβ,γ(G\{i}))
Λβ,γ(G)(1 − Λβ,γ(G))
=
1− β ∑
j∈N+i
Γβ,γj (1 − Λβ,γ(G))
1 + β(d+j − 1)− γd−j
− γ
∑
j∈N−i
Γβ,γj (1 − Λβ,γ(G))
1 + βd+j − γ(d−j − 1)
−1 ,
one can show that
RDβ,γ(G) − RDβ,γ(G\{i})
= V Λβ,γ(G)(1 − Λβ,γ(G))

n∑
j=1
cβ,γj (G) +
∑
j 6=i
hβ,γi (G)(1 − (1− Λβ,γ(G)))hβ,γi (G)
1− Λβ,γ(G)
×
n∑
k=1
[(
mβ,γjk (G)−
mβ,γij (G)m
β,γ
ik (G)
mβ,γii (G)
)
Γβ,γk (G)
(
1 + βd+k − γd−k
1 + β(d+k − 1)− γd−k
1{k∈N+i }
+
1 + βd+k − γd−k
1 + βd+k − γ(d−k − 1)
1{k∈N−i }
+ 1{k/∈(N+i ∪N
−
i )}
)] , (51)
where 1{k∈N+i }
and 1{k∈N−i }
are indicator variables taking the value of one if, respectively, k ∈ N+i and
k ∈ N−i , and zero otherwise. Then, the key player can be computed explicitly as
i∗ = argmax
i∈N

n∑
j=1
cβ,γj (G) +
∑
j 6=i
hβ,γi (G) (1−
(
1− Λβ,γ (G))hβ,γi (G))
1− Λβ,γ (G)
×
n∑
k=1
[(
mβ,γjk (G)−
mβ,γij (G)m
β,γ
ik (G)
mβ,γii (G)
)
Γβ,γk (G)
(
1 + βd+k − γd−k
1 + β
(
d+k − 1
)− γd−k 1{k∈N+i }
+
1 + βd+k − γd−k
1 + βd+k − γ
(
d−k − 1
)1{k∈N−i } + 1{k/∈(N+i ∪N−i )}
)]}
. (52)
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Observe that the group i∗ identified in Proposition 3 differs from the “key player” introduced in Ballester
et al. (2006). In the latter, the key player is defined as i∗ = argmaxi∈N bu,i(G,α)/Wi(G,α) with bu,i(G,α)
being the Katz-Bonacich centrality of group i in G andWi(G,α) being the generating function of the number
of closed walks that start and terminate at node i.44 Compared with our key player formula in equation
(50) we find that it is more involved. This is not surprising as the contest success function makes our payoff
function generically non-linear.
C.4 Appendix to Section 5.2
In this section, we develop the theoretical underpinning of the arms embargo that has been introduced in
Section 5.2. In Section C.4.1 we generalize our payoff function to allow for a arms embargo that increases the
marginal cost of fighting of the groups. We then show that this policy is equivalent to reducing the fighting
efforts of the groups by a proportional factor. Section C.4.2 defines the planner’s problem as a two-stage
game where, in the first stage, the planner chooses the policy intervention with the objective to minimize the
rent dissipation, while in the second stage, the groups take the policy as given and choose the fighting efforts
so as to maximize their payoffs. In particular, Section C.4.2 solves for the Nash equilibrium of the second
stage of the game, in which groups choose fighting efforts optimally, taking the policy as given. Section
C.4.2 then provides an explicit expression for the planner’s problem in the first stage, taking into account
the Nash equilibrium effort levels from the second stage, assuming that the planner chooses a bilevel policy
with only two possible values for the marginal fighting costs of the groups.
C.4.1 Payoffs
Consider a policy s ∈ S ⊂ Rn+ introduced by the planner to minimize the rent dissipation.45 We assume
that the policy s affects the groups’ OP. That is, the marginal cost of fighting of each group i changes from
one to 1 + si, so that the group i’s payoff can be written as follows:
πi (G,x) =

ϕi(G,x)∑
n
j=1 max{0,ϕj(G,x)}
− (1 + si)xi, if ϕi (G,x) ≥ 0,
−D, if ϕi (G,x) < 0,
(53)
where the group i’s OP, ϕi, depends on an idiosyncratic shifter ϕ˜i as in equation (11). The payoff function
in equation (53), assuming that the operational performance of i is positive, can then be written as
πi(G,x) =
xi + β
∑n
j=1 a
+
ijxj − γ
∑n
j=1 a
−
ijxj + ϕ˜i∑n
j=1max
{
0, xj + β
∑n
k=1 a
+
jkxk − γ
∑n
j=1 a
−
jkxk + ϕ˜j
} − (1 + si)xi. (54)
Observe that when denoting by ηi ≡ 11+si and introducing the the rescaled effort levels yi ≡ 1ηixi =
(1 + si)xi, equation (54) can be written as
πi(G,y) =
ηiyi + β
∑n
j=1 a
+
ijηjyj − γ
∑n
j=1 a
−
ijηjyj + ϕ˜i∑n
j=1max
{
0, ηjyj + β
∑n
k=1 a
+
jkηkyk − γ
∑n
j=1 a
−
jkηkyk + ϕ˜j
} − yi. (55)
Solving the Nash equilibrium for y∗ then yields the corresponding Nash equilibrium for x∗. Hence, there
exists a duality between efforts and cost rescaling. Notice also that without the network, G, and the shifters,
ϕ˜, equation (55) is equivalent to a contest success game with different relative effectiveness, (ηi)1≤i≤n, as it
has been considered in Stein (2002) and Baik (1994).
44See also equation (44) in the Appendix C.1.1.
45See also Section C.4.2 below.
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C.4.2 The Planner’s Problem
The planner’s objective is to maximize welfare defined as
W β,γ(G, s) =
n∑
i=1
π∗i (G, s) = 1−
n∑
i=1
x∗i (G, s) = 1− RDβ,γ(G, s), (56)
where the rent dissipation is
RDβ,γ(G, s) ≡
n∑
i=1
x∗i (G, s),
and x∗i (G, s) are the Nash equilibrium effort levels in the presence of the policy s. Obviously, maximizing
welfare is equivalent to minimizing the rent dissipation. Then planner then has to solve to following 2-stage
game:
First Stage: The planner (international agency) announces a policy s ∈ S to change the opportunity
costs of fighting of the groups in order to minimize the rent dissipation in equation (56).
Second Stage: After observing s, the groups choose their fighting efforts optimally (Nash equilibrium),
taking s as given. Then, payoffs are realized.
Second Stage In this section we solve the second stage of the game, in which groups choose fighting
efforts optimally, taking the policy s as given. The following proposition characterizes the corresponding
Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 4. Denote by D(s) ≡ diag(s1, . . . , sn), define the local hostility level as
Γβ,γi (G) ≡
1
1 + βd+i − γd−i
,
and let the weighted total local fighting intensity be given by
Λ˜β,γ(G, s) ≡ u
⊤Γβ,γ(G)− 1
u⊤(In +D(s))Γβ,γ(G)
. (57)
Assume that the same parameter restrictions on β and γ hold as in Proposition 1. Then for the cost of
defeat, D, large enough there exists a unique Nash equilibrium of the n–player simultaneous move game with
payoffs given by equation (53), groups’ OPs in equation (11) and strategy space Rn, where the equilibrium
effort levels are given by
x∗(G, s) = (In + βA
+ − γA−)−1
[
Λ˜β,γ(G, s)(In − Λ˜β,γ(G, s)(In +D(s))Γβ,γ(G)− ϕ˜
]
, (58)
for all i = 1, . . . , n.
Proof of Proposition 4. We start by considering an equilibrium in which all groups participate in the
contest (i.e. an interior equilibrium). The necessary FOCs can be written as
1
1 + si
∂πi
∂xi
=
1
1 + si
∑n
j=1 ϕj − ϕi(1 + βd+i − γd−i )(∑n
j=1 ϕj
)2 − 1 = 0. (59)
We then get
ϕi =
1
1 + βd+i − γd−i
1− (1 + si) n∑
j=1
ϕj
 n∑
j=1
ϕj .
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Summation over all i gives
n∑
j=1
ϕj =
1∑n
j=1
1+sj
1+βd+j −γd
−
j
 n∑
j=1
1
1 + βd+j − γd−j
− 1
 .
In the following we denote by
Λ˜β,γ(G, s) ≡ 1∑n
j=1
1+sj
1+βd+j −γd
−
j
 n∑
j=1
1
1 + βd+j − γd−j
− 1

=
1∑n
i=1(1 + si)Γ
β,γ
i (G)
(
n∑
i=1
Γβ,γi (G)− 1
)
=
u⊤Γβ,γ(G) − 1
u⊤(In +D(s))Γβ,γ(G)
,
so that we can write aggregate effective fighting effort as follows
n∑
j=1
ϕj = Λ˜
β,γ(G, s).
We then get
ϕi = Λ˜
β,γ(G, s)
(
1− (1 + si)Λ˜β,γ(G, s)
)
Γβ,γi (G),
and so we can write
xi + β
n∑
j=1
a+ijxj − γ
n∑
j=1
a−ijxj + ϕ˜i = Λ˜
β,γ(G, s)
(
1− (1 + si)Λ˜β,γ(G, s)
)
Γβ,γi (G).
In vector-matrix notation this is(
In + βA
+ − γA−)x = Λ˜β,γ(G, s)Γβ,γ(G,λ)− Λ˜β,γ(G, s)2(In +D(s))Γβ,γ(G,λ)− z,
where D(s) = diag {s1, . . . , sn}. When the matrix (In + βA+ − γA−) is invertible,46 we can write
x = Λ˜β,γ(G, s)
(
In + βA
+ − γA−)−1 Γβ,γ(G)
− Λ˜β,γ(G, s)2 (In + βA+ − γA−)−1 (In +D(s))Γβ,γ(G)− (In + βA+ − γA−)−1 z.
If we denote by Mβ,γ(G) ≡ (In + βA+ − γA−)−1 then we can write this as follows
x = Λ˜β,γ(G, s)Mβ,γ(G)
(
In − Λ˜β,γ(G, s)(In +D(s))
)
Γβ,γ(G)−Mβ,γ(G)ϕ˜.
From equation (59) we further find that
∂2πi
∂x2i
= − 2
Λ˜β,γ(G, s)Γβ,γi (G)
= −2
∑n
i=1(1 + si)Γ
β,γ
i (G)∑n
i=1 Γ
β,γ
i (G)− 1
(1 + βd+i − γd−i ), (60)
which is negative if Λ˜β,γ(G, s) > 0 and 1+βd+i −γd−i > 0. The last inequality implies that the local hostility
level of group i is positive, i.e. Γβ,γi (G) > 0. Observe from the definition of Λ˜
β,γ(G, s) > 0 in equation
(57) that Λ˜β,γ(G, s) > 0 if Λβ,γ(G) > 0. Hence, the same parameter restrictions as in Proposition 1 can be
applied here. Moreover, as in the proof of Proposition 1 one can then proceed to establish that there exists
a unique interior Nash equilibrium when the cost of defeat, D, is large enough.
From Proposition 4 it follows that the share of the territory appropriated by group i in the equilibrium
is given by
ϕi∑n
j=1 ϕj
=
(
1−
∑n
j=1 Γ
β,γ
j (G)− 1∑n
j=1
1+sj
1+si
Γβ,γj (G)
)
Γβ,γi (G),
and thus is decreasing with si, the policy targeting group i.
46See the proof of Proposition 1 for sufficient conditions that guarantee invertibility.
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First Stage In the following sections we provide an explicit expression for the planner’s problem, taking
into account the Nash equilibrium effort levels from the second stage (cf. Section C.4.2), when the planner
chooses a bilevel policy with two possible values s1 6= s2 and si = s1 for all i ∈ N1 while si = s2 for all
i ∈ N2 with N = {1, 2, . . . , n} = N1 ∪ N2.47 W.l.o.g. we set s2 = 0, s1 = s, and let N1 = {1, . . . , n1} and
N2 = {n1 + 1, . . . , n}. We then have that
D(s) =

s 0 · · · · · · 0
0
. . .
. . .
...
...
. . . s
. . .
...
... 0
. . . 0
...
. . .
. . . 0
0 · · · · · · 0 0

,
and we can write
Λ˜β,γ(G, s) =
u⊤Γβ,γ(G)− 1
u⊤(In +D(s))Γβ,γ(G)
=
∑n
i=1 Γ
β,γ
i (G)− 1
(1 + s)
∑n1
i=1 Γ
β,γ
i (G) +
∑n
i=n1+1
Γβ,γi (G)
=
u⊤Γβ,γ(G) − 1
(1 + s)u⊤1 Γ
β,γ(G) + u⊤2 Γ
β,γ(G)
,
where we have denoted by u1 = (1, . . . , 1, 0, . . . , 0)
⊤ and u2 = (0, . . . , 0, 1, . . . , 1)
⊤. Further, let Mβ,γ(G) =
(In+βA
+−γA−)−1, u be a column vector of ones, then with equation (58) we can write the rent dissipation
as follows
RDβ,γ(G, s) = u⊤x∗(G, s)
= u⊤Mβ,γ(G)
[
Λ˜β,γ(G, s)(In − Λ˜β,γ(G, s)(In +D(s))Γβ,γ(G)− ϕ˜
]
= Λ˜β,γ(G, s)u⊤Mβ,γ(G)Γβ,γ(G)
− Λ˜β,γ(G, s)2u⊤Mβ,γ(G)(In +D(s))Γβ,γ(G)
− u⊤Mβ,γ(G)ϕ˜. (61)
The planner’s problem is then to choose a value of s such that the rent dissipation RDβ,γ(G, s) from in
equation (61) is minimized, given the partition N = N1 ∪ N2.
47Note that the number of partitions of N into two mutually disjoint non-empty subsets whose union is N is given
by 2n−1 − 1 (see Prop. 3.10, in Joshi 1989: 101). For n = 80 this is 6.0446 × 1023. Because this large number is
computationally infeasible, in our experiments in Section 5.2 we consider only partitions among up to 15 groups with
16, 383 possible cases.
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C.5 Appendix to Section 3
C.5.1 Fighting Groups
In the paper, we discuss pros and cons of different datasets. In column 7 of the baseline Table 1 we show
robustness of the main findings with respect to using geo-coordinates from GED for the ACLED events to
which they can be matched. This serves the purpose of addressing the concerns of Eck (2012) arguing that
geo-coordinates of ACLED are sometimes imprecise. We proceed as follows:
1. The first step is to automatically match events based on the date. In particular, to each event in
ACLED, all those events in GED are associated that may be matches given information on the date
of the event. We construct a time buffer of +/-2 days around each event in GED to allow for possibly
imprecise measurement of the date. We also account for differences in the definition of multi-day
events across both data sets by splitting the GED event into a separate event for each day of its
duration.
2. Among these candidate matches we keep only those event-pairs for which at least one armed group of
the potential match is present for both data sets.
3. To further reduce the set of acceptable event-pairs we require that either of the following two conditions
holds true: i) The GED event involves only non-civilians and for both sides of the conflict, we can
find at least one common fighting party across the datasets. ii) The GED event is a conflict between
civilians and some armed group, which is also involved (on either side) in the corresponding ACLED
event (here we account for the fact that GED tends to report civilians when ACLED would report
armed groups).
4. Next, whenever an event in either of the datasets comes with information about fatalities, we use this
information to classify the event according to three “atrocity categories”: low (# fatalities < 25th
percentile), medium (# fatalities ≥ 25th percentile & < 75th percentile) or high (# fatalities ≥ 75
percentile). We eliminate candidate matches for which fatality numbers are high in one dataset and
low in the other one.
5. Finally, for every ACLED event that is still associated with more than one event from GED, we keep
only the event pair that minimizes the distance between the specified locations in GED and ACLED.
6. We then go manually through the set of these candidate matches, comparing any available information
describing a particular event in the datasets. We confirm a match whenever the distance between two
algorithmically matched events (steps 1-5) is lower than a hundred kilometers and/or our manual
inspection reveals that the events are identical.
Out of the total of 1641 events in GED, the ones that successfully pass through all six steps are called
confirmed match (1090 events), the ones going through the most basic automatic steps 1-2 but being weeded
out afterwards are called inconclusive (149 events), while all other GED events are called unmatched (402
events). For the confirmed matches, we replace in column 7 the coordinates in ACLED with the respective
coordinates in GED. This conservative coding minimizes the risk of introducing wrong georeferences in the
dataset.
In column 8 of the baseline Table 1 we build a so-called superdataset that is the union of GED and
ACLED. In particular, we start out from the dataset of column 7 that has replaced the ACLED geo-
coordinates with GED geo-coordinates for the 1090 confirmed matches. To this dataset we add the 402
clear-cut unmatched cases for which we can be confident that they are not present in the ACLED dataset.
This conservative approach minimizes the risk of double-counting events.
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Other alternative georeferenced datasets Below we shall discuss two further georeferenced datasets
of violence in the DRC, and discuss for which reasons we could not draw on them in our study.
First of all, Van der Windt and Humphreys (2016) conduct a localized study (Voix des Kivus) in 18
villages in the Southern Kivu province in 2011 entrusting selected villagers to collect information and send
SMS coded reports about violent events (e.g. violence against women, riots or attacks against the village).
During a period of eighteen months Voix des Kivus received about 5,000 messages, while ACLED reports
only 50 events. It is not surprising that villagers report minor episodes that do not make their way into the
press. Although this pilot study is very useful, it is difficult for us to draw formal comparisons, since Voix
des Kivus does for confidentiality reasons not reveal the name of the village where a given event took place.
Another georeferenced dataset of political violence is GDELT (Leetaru and Schrodt 2013), which follows
a “Big Data” approach and relies on automatic computer coding. Compared to ACLED and GED, GDELT
has the advantage of worldwide coverage. However, it is –at least as far as the DRC is concerned– much less
precise and more prone to errors. In particular, in most cases different rebel groups are not distinguished
and just called “rebels” or “Congolese”. The computer algorithm also relatively often fails to filter out
the correct actors involved (e.g. “Reuters” often appears as actor rather than source). Further, like GED,
GDELT restricts the number of actors in an event to a total of two, which makes it unsuitable to be used
for detecting alliances.
C.5.2 The Network
While in the main text we discuss the construction of the fighting network in some depth, there are two
aspects on which we shall elaborate here. First, we shall explain in more detail the rationale underlying the
choice of our four sources of expert coding. Second, we will discuss in more details the few cases showing
changes in alliances and enmities.
As listed in the main text, our primary sources for constructing the network of enmities and alliances are
four expert classifications of links in the Second Congo War. In particular, (i) the Yearbook of the Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI (Seybolt 2000), (ii) “Non-State Actor data” (Cunningham et
al. 2013), (iii) Briefing on the Congo War by the International Crisis Group (1998), and (iv) a summary
account of the war by Williams (2013).
The sources (i) and (ii) are most comprehensive and cover the large actors. SIPRI lists both alliances and
enmities between the major actors, including both actors operating in the same region and groups fighting
in different parts of the country but supporting each other logistically. The “Non-State Actor data” is based
on the Uppsala Armed Conflict Data about civil conflicts augmented with information about the non-state
actors involved and about the external support to active groups. The sources (iii) and (iv) supplement the
main information from (i) and (ii), by covering also some smaller groups that are left out by (i) and (ii).
Source (iii) has the advantage of being collected by a major intelligence provider on conflict with extensive
local knowledge. However, it has the disadvantage of dating back to the beginning of the conflict. In contrast,
source (iv) is more recent.
The second aspect of network construction that we want to emphasize here is the potential worry about
possible changes in the system of alliances involving small groups that we might be unaware of. To detect
such possible cases, we focus on dyads classified as neutral featuring an inconsistent battlefield behavior,
namely neutral dyads that are observed fighting more than once as brother-in-arms and more than once on
opposite sides. With this definition, we have 8 inconsistent dyads. Among them, we should be especially
worried about cases where we observe a clear structural break, namely, when there exists a threshold year
T ∈ {1998, . . . , 2010} such that two groups would be classified as allies (enemies) if one restricted attention
to the years up to T, while the same two groups would be classified as enemies (allies) if one considered
the years after T. This would suggest a reshuﬄe in the alliance in conflict with our assumption of a stable
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network. Altogether, this problem arises for only two dyads.48 This suggests that the problem of changing
alliances is not severe. In the remaining six cases, inconsistencies may arise from tactical behavior, thereby
suggesting that two groups are neither solid allies nor enemies. Four of the eight inconsistent observations
concern the Mayi-Mayi militia, a group that has no centralized structure and that is prone to tactical shifts.
List of network links Table C.1 below reports a list of all 80 groups of our sample indicating the number
of allies (d+) and the number of enemies (d−) of each group, as well as listing the acronyms of allies and
enemies.49
48The two dyads are the Burundi-based CNDD(FDD) and the RCD-G, and the RCD and MayMay Militia. In
the first case, the narrative is inconclusive. In the second case, the narrative would suggest a hostile relationship.
However, we have no information from our expert sources. In addition the two groups fight alongside in one quarter
of the events. Therefore, we stick to our rule not to hand-code links, and classify them as neutral.
49In the Appendix tables, we use the shorter acronyms RWA94 and RWA00 for Rwanda-I and Rwanda-II, respec-
tively. When listing groups we order them according to their Africa-wide involvement in fighting events (i.e. we list
more active groups first).
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Table C.1: List of groups with their alliances and enemies.
Name Acronym d+ d− Names allies Names enemies
LRA: Lord’s Resistance Army LRA 1 6 SUDAN UGANDA, SPLA, FARDC-LK, FARDC-JK
RWA00, UELE
UNITA: National Union for the Total UNITA 4 3 UGANDA, RWA94, RCD, DSP ANGOLA, FARDC-LK, NAMIBIA
Independence of Angola
FAA/MPLA: Military Forces of Angola ANGOLA 4 5 FARDC-LK, ZIMBABWE, FARDC-JK UNITA, UGANDA, RCD-G, RWA94, RCD-K
(1975-) NAMIBIA
Military Forces of Uganda (1986-) UGANDA 9 13 UNITA, BURUNDI, SPLA, RWA94 LRA, ANGOLA, HUTU, SUDAN, FARDC-LK
RCD-K, MLC, RCD, HEMA, UELE ADF, FDLR, MM, INTERAH, FARDC-JK
UPC, LENDU, RWA00
Hutu Rebels HUTU 2 3 FARDC-LK, MM UGANDA, RCD-G, RWA94
Military Forces of Burundi (1996-2005) BURUNDI 3 1 UGANDA, RWA94, RCD CNDD
SPLA/M: Sudanese People’s SPLA 1 1 UGANDA LRA
Liberation Army/Movement
Military Forces of Sudan (1993-) SUDAN 4 3 LRA, FARDC-LK, ADF, FARDC-JK UGANDA, RCD-K, MLC
FNL: National Forces of Liberation FNL 1 2 FDLR CNDD, FARDC-JK
Military Forces of Democratic Republic FARDC-LK 21 16 ANGOLA, HUTU, SUDAN, ADF, FDLR, LRA, UNITA, UGANDA, RCD-G,
of Congo (Kabila, L.) MM, CNDD, ZIMBABWE, CHAD, INTERAH RWA94, RCD-K, MLC, RCD,
LENDU, ADFL, NAMIBIA, RWA73, SAF HEMA, MUTINY, ALIR, FLC,
MM-P, MM-Y, MM-K, MM-L, MM-J, MM-M RWA00, BANYA, RCD-M, RCD-N
ADF: Allied Democratic Forces ADF 4 3 SUDAN, FARDC-LK, MM, NALU UGANDA, RWA94, FARDC-JK
RCD: Rally for Congolese Democracy RCD-G 4 14 RWA94, RCD, RWA00, RCD-N ZIMBABWE, INTERAH, RCD-K, MLC,
(Goma) FARDC-JK, ADFL, NAMIBIA, RWA73,
SAF, CNDD-N
FDLR: Democratic Forces for the FDLR 6 5 FNL, FARDC-LK, INTERAH, MM-P, UGANDA, CNDP, POLICE,
Liberation of Rwanda MM-Y, APCLS RWA00, RUD
Military Forces of Rwanda (1994-1999) RWA94 7 10 UNITA, UGANDA, BURUNDI, RCD-G, ANGOLA, HUTU, FARDC-LK, ADF,
ADFL, RCD, MUTINY ZIMBABWE, INTERAH, FARDC-JK,
NAMIBIA, RWA73, ALIR
Mayi-Mayi Milita MM 7 6 HUTU, FARDC-LK, ADF, FARDC-JK, UGANDA, RCD-G, RCD-K,
RWA73, MM-P, CNDD-N FLC, RWA00, ZAMBIA
CNDD-FDD: National Council for the CNDD 1 3 FARDC-LK BURUNDI, FNL, INTERAH
Defence of Democracy – Forces
for the Defence of Democracy
Military Forces of Zimbabwe (1980-) ZIMBABWE 6 4 ANGOLA, FARDC-LK, INTERAH RCD-G, RWA94, RCD-K
FARDC-JK, NAMIBIA, SAF FLC
Military Forces of Chad (1990-) CHAD 2 1 FARDC-LK, FARDC-JK RCD-K
Interahamwe Hutu Ethnic Militia INTERAH 5 7 FARDC-LK, FDLR, ZIMBABWE UGANDA, RCD-G, RWA94,
FARDC-JK, RCD-M CNDD, MLC, RCD, RWA00
RCD: Rally for Congolese Democracy RCD-K 5 13 UGANDA, LENDU, RCD, ANGOLA, SUDAN, FARDC-LK
(Kisangani) NGITI, RCD-N RCD-G, MM, ZIMBABWE
CHAD, MLC, FARDC-JK,
UPC, NAMIBIA, HEMA, RWA00
CNDP: National Congress for CNDP 2 3 MUTINY, RWA00 FDLR, FARDC-JK, MM-P
the Defense of the People
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Table C.1 cont.: List of groups with their alliances and enemies.
Name Acronym d+ d− Names allies Names enemies
MLC: Congolese Liberation Movement MLC 4 7 UGANDA, RCD, RWA00, SUDAN, FARDC-LK, RCD-G,
RCD-N INTERAH, RCD-K, FARDC-JK,
IHEMA
Military Forces of Democratic Republic FARDC-JK 16 26 ANGOLA, SUDAN, MM, ZIMBABWE LRA, UGANDA, FNL, ADF
of Congo (Kabila, J.) CHAD, INTERAH, LENDU, NAMIBIA, RCD-G, RWA94, RCD-K, CNDP,
RWA73, POLICE, MM-P, MLC, UPC, RCD, FNI,
MM-Y, MM-K, MM-L, MM-J, FPJC, FRPI, MUTINY, MRC,
MM-M NALU, RWA00, UPPS, BDK,
ENYELE, LOBALA, FRF,
APCLS, MUNZ, MINEM
UPC: Union of Congolese Patriots UPC 1 5 HEMA UGANDA, RCD-K, FARDC-JK,
LENDU, PUSIC
Lendu Ethnic Militia (DRC) LENDU 3 6 FARDC-LK, RCD-K, UGANDA, UPC, RCD,
FARDC-JK HEMA, PUSIC, WAGE
ADFL: Alliance of Democratic Forces for Liberation ADFL 2 2 FARDC-LK, RWA94 RCD-G, RWA00
(Congo-Zaire) (1996-1997)
RCD: Rally for Congolese Democracy RCD 11 4 UNITA, UGANDA, BURUNDI, FARDC-LK, INTERAH,
RCD-G, RWA94, RCD-K, MLC, FARDC-JK, LENDU
HEMA, RWA00, RCD-M, RCD-N
Military Forces of Zaire (1965-1997) ZAIRE 0 0
Military Forces of Namibia (1990-2005) NAMIBIA 4 4 ANGOLA, FARDC-LK, UNITA, RCD-G, RWA94,
ZIMBABWE, FARDC-JK RCD-K
FNI: Nationalist and Integrationist Front FNI 1 1 MRC FARDC-JK
Former Military Forces of Rwanda (1973-1994) RWA73 3 3 FARDC-LK, MM, FARDC-JK RCD-G, RWA94, RWA00
FPJC: Popular Front for Justice in Congo FPJC 0 1 FARDC-JK
FRPI: Front for Patriotic Resistance of Ituri FRPI 1 2 MRC FARDC-JK, MUTINY
Hema Ethnic Militia (DRC) HEMA 4 5 UGANDA, UPC, RCD, FARDC-LK, RCD-K, MLC,
ALUR LENDU, LENDU-U
Mutiny of Military Forces of Democratic MUTINY 2 3 RWA94, CNDP FARDC-LK, FARDC-JK, FRPI
Republic of Congo (2003-) 2 3
ALIR: Army for the Liberation of Rwanda ALIR 0 2 FARDC-LK, RWA94
MRC: Revolutionary Movement of Congo MRC 2 1 FNI, FRPI FARDC-JK
NALU: National Army for the Liberation of Uganda NALU 2 1 ADF, ADC FARDC-JK
FLC: Congolese Liberation Front FLC 0 3 FARDC-LK, MM, ZIMBABWE
Military Forces of South Africa (1994-1999) SAF 2 1 FARDC-LK, ZIMBABWE RCD-G
Police Forces of Democratic Republic of Congo POLICE 1 1 FARDC-JK FDLR
(2001-2011)
Mayi Mayi Militia (PARECO) MM-P 4 1 FARDC-LK, FDLR, MM, FARDC-JK CNDP
PUSIC: Party for the Unity and Safekeeping PUSIC 0 2 UPC, LENDU
of Congo’s Integrity
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Table C.1 cont.: List of groups with their alliances and enemies.
Name Acronym d+ d− Names allies Names enemies
Military Forces of Rwanda (2000-) RWA00 4 11 RCD-G, CNDP, MLC, LRA, UGANDA, FARDC-LK,
RCD FDLR, MM, INTERAH, RCD-K,
FARDC-JK, ADFL, RWA73,
RCD-M
UPPS: Union for Democracy and Social Progress Party (DRC) UPPS 0 1 FARDC-JK
Mayi-Mayi Militia (Yakutumba) MM-Y 3 0 FARDC-LK, FDLR, FARDC-JK
PRA: People’s Redemption Army PRA 0 0
BDK: Bunda Dia Kongo BDK 0 1 FARDC-JK
Military Forces of Zambia (1991-2002 ) ZAMBIA 0 1 MM
PPRD: People’s Party for Reconstruction and Democracy PPRD 0 0
RUD: Gathering for Unity and Democracy RUD 0 1 FDLR
Enyele Ethnic Militia (DRC) ENYELE 0 1 FARDC-JK
Lobala (Enyele) Militia LOBALA 0 2 FARDC-JK, BOMBO
Mayi-Mayi Militia (Kifuafua) MM-K 2 0 FARDC-LK, FARDC-JK
FRF: Federal Republican Forces FRF 0 1 FARDC-JK
APCLS: Alliance of Patriots for a Free and Sovereign Congo APCLS 1 1 FDLR FARDC-JK
Banyamulenge Ethnic Militia (DRC) BANYA 0 1 FARDC-LK
Lendu Ethnic Militia (Uganda) LENDU-U 0 1 HEMA
Munzaya Ethnic Militia (DRC) MUNZ 0 1 FARDC-JK
Alur Ethnic Militia (Uganda) ALUR 1 0 HEMA
Haut-Uele Resident Militia UELE 1 1 UGANDA LRA
Mayi Mayi Milita (Cmdt La Fontaine) MM-L 2 1 FARDC-LK, FARDC-JK MM-J
Mayi-Mayi Militia (Cmdt Jackson) MM-J 2 1 FARDC-LK, FARDC-JK MM-L
Minembwe Dissidents MINEM 0 1 FARDC-JK
Bomboma Ethnic Militia BOMBO 0 1 LOBALA
DSP: Division Speciale Presidentelle DSP 1 0 UNITA
Group of 47 G47 0 0
Ngiti Ethnic Militia NGITI 1 0 RCD-K
RCD: Rally for Congolese Democracy (Masunzu) RCD-M 3 2 INTERAH, RCD, RCD-N FARDC-LK, RWA00
Wageregere Ethnic Militia WAGE 0 1 LENDU
Alliance for Democratic Change ADC 1 0 NALU
CNDD-FDD: National Council for the Defense of CNDD-N 1 1 MM RCD-G
Democracy-Ndayikengurukiye faction
RCD: Rally for Congolese Democracy (National) RCD-N 5 1 RCD-G, RCD-K, MLC, RCD, RCD-M FARDC-LK
FAP: Popular Self-Defense Forces FAP 0 0
Hutu Refugees (Rwanda) HUTU-R 0 0
Mayi Mayi Militia (Mbuayi) MM-M 2 0 FARDC-LK, FARDC-JK
Mbingi Community Militia (DRC) MBINGI 0 0
Mutiny of LRA: Lord’s Resistance Army MUTLRA 0 0
Pygmy Ethnic Group (DRC) PYGMY 0 0
Wangilima Ethnic Militia WANGI 0 0
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C.6 Appendix to Section 4
C.6.1 Migration
The outbreak of the Second Congo War in 1998 has led to large-scale internal migration, with the peak of
3.4 million internally displaced people (IDPs) being reached at the end of 2003 (White 2014). The number
of IDPs has somewhat dropped since then, but remains high until today (fluctuating between one and three
million people in the past 10 years). Most IDPs are accounted for by North Kivu, Province Orientale (mainly
Ituri), South Kivu and Katanga (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2009).
According to Zeender and Rothing (2010: 10), “the vast majority of IPD’s find refuge outside camp
settings, whether with host families in other villages and urban areas, or in forests. Very often people are
displaced on multiple occasions but for a short time”. Ethnic and family ties play a crucial role and drive
moving decisions to large extent: “Displaced would reportedly go to a location where they knew they had
family or at least members of their same ethnic group. If there were difficulties in going to a place where
family or their ethnic group could be found, groups of displaced would go to larger towns with a mixed
ethnic profile, such as Kiwanja/Rutshuru or Goma” (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2009: 69).
One challenge to the exclusion restriction could be migration triggered by weather shocks. One could
imagine a situation where averse weather shocks hitting a group i’s allies j or enemies k leads people from j
or k to move to i, and the presence of new arrivers could cause tensions and ultimately increase fighting effort
of i. In this case there would be a violation of the exclusion restriction that j and k’s rainfall should only
affect i’s fighting effort through the channel of j and k’s fighting effort. While in some countries this could be
a valid concern, in the case of the DRC this seems unlikely to matter empirically. According to White (2014)
the quasi-totality of migration movements in the DRC in the last decades have been caused by conflict and
concerns about security (i.e. only 0.7% of migrants indicate fleeing from “natural catastrophes”, with all
other reported categories been conflict/security related). Given that the displacements are a consequence of
conflict (Refugee Studies Center 2010), it seems hence very unlikely in the DRC context that lack of rain
lets people leave their fields, which is often the only resource they have at disposal for making a living.
This strong reliance on access to their fields also makes that “people reportedly try to stay close to home
so that they can monitor their lands and track the local security situation. (. . . ) IDPs travel between half
a day to one and a half days to reach a place of safety” (White 2014: 6). Or in the words of the Internal
Displacement Monitoring Centre (2009: 69), “Generally, respondents indicated a preference to stay as close
to their home locations as possible. Reasons for this included, being in a familiar rural environment, being
close to their homes to monitor security or to access their banana plantations, root crops or fields. (. . . )
The nature of the displacement movements that we see in North Kivu and Ituri is often over short distances
from 5 to 80 kilometers”. This means that even when people seek shelter, they are unlikely to travel far
away and hence not overly likely to penetrate zones of activity of other groups.
Further, if there were to be isolated cases of rainfall shocks triggering migration waves, one would –a
priori—expect the impact of rain on the willingness to migrate to be similar for different groups j and k,
while in our first stage regressions we detect opposite signs for rainfall shocks hitting allies and enemies of a
given group i.
Note also that the waging of the war and the implied displacements have also led to a collapse of
internal trade: “The displacement of farmers, the burning of fields and food stocks, and the destruction
of infrastructure have made trade and commerce extremely difficult (. . . )” (Zeender and Rothing 2010:
11). This has important consequences for our identification strategy. A potential threat to the exclusion
restriction would be that rain fall shocks hitting group i’s allies j and enemies k could affect internal trade
and thereby could have a direct impact on fighting effort of group i, other than going through the fighting
efforts of j and k. However, the fact that fighting led to a collapse in internal trade attenuates concerns
about the violation of the exclusion restriction.
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C.6.2 Alternative Spatial Kernels
In Section 4, we discuss issues related to spatial dependence in our data. In Section 4.1, we estimate standard
errors with a spatial HAC correction allowing for both cross-sectional spatial correlation and location-specific
serial correlation, following Conley (1999 and 2008). We program a STATA code that allows us to estimate
Conley standard errors in a flexible fashion. In the spatial dimension we retain a radius of 150 km for
the spatial kernel. More specifically, the weighs in the covariance matrix are assumed to decay linearly
with the distance from the central point of a group’s homeland, reaching zero after 150km. We impose no
constraint on the temporal decay for the Newey-West/Bartlett kernel that governs serial correlation across
time periods.
In this section, we show the robustness of our results to an alternative spatial kernel. In Tables C.2 and
C.3 we replicate the baseline tables of the main text (second stage Table 1 and first stage Table 2), but using
a spatial threshold for correlated standard errors of 500 km (instead of 150 km). The results are very similar
to the baseline and –if anything– stronger.
Further, in Tables C.4 and C.5 we take the other extreme stand and shut down all spatial correlation.
Concretely, we simply cluster standard errors at the group level. Again, the results are very similar to the
ones presented in the baseline Tables 1 and 2.
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Table C.2: Benchmark second stage (spatial 500km).
Dependent variable: Total fighting
OLS Reduced IV Full IV Neutrals Battles d− ≥ 1 ∧ d+ ≥ 1 GED coord. GED union
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Total Fight. Enemies (TFE) 0.066*** 0.130** 0.066*** 0.083*** 0.081*** 0.091*** 0.084*** 0.125***
(0.014) (0.053) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.020) (0.016) (0.030)
Total Fight. Allies (TFA) 0.001 -0.218*** -0.117*** -0.114*** -0.117*** -0.157*** -0.112*** -0.117***
(0.012) (0.081) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.034) (0.021) (0.025)
Total Fight. Neutrals (TFN) – – – 0.004 0.004 0.013 0.004 0.006
– – – (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.003) (0.003)
Additional controls Reduced Reduced Full Full Full Full Full Full
Estimator OLS IV IV IV IV IV IV IV
Set of Instrument Variables n.a. Restricted Full Full Full Full Full Full
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat n.a. 17.4 48.0 62.0 52.0 77.0 60.1 31.2
Hansen J (p-value) n.a. 0.32 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Observations 1040 1040 1040 1040 988 598 1040 1781
R-squared 0.510 0.265 0.579 0.568 0.567 0.537 0.569 0.516
Note: An observation is a given armed group in a given year. The panel contains 80 armed groups between 1998 and 2010. All regressions include
group fixed effects and control for rainfall in the group’s homeland. Columns 1-3 include time fixed effects. Robust standard errors corrected for
Spatial HAC in parentheses (distance threshold 500 km). Significance levels are indicated by * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table C.3: Baseline first stage (spatial 500 km).
IV regression of column (2) IV regression of column (3) IV regression of column (4)
Dep. Variable: TFE TFA TFE TFA TFE TFA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rain (t− 1) Enem. -1.595*** -0.019 -1.354*** 0.277 -1.327*** 0.291**
(0.195) (0.141) (0.259) (0.172) (0.243) (0.139)
Sq. Rain (t− 1) Enem. 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** -0.000 0.000*** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Rain (t− 1) All. 0.126 -0.929*** 0.028 -0.588*** 0.089 -0.571***
(0.308) (0.117) (0.232) (0.149) (0.224) (0.188)
Sq. Rain (t− 1) All. -0.000* 0.000*** -0.000 0.000*** -0.000 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Current Rain Enem. – – -1.125*** 0.131* -0.937*** 0.073
– – (0.165) (0.076) (0.168) (0.089)
Sq. Curr. Rain Enem. – – 0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000***
– – (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Current Rain All. – – -0.461** -0.366*** -0.414* -0.448***
– – (0.205) (0.080) (0.226) (0.139)
Sq. Curr. Rain All. – – 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000***
– – (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 17.4 17.4 48.0 48.0 62.0 62.0
Hansen J (p-value) 0.32 0.32 0.97 0.97 0.99 0.99
Observations 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040
Note: An observation is a given armed group in a given year. The panel contains 80 armed groups between 1998
and 2010. All regressions include group fixed effects and control for rainfall in the group’s homeland. Columns 1-4
contain time fixed effects. Robust standard errors corrected for Spatial HAC in parentheses (spatial threshold 500 km).
Significance levels are indicated by * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table C.4: Benchmark second stage (clustering at group level).
Dependent variable: Total fighting
OLS Reduced IV Full IV Neutrals Battles d− ≥ 1 ∧ d+ ≥ 1 GED coord. GED union
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Total Fight. Enemies (TFE) 0.066*** 0.130** 0.066*** 0.083*** 0.081*** 0.091*** 0.084*** 0.125***
(0.015) (0.055) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.025) (0.021) (0.037)
Total Fight. Allies (TFA) 0.001 -0.218*** -0.117*** -0.114*** -0.117** -0.157** -0.112*** -0.117***
(0.020) (0.082) (0.045) (0.043) (0.047) (0.068) (0.041) (0.042)
Total Fight. Neutrals (TFN) – – – 0.004 0.004 0.013 0.004 0.006
– – – (0.005) (0.005) (0.013) (0.004) (0.005)
Additional controls Reduced Reduced Full Full Full Full Full Full
Estimator OLS IV IV IV IV IV IV IV
Set of Instrument Variables n.a. Restricted Full Full Full Full Full Full
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat n.a. 10.3 11.1 13.7 12.9 12.3 14.0 6.8
Hansen J (p-value) n.a. 0.11 0.67 0.50 0.39 0.55 0.48 0.46
Observations 1040 1040 1040 1040 988 598 1040 1781
R-squared 0.510 0.265 0.579 0.568 0.567 0.537 0.569 0.516
Note: An observation is a given armed group in a given year. The panel contains 80 armed groups between 1998 and 2010. All regressions
include group fixed effects and control for rainfall in the group’s homeland. Columns 1-3 include time fixed effects. Robust standard errors
clustered at group level in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table C.5: Baseline first stage (clustering at group level).
IV regression of column (2) IV regression of column (3) IV regression of column (4)
Dep. Variable: TFE TFA TFE TFA TFE TFA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rain (t− 1) Enemies -1.595*** -0.019 -1.354*** 0.277* -1.327*** 0.291*
(0.250) (0.143) (0.322) (0.161) (0.311) (0.155)
Sq. Rain (t− 1) Enem. 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** -0.000 0.000*** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Rain (t− 1) Allies 0.126 -0.929*** 0.028 -0.588*** 0.089 -0.571**
(0.309) (0.164) (0.262) (0.203) (0.262) (0.227)
Sq. Rain (t− 1) All. -0.000 0.000*** -0.000 0.000*** -0.000 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Current Rain Enemies – – -1.125*** 0.131 -0.936*** 0.073
– – (0.259) (0.127) (0.274) (0.126)
Sq. Curr. Rain Enem. – – 0.000*** -0.000** 0.000* -0.000*
– – (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Current Rain Allies -0.461** -0.366*** -0.414** -0.448***
(0.210) (0.135) (0.203) (0.160)
Sq. Curr. Rain All. – – 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000***
– – (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 10.3 10.3 11.1 11.1 13.7 13.7
Hansen J (p-value) 0.11 0.11 0.67 0.67 0.50 0.50
Observations 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040
Note: An observation is a given armed group in a given year. The panel contains 80 armed groups between 1998 and
2010. All regressions include group fixed effects and control for rainfall in the group’s homeland. Columns 1-4 contain
time fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at group level in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by *
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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C.6.3 Appendix to Section 4.2.1
In Subsection 4.2.1 we show that our baseline results are robust to a time-varying network, taking into
account periods of activities of the armed groups in our sample. Table C.6 below lists the window of activity
used for every group.
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Table C.6: Window of activity used for every group.
Name Start End Name Start End
LRA 1998 2010 POLICE 2001 2010
UNITA 1998 2010 MM-P 2006 2009
ANGOLA 1998 2010 PUSIC 2003 2004
UGANDA 1998 2010 RWA00 2000 2010
HUTU 1998 2005 UPPS 2005 2010
BURUNDI 1998 2010 MM-Y 2008 2010
SPLA 1998 2010 PRA 2006 2006
SUDAN 1998 2010 BDK 2006 2008
FNL 1998 2010 ZAMBIA 1998 2010
FARDC-LK 1998 2001 PPRD 2006 2010
ADF 1998 2010 RUD 2008 2008
RCD-G 1998 2010 ENYELE 2009 2010
FDLR 2000 2010 LOBALA 2009 2010
RWA94 1998 1999 MM-K 2009 2009
MM 1998 2010 FRF 2002 2010
CNDD 1998 2002 APCLS 2008 2010
ZIMBABWE 1998 2010 BANYA 2001 2001
CHAD 1998 2010 LENDU-U 2002 2003
INTERAH 1998 2010 MUNZ 2009 2010
RCD-K 1998 2010 ALUR 2002 2002
CNDP 2006 2010 UELE 2009 2009
MLC 1998 2010 MM-L 2007 2007
FARDC-JK 2002 2010 MM-J 2007 2007
UPC 2001 2005 MINEM 2007 2007
LENDU 1999 2003 BOMBO 2009 2009
ADFL 2002 2002 DSP 1998 1999
RCD 1999 2004 G47 2007 2008
ZAIRE 2004 2004 NGITI 2002 2009
NAMIBIA 1998 2010 RCD-M 2002 2002
FNI 2003 2010 WAGE 1999 1999
RWA73 1999 2004 ADC 2010 2010
FPJC 2008 2010 CNDD-N 2002 2002
FRPI 2002 2010 RCD-N 2002 2002
HEMA 2000 2003 FAP 1999 1999
MUTINY 1998 2008 HUTU-R 2009 2009
ALIR 1998 2001 MM-M 2007 2007
MRC 2005 2007 MBINGI 2009 2009
NALU 1998 2010 MUTLRA 2008 2008
FLC 2001 2001 PYGMY 2009 2009
SAF 1998 2010 WANGI 2000 2000
Note: This table lists the windows of activity of groups defined by expert coding and ACLED, as used in columns
1 and 4 of Table 3 (for the other columns see the explanations in the text). We did not restrict the windows of
activity of state actors because these are always in existence (besides for DRC and Rwanda, as discussed). For the
other groups, when no expert sources were available we sticked to the ACLED window of activity. For the groups
with expert sources available, see listed below the sources used (with clickable links): LRA: Human Rights Watch;
UNITA: Encyclopedia Britannica; FNL: International Crisis Group Africa Briefing, 6 August 2002 (p. 6); ADF:
International Crisis Group Africa Briefing N93 (p. 1); RCD: GlobalSecurity.org; FDLR: UN report: S/2008/43 (p. 9);
Interahamwe Hutu Ethnic Militia: Human Rights Watch (p. 8); RCD: GlobalSecurity.org; CNDP:
Human Rights Watch (p. 3); MLC: Human Rights Watch (p. 15); UPC: Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium;
FPJC: UN report: S/2008/773 (p. 30); FRPI: Human Rights Watch (p. 16); ALIR: UN Report (footnote 1094 on p. 306);
NALU: UN Report (p. 173); FLC: UN Report (p. 221); PUSIC: Human Rights Watch (p. 16); UPPS:
RefWorld.org; BDK: GlobalSecurity.org; PPRD: BBC.co.uk; RUD: International Crisis Group (footnote, p. 5); FRF:
Congosiasa Blog; APCLS: IRINnews.org; Minembwe Dissidents: Syfia Grands Lacs; RCD: IRINnews.org; CNDD-
FDD: International Crisis Group Arica Briefing, 6 August 2002 (p. 8); RCD: Human Rights Watch (p. 36); FAP:
Politique Africaine N-084-RDC (footnote 20, p. 25); UNAFEC: LaConscience.com (Archived).
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C.6.4 Appendix to Section 4.2.3
In this section, we provide a more detailed discussion of the issue related to TRMM data, with reference
to the geography literature. Launched at the end of 1997, the TRMM satellite has delivered annual data
from 1998 onwards. The project was terminated in 2015. Here, we describe some issues that are relevant for
our analysis. First, the precision of TRMM has been found to deteriorate significantly in areas with large
rivers and lakes, periodic high rainfalls, and high elevation (see Tian and Peters-Lidard 2007, Romilly and
Gebremichael 2011, and Harsh et al. 2016). Tian and Peters-Lidard (2007) also note that the uncertainty
associated with gauge measures of rainfall in remote areas when gauges are sparse translate into uncertainty
in the satellite-based instrumental measurements and in the algorithms used to transform such measurements
into estimates of ground level rainfall. Liu (2016: 978) documents biases in TRMM estimates (relative to
GPCC) that can be as large as 36% in orographically influenced regions. The biases are not consistent, and
as such they are difficult to correct. The key areas of the DRC conflict share most of these characteristics
(e.g., Lake Kivu has a surface elevation of 1460m).
The second, and more important issue, is the precision of within-cell variations, which is our source
of identification. A number of studies document that the within-cell variation is imprecisely measured, as
summarized in footnote 26. First, the data before and after the year 2000 are collected and adjusted in
different ways (Huffman and Bolvin 2015: 6). Libertino (2016) documents a significant improvement over
time in the accuracy of TRMM, which is due to the evolution of TRMM constellation. However, this change
makes it difficult to rely on the within-cell estimate of the change in rainfall over time. In a study of TRMM
rainfall estimates in the Brazilian Amazon, Clarke et al. (2011) documents that TRMM performs reasonably
well in the between-site analysis; however, its performance in the within-site analysis over time is pretty poor
(the pooled correlation coefficient for total annual rainfall being 0.54).
Finally, an important issue for our purpose is that TRMM has no observation for 1997. Because our IV
strategy hinges on lagged rainfall, this implies that TRMM cannot provide instruments for 1998, which is
the first year of the Congo War and one in which a very large number of events is recorded.
C.6.5 Appendix to Section 4.2.4
In this section, we discuss in more details the Monte Carlo results in Table B.9. The approach is based on
rewiring links in the observed network at random, and measuring the robustness of our estimates in such
perturbed networks. For each Monte Carlo draw, we consider a data generating process based on the reduced
form equation (12): The true parameters correspond to our baseline estimates, β = 0.114 and γ = 0.083,
and the true network corresponds to the one used in our baseline estimation after rewiring a (sub-)set of
alliances/enmities/neutral links according to a binomial process with a probability that is invariant across
the draws. Then the benchmark 2SLS specification (Column 4, Table 1) is estimated on this fake dataset
under the assumption that the network observed by the econometrician is identical to the baseline one before
rewiring. Iterating over 1,000 Monte Carlo draws yields the sampling distribution of the estimates of β and
γ subject to link measurement error. We consider different assumptions about the extent and nature of
measurement error of the network.
In Table B.9, each pair of columns refers to a particular mismeasurement probability, namely the prob-
ability governing the binomial re-wiring process. From left to right, we assume that the probability that
links are measured with error is zero (no measurement error), 1%, 10%, 20%, 50% and one (pure noise),
respectively. In all cases we report the mean and standard deviations of the sampling distribution based on
1,000 simulations.
In the absence of measurement error – Columns 1 and 2 – we see that the mean of the sampling
distribution is close to the true value of the parameter (difference arises at the 3 digit level due to finite-
sampling). This confirms that our estimator is consistent. Consider, next, the pair of columns corresponding
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to interior probabilities of mismeasurement (1%, 10%, 20% and 50%). For instance, focus on the 10%
measurement error case (fifth and sixth columns). In the first row (enmity links only), we draw from a
distribution where each enmity link has a probability 10% to be in reality a neutral relationship (no link),
whereas each neutral (no link) has a probability 10% to be in fact an enmity link. Since the number of
neutrals exceeds by far that of enmities, this perturbation implies that in reality there are more enmity
links than we observe. As expected, this experiment affects the estimate of γ more than it affects that of
β. The estimate of β is close to the no measurement error benchmark (first column) at the two digit level,
whereas the estimate of γ falls from 0.085 to 0.077. Namely, measurement error implies an attenuation bias.
Next, consider the second row (alliance links only). This is the polar opposite scenario: alliance (rather than
enmity) links are measured with error. Now, the estimate of β also falls from 0.119 to 0.107. Finally, in the
third row, we allow mismeasurement of both enmity and alliance links. In this case the estimate of β falls to
0.101 and that of γ falls to 0.067. A similar pattern is observed in the other interior columns. As one moves
to the right, i.e., towards larger measurement errors, the attenuation bias becomes stronger. In the last two
columns, when the econometrician observes pure noise for enmity (alliance) links, the estimates of γ and β
tend to zero.
The lesson from this section is twofold. First, the Monte Carlo generated measurement errors in the
links leads to an attenuation bias. This suggests that, under the plausible assumption that some information
about existing links is missing, our regression analysis underestimates the spillover effects. Second, the extent
of the bias is quantitatively modest. A measurement error of the order of 10% (which we regard as fairly
large) yields an underestimate of the spillover parameters of the order of 12% for β and 23% for γ.
C.7 Appendix to Section 5
In this section, we provide the appendix tables that are referred in Section 5.
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Table C.7: Complete list of group removal.
Group Sh. aggr. fight. −∆RD Multiplier
RCD-G 0.087 0.151 1.740
RCD-K 0.060 0.094 1.587
RWANDA 0.053 0.066 1.232
LRA 0.041 0.056 1.365
FDLR 0.066 0.055 0.822
MM 0.057 0.046 0.814
UGANDA 0.043 0.043 0.996
CNDP 0.043 0.041 0.946
MLC 0.031 0.039 1.254
UPC 0.022 0.030 1.406
LENDU 0.024 0.022 0.912
MUTINY 0.016 0.016 0.979
INERAH 0.014 0.014 1.013
ADF 0.013 0.012 0.939
FRPI 0.009 0.010 1.107
HEMA 0.009 0.009 0.975
FNI 0.008 0.009 1.033
CNDD 0.007 0.008 1.173
FPJC 0.006 0.007 1.146
SPLA 0.007 0.007 0.961
HUTU 0.005 0.006 1.163
ZIMBABWE 0.007 0.005 0.699
MRC 0.005 0.004 0.878
ALIR 0.004 0.004 1.081
ANGOLA 0.004 0.004 1.044
PUSIC 0.003 0.003 1.177
NAMIBIA 0.003 0.003 0.940
SAF 0.003 0.003 1.009
NALU 0.003 0.002 0.905
BURUNDI 0.003 0.002 0.811
RWA73 0.002 0.002 0.956
BDK 0.002 0.002 1.136
MM-P 0.004 0.002 0.564
SUDAN 0.002 0.002 0.749
FLC 0.002 0.002 1.112
ENYELE 0.001 0.001 1.126
MUNZ 0.001 0.001 1.126
PPRD 0.001 0.001 0.979
LOBALA 0.001 0.001 1.201
UNITA 0.001 0.001 0.779
FNL 0.001 0.001 1.098
BOMBO 0.001 0.001 1.060
MM-Y 0.001 0.001 0.582
MINEM 0.001 0.001 1.108
ADFL 0.001 0.001 1.079
LENDU-U 0.001 0.001 1.035
APCLS 0.001 0.001 0.995
UELE 0.001 0.001 0.924
FRF 0.000 0.001 1.094
WAGE 0.000 0.000 1.013
ZAMBIA 0.000 0.000 1.006
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Table C.7 cont.: Complete list of group re-
moval.
Group Sh. aggr. fight. −∆RD Multiplier
RUD 0.000 0.000 1.005
MM-L 0.001 0.000 0.707
MM-J 0.001 0.000 0.707
RCD-M 0.000 0.000 0.902
CHAD 0.000 0.000 0.801
UPPS 0.000 0.000 1.066
CNDD-N 0.000 0.000 1.006
BANYA 0.000 0.000 0.916
G47 0.000 0.000 0.914
MBINGI 0.000 0.000 0.914
ALUR 0.000 0.000 0.786
NGITI 0.000 0.000 0.647
MM-K 0.000 0.000 0.613
HUTU-R 0.000 0.000 0.829
PRA 0.000 0.000 0.829
PYGMY 0.000 0.000 0.829
FAP 0.000 0.000 0.829
MUTLRA 0.000 0.000 0.829
WANGI 0.000 0.000 0.829
DSP 0.000 0.000 0.738
ADC 0.000 0.000 0.727
MM-M 0.000 0.000 0.519
RCD-N 0.000 0.000 0.036
RCD 0.018 -0.002 0.142
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Table C.8: Joint removal of two groups (top 50).
Group 1 Group 2 −∆RD
Sh.
Multiplier
Cumul. Multi-
aggr. −∆RD sep. player
fight. removal complem.
RWANDA RCD-G 0.243 0.140 1.735 0.217 1.122
RCD-K RCD-G 0.213 0.146 1.455 0.245 0.867
FDLR RCD-G 0.209 0.153 1.362 0.206 1.015
RCD-G LRA 0.208 0.128 1.620 0.207 1.001
RCD-G UGANDA 0.195 0.130 1.498 0.194 1.004
CNDP RCD-G 0.190 0.130 1.463 0.192 0.992
MM RCD-G 0.187 0.144 1.306 0.197 0.950
UPC RCD-G 0.180 0.108 1.658 0.181 0.991
LENDU RCD-G 0.178 0.111 1.601 0.173 1.027
MLC RCD-G 0.169 0.118 1.435 0.190 0.890
RCD-G ADF 0.165 0.100 1.650 0.163 1.010
MUTINY RCD-G 0.165 0.103 1.601 0.167 0.989
INTERAH RCD-G 0.159 0.101 1.582 0.165 0.965
RCD-K UGANDA 0.155 0.103 1.501 0.138 1.122
RCD-K FDLR 0.151 0.126 1.196 0.149 1.011
RCD-K LRA 0.149 0.101 1.479 0.151 0.989
RCD-K RWANDA 0.147 0.113 1.303 0.160 0.919
CNDP RCD-K 0.136 0.103 1.324 0.136 1.006
LENDU RCD-K 0.134 0.084 1.601 0.117 1.151
RCD-K MM 0.130 0.116 1.118 0.141 0.924
UPC RCD-K 0.118 0.081 1.459 0.125 0.948
CNDP RWANDA 0.118 0.097 1.216 0.107 1.102
MLC RCD-K 0.116 0.090 1.279 0.133 0.869
MLC RWANDA 0.113 0.084 1.342 0.104 1.083
RWANDA FDLR 0.112 0.120 0.937 0.120 0.933
RCD-K INTERAH 0.111 0.073 1.508 0.109 1.021
FDLR LRA 0.111 0.108 1.027 0.111 0.997
RWANDA LRA 0.110 0.095 1.163 0.122 0.902
RCD-K ADF 0.109 0.073 1.501 0.107 1.022
MUTINY RCD-K 0.109 0.076 1.437 0.110 0.987
RWANDA MM 0.108 0.110 0.978 0.112 0.962
MM LRA 0.105 0.098 1.069 0.103 1.021
RWANDA UGANDA 0.102 0.097 1.049 0.109 0.932
CNDP LRA 0.098 0.085 1.155 0.098 1.004
MM FDLR 0.098 0.123 0.793 0.101 0.969
MLC FDLR 0.098 0.097 1.002 0.093 1.045
MLC LRA 0.096 0.072 1.325 0.095 1.006
MLC UGANDA 0.095 0.074 1.285 0.082 1.165
UPC RWANDA 0.094 0.075 1.256 0.096 0.980
UGANDA LRA 0.092 0.085 1.083 0.100 0.921
RWANDA LENDU 0.091 0.078 1.177 0.088 1.040
CNDP MM 0.090 0.100 0.895 0.087 1.027
CNDP FDLR 0.089 0.110 0.813 0.096 0.934
FDLR UGANDA 0.089 0.110 0.808 0.098 0.907
MLC MM 0.086 0.088 0.982 0.085 1.014
UPC LRA 0.085 0.063 1.348 0.087 0.977
CNDP UGANDA 0.085 0.087 0.976 0.084 1.005
MM UGANDA 0.084 0.100 0.837 0.090 0.937
UPC FDLR 0.084 0.088 0.950 0.085 0.985
RWANDA MUTINY 0.084 0.070 1.199 0.082 1.023
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Table C.9: Results for 3 groups removal (top 50).
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 −∆RD
Share
Multipl.
Cumul. Multi-
aggr. −∆RD player
fight. sep remov. compl.
CNDP RWANDA RCD-G 0.294 0.184 1.604 0.258 1.142
RWANDA FDLR RCD-G 0.292 0.207 1.413 0.271 1.076
RWANDA RCD-K RCD-G 0.290 0.200 1.453 0.311 0.933
RWANDA RCD-G LRA 0.286 0.181 1.575 0.273 1.047
RWANDA RCD-G UGANDA 0.279 0.184 1.520 0.260 1.073
LENDU RWANDA RCD-G 0.275 0.164 1.673 0.239 1.151
MM RWANDA RCD-G 0.274 0.197 1.394 0.263 1.044
RCD-K FDLR RCD-G 0.272 0.213 1.276 0.300 0.905
RCD-K RCD-G UGANDA 0.271 0.190 1.427 0.289 0.938
UPC RWANDA RCD-G 0.269 0.162 1.666 0.247 1.091
RCD-K RCD-G LRA 0.268 0.188 1.428 0.302 0.888
RWANDA MLC RCD-G 0.266 0.171 1.556 0.255 1.042
FDLR RCD-G LRA 0.265 0.195 1.361 0.262 1.011
RWANDA MUTINY RCD-G 0.260 0.157 1.659 0.233 1.115
LENDU RCD-K RCD-G 0.254 0.171 1.491 0.268 0.951
RWANDA RCD-G ADF 0.254 0.153 1.656 0.229 1.109
CNDP RCD-K RCD-G 0.253 0.190 1.334 0.287 0.884
RWANDA INTERAH RCD-G 0.248 0.154 1.613 0.231 1.076
CNDP RCD-G LRA 0.247 0.172 1.442 0.249 0.996
MM RCD-G LRA 0.246 0.185 1.330 0.254 0.969
RCD-G UGANDA LRA 0.244 0.172 1.420 0.251 0.972
FDLR RCD-G UGANDA 0.243 0.197 1.237 0.249 0.978
MM FDLR RCD-G 0.242 0.210 1.153 0.252 0.962
RCD-K MM RCD-G 0.242 0.203 1.192 0.292 0.830
CNDP FDLR RCD-G 0.242 0.197 1.229 0.247 0.980
LENDU RCD-G LRA 0.238 0.152 1.558 0.230 1.035
UPC RCD-K RCD-G 0.236 0.168 1.409 0.276 0.858
UPC FDLR RCD-G 0.236 0.175 1.350 0.236 1.000
CNDP RCD-G UGANDA 0.235 0.174 1.353 0.235 0.999
UPC RCD-G LRA 0.234 0.150 1.565 0.238 0.985
LENDU FDLR RCD-G 0.234 0.178 1.317 0.228 1.027
MLC FDLR RCD-G 0.229 0.184 1.247 0.244 0.939
CNDP MM RCD-G 0.229 0.187 1.225 0.238 0.961
RCD-K RCD-G ADF 0.229 0.160 1.434 0.258 0.887
MM RCD-G UGANDA 0.226 0.187 1.211 0.240 0.941
MUTINY RCD-K RCD-G 0.226 0.163 1.389 0.261 0.865
MLC RCD-G LRA 0.226 0.159 1.420 0.246 0.917
INTERAH FDLR RCD-G 0.225 0.167 1.343 0.220 1.022
MUTINY FDLR RCD-G 0.224 0.170 1.320 0.222 1.010
RCD-K INTERAH RCD-G 0.223 0.160 1.393 0.260 0.860
MLC RCD-G UGANDA 0.223 0.161 1.383 0.233 0.956
FDLR RCD-G ADF 0.222 0.167 1.332 0.218 1.017
MLC RCD-K RCD-G 0.222 0.177 1.252 0.284 0.781
RCD-G ADF LRA 0.220 0.141 1.559 0.220 1.002
MUTINY RCD-G LRA 0.220 0.145 1.520 0.223 0.983
UPC CNDP RCD-G 0.219 0.152 1.440 0.222 0.983
LENDU CNDP RCD-G 0.218 0.155 1.408 0.214 1.016
INTERAH RCD-G LRA 0.218 0.142 1.531 0.222 0.982
LENDU RCD-G UGANDA 0.217 0.155 1.401 0.216 1.000
UPC MM RCD-G 0.216 0.165 1.308 0.228 0.949
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Table C.10: Results for 5 groups removal (top 50).
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 −∆RD
Share
Multipl.
Cumul. Multi-
aggr. −∆RD player
fight. sep. remov. compl.
CNDP RCD-K RWANDA RCD-G UGANDA 0.388 0.287 1.355 0.396 0.982
LENDU CNDP RCD-K RWANDA RCD-G 0.388 0.267 1.450 0.374 1.036
RWANDA LENDU RCD-K FDLR RCD-G 0.384 0.290 1.322 0.388 0.990
RWANDA RCD-K FDLR RCD-G LRA 0.384 0.307 1.249 0.422 0.910
RWANDA CNDP RCD-K FDLR RCD-G 0.384 0.310 1.240 0.407 0.944
CNDP RCD-K RWANDA RCD-G LRA 0.383 0.284 1.348 0.409 0.938
RWANDA LENDU RCD-K RCD-G LRA 0.382 0.265 1.439 0.390 0.979
RWANDA RCD-K FDLR RCD-G UGANDA 0.381 0.310 1.229 0.409 0.930
RWANDA CNDP FDLR RCD-G LRA 0.378 0.291 1.297 0.369 1.025
LENDU RCD-K RWANDA RCD-G UGANDA 0.378 0.267 1.412 0.377 1.003
RCD-K RWANDA RCD-G UGANDA LRA 0.375 0.284 1.318 0.411 0.913
RWANDA LENDU CNDP RCD-G LRA 0.372 0.249 1.491 0.336 1.105
CNDP MM RWANDA RCD-G LRA 0.371 0.282 1.319 0.360 1.031
LENDU RCD-K FDLR RCD-G LRA 0.370 0.278 1.328 0.379 0.976
RWANDA CNDP RCD-K MM RCD-G 0.369 0.300 1.229 0.398 0.925
LENDU RWANDA FDLR RCD-G LRA 0.368 0.272 1.351 0.350 1.051
MM RWANDA FDLR RCD-G LRA 0.367 0.305 1.204 0.374 0.981
RWANDA LENDU CNDP FDLR RCD-G 0.366 0.274 1.335 0.335 1.095
CNDP MM RWANDA FDLR RCD-G 0.366 0.307 1.194 0.359 1.021
RWANDA CNDP RCD-G UGANDA LRA 0.366 0.268 1.365 0.358 1.024
RCD-K FDLR RCD-G UGANDA LRA 0.365 0.298 1.227 0.400 0.913
RWANDA RCD-K MM FDLR RCD-G 0.365 0.323 1.129 0.412 0.885
RWANDA MUTINY CNDP RCD-K RCD-G 0.365 0.259 1.405 0.368 0.990
CNDP RWANDA FDLR RCD-G UGANDA 0.364 0.294 1.240 0.356 1.023
RWANDA UPC CNDP RCD-K RCD-G 0.363 0.265 1.371 0.383 0.949
RWANDA UPC RCD-K FDLR RCD-G 0.362 0.288 1.258 0.396 0.914
RCD-K MM RWANDA RCD-G LRA 0.361 0.298 1.213 0.414 0.873
RWANDA MLC CNDP RCD-G UGANDA 0.361 0.258 1.400 0.340 1.062
RWANDA MUTINY CNDP FDLR RCD-G 0.361 0.266 1.354 0.328 1.098
RWANDA UPC CNDP RCD-G LRA 0.361 0.247 1.463 0.345 1.047
CNDP RCD-K FDLR RCD-G LRA 0.361 0.298 1.212 0.398 0.907
RWANDA MLC CNDP FDLR RCD-G 0.360 0.281 1.283 0.351 1.027
MLC RWANDA FDLR RCD-G LRA 0.360 0.279 1.293 0.366 0.983
RWANDA UPC CNDP FDLR RCD-G 0.360 0.272 1.326 0.343 1.051
RCD-K MM RWANDA RCD-G UGANDA 0.360 0.300 1.200 0.401 0.898
RWANDA FDLR RCD-G UGANDA LRA 0.359 0.291 1.233 0.371 0.968
RWANDA UPC FDLR RCD-G LRA 0.359 0.270 1.333 0.358 1.003
MLC RCD-K RWANDA RCD-G UGANDA 0.359 0.274 1.310 0.393 0.913
CNDP MM RWANDA RCD-G UGANDA 0.359 0.284 1.264 0.347 1.033
RWANDA MLC CNDP RCD-G LRA 0.359 0.256 1.403 0.353 1.017
RWANDA LENDU RCD-K MM RCD-G 0.359 0.281 1.278 0.380 0.945
RWANDA MUTINY CNDP RCD-G LRA 0.359 0.241 1.486 0.330 1.086
CNDP RCD-K RCD-G UGANDA LRA 0.358 0.275 1.304 0.386 0.927
RWANDA LENDU CNDP MM RCD-G 0.358 0.265 1.352 0.326 1.097
MUTINY RCD-K RWANDA FDLR RCD-G 0.358 0.283 1.266 0.382 0.937
RWANDA LENDU CNDP RCD-G UGANDA 0.357 0.251 1.419 0.323 1.103
RWANDA MLC RCD-K FDLR RCD-G 0.356 0.297 1.199 0.404 0.881
LENDU RCD-K RCD-G UGANDA LRA 0.356 0.255 1.393 0.367 0.969
RCD-K INTERAH RWANDA FDLR RCD-G 0.355 0.280 1.267 0.380 0.934
MLC CNDP RCD-K RWANDA RCD-G 0.355 0.274 1.295 0.391 0.908
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Table C.11: Pacifying top 33 groups.
Group
Sh. Sh. bilat.
−∆RD Multiplier
fight. fight.
RWANDA 0.053 0.010 0.063 6.048
RCD-G 0.087 0.030 0.056 1.864
RCD-K 0.060 0.030 0.050 1.643
LRA 0.041 0.023 0.037 1.640
MLC 0.031 0.019 0.034 1.813
UGANDA 0.043 0.006 0.031 5.684
UPC 0.022 0.002 0.024 11.205
MUTINY 0.016 0.015 0.023 1.571
CNDP 0.043 0.038 0.019 0.515
LOBALA 0.001 0.000 0.017 52.721
FPJC 0.006 0.006 0.017 2.612
FRPI 0.009 0.007 0.017 2.369
BDK 0.002 0.002 0.016 8.138
ENYELE 0.001 0.001 0.016 24.226
MUNZ 0.001 0.000 0.016 32.301
MINEM 0.001 0.000 0.016 32.151
FRF 0.000 0.000 0.016 32.101
FNL 0.001 0.001 0.016 24.063
UPPS 0.000 0.000 0.016 48.076
FNI 0.008 0.008 0.015 1.873
ADF 0.013 0.004 0.015 3.884
APCLS 0.001 0.000 0.014 28.728
NALU 0.003 0.003 0.013 4.547
MRC 0.005 0.005 0.012 2.621
FLC 0.002 0.000 0.010 30.517
ALIR 0.004 0.002 0.009 4.167
HEMA 0.009 0.002 0.009 4.093
BANYA 0.000 0.000 0.009
RCD-M 0.000 0.000 0.009
UNITA 0.001 0.001 0.007 11.134
FDLR 0.066 0.047 0.004 0.092
RCD-N 0.000 0.000 0.003
RCD 0.018 0.003 -0.006 2.163
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Table C.12: Results for 2 groups reconciliation (top 50).
Group 1 Group 2 −∆RD
Share aggr.
Multipl.
Cumul. Multi-
fight. Congol. −∆RD player
troops sep. reconcil. compl.
RWANDA RCD-G 0.113 0.040 2.791 0.119 0.949
RWANDA RCD-K 0.111 0.041 2.743 0.112 0.990
RCD-K RCD-G 0.110 0.060 1.828 0.105 1.043
RWANDA LRA 0.097 0.033 2.953 0.100 0.975
RWANDA MLC 0.095 0.029 3.235 0.097 0.977
RWANDA UGANDA 0.093 0.016 5.872 0.094 0.992
MLC RCD-G 0.091 0.049 1.858 0.090 1.007
RCD-G LRA 0.088 0.053 1.668 0.093 0.944
RWANDA UPC 0.085 0.012 6.814 0.086 0.985
RWANDA MUTINY 0.085 0.025 3.366 0.086 0.984
RCD-G UGANDA 0.084 0.036 2.360 0.087 0.960
MLC RCD-K 0.083 0.049 1.681 0.084 0.984
RCD-K LRA 0.082 0.053 1.559 0.087 0.950
RWANDA CNDP 0.081 0.048 1.684 0.082 0.986
LOBALA RWANDA 0.079 0.011 7.413 0.080 0.993
RCD-K UGANDA 0.079 0.036 2.206 0.081 0.973
FPJC RWANDA 0.079 0.017 4.706 0.079 0.991
RWANDA FRPI 0.079 0.017 4.526 0.079 0.991
BDK RWANDA 0.078 0.012 6.335 0.079 0.993
MUNZ RWANDA 0.078 0.011 7.178 0.078 0.994
RWANDA FNL 0.078 0.011 7.071 0.078 0.995
MINEM RWANDA 0.078 0.011 7.173 0.078 0.994
FRF RWANDA 0.078 0.011 7.171 0.078 0.994
UPPS RWANDA 0.078 0.011 7.278 0.078 0.994
UPC RCD-G 0.078 0.032 2.414 0.080 0.974
FNI RWANDA 0.077 0.018 4.181 0.078 0.992
MUTINY RCD-G 0.076 0.045 1.706 0.079 0.965
APCLS RWANDA 0.076 0.011 7.024 0.077 0.994
RWANDA ADF 0.076 0.014 5.324 0.078 0.976
UPC RCD-K 0.075 0.032 2.321 0.073 1.024
NALU RWANDA 0.075 0.013 5.703 0.075 0.995
RWANDA MRC 0.075 0.015 4.954 0.075 0.995
CNDP RCD-G 0.073 0.068 1.084 0.075 0.975
LOBALA RCD-G 0.072 0.030 2.365 0.073 0.982
FPJC RCD-G 0.071 0.036 1.957 0.072 0.981
FRPI RCD-G 0.071 0.037 1.921 0.072 0.980
MUTINY RCD-K 0.071 0.045 1.571 0.073 0.970
BDK RCD-G 0.071 0.032 2.208 0.072 0.983
ENYELE RCD-G 0.070 0.031 2.298 0.072 0.983
MUNZ RCD-G 0.070 0.030 2.310 0.072 0.983
MINEM RCD-G 0.070 0.030 2.308 0.072 0.983
RCD-G FNL 0.070 0.031 2.296 0.072 0.984
FRF RCD-G 0.070 0.030 2.308 0.072 0.983
UPPS RCD-G 0.070 0.030 2.319 0.072 0.983
RCD-G ADF 0.070 0.034 2.071 0.071 0.988
FNI RCD-G 0.070 0.038 1.833 0.071 0.982
MLC LRA 0.069 0.042 1.659 0.071 0.965
APCLS RCD-G 0.069 0.030 2.256 0.070 0.984
UGANDA LRA 0.068 0.028 2.419 0.068 0.994
CNDP RCD-K 0.068 0.068 0.994 0.069 0.978
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Table C.13: Results for 3 groups reconciliation (top 50).
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 −∆RD
Share aggr.
Multipl.
Cumul. Multi-
fight. Congol. −∆RD player
troops sep. reconcil. compl.
RWANDA RCD-K RCD-G 0.166 0.071 2.354 0.168 0.987
MLC RWANDA RCD-G 0.147 0.059 2.470 0.153 0.958
MLC RCD-K RWANDA 0.143 0.060 2.401 0.147 0.974
RWANDA RCD-G LRA 0.142 0.063 2.262 0.156 0.914
RCD-K RWANDA LRA 0.141 0.063 2.240 0.149 0.947
MLC RCD-K RCD-G 0.141 0.079 1.780 0.140 1.007
RWANDA RCD-G UGANDA 0.140 0.046 3.053 0.150 0.934
RCD-K RWANDA UGANDA 0.139 0.046 3.026 0.144 0.970
RCD-K RCD-G LRA 0.138 0.083 1.673 0.142 0.972
RCD-K RCD-G UGANDA 0.136 0.066 2.075 0.137 0.996
UPC RCD-K RWANDA 0.135 0.043 3.168 0.136 0.994
UPC RWANDA RCD-G 0.133 0.042 3.127 0.142 0.933
UPC RCD-K RCD-G 0.133 0.062 2.130 0.129 1.028
RWANDA MUTINY RCD-G 0.131 0.055 2.383 0.142 0.926
MUTINY RCD-K RWANDA 0.131 0.055 2.368 0.136 0.966
MUTINY RCD-K RCD-G 0.129 0.075 1.719 0.129 1.001
RWANDA CNDP RCD-G 0.129 0.078 1.648 0.138 0.932
CNDP RCD-K RWANDA 0.128 0.078 1.638 0.132 0.973
LOBALA RWANDA RCD-G 0.128 0.041 3.142 0.136 0.942
MLC RWANDA LRA 0.127 0.052 2.454 0.134 0.949
FPJC RWANDA RCD-G 0.127 0.047 2.721 0.135 0.940
LOBALA RWANDA RCD-K 0.127 0.041 3.108 0.129 0.981
FRPI RWANDA RCD-G 0.127 0.047 2.681 0.135 0.939
BDK RWANDA RCD-G 0.127 0.042 2.993 0.135 0.942
RWANDA RCD-G FNL 0.127 0.041 3.086 0.134 0.943
ENYELE RWANDA RCD-G 0.127 0.041 3.086 0.134 0.942
MINEM RWANDA RCD-G 0.127 0.041 3.098 0.134 0.942
FRF RWANDA RCD-G 0.127 0.041 3.097 0.134 0.942
UPPS RWANDA RCD-G 0.127 0.041 3.109 0.134 0.942
RWANDA UGANDA LRA 0.126 0.038 3.291 0.131 0.965
CNDP RCD-K RCD-G 0.126 0.098 1.289 0.125 1.011
FPJC RCD-K RWANDA 0.126 0.047 2.693 0.129 0.980
FRPI RCD-K RWANDA 0.126 0.048 2.653 0.129 0.978
RWANDA FNI RCD-G 0.126 0.048 2.596 0.134 0.940
BDK RWANDA RCD-K 0.126 0.042 2.961 0.128 0.982
RWANDA RCD-K FNL 0.126 0.041 3.053 0.128 0.983
ENYELE RCD-K RWANDA 0.126 0.041 3.052 0.128 0.982
MINEM RWANDA RCD-K 0.126 0.041 3.063 0.128 0.982
FRF RCD-K RWANDA 0.126 0.041 3.063 0.128 0.982
UPPS RWANDA RCD-K 0.126 0.041 3.075 0.128 0.982
RWANDA RCD-G ADF 0.125 0.044 2.832 0.134 0.937
LOBALA RCD-K RCD-G 0.125 0.060 2.069 0.123 1.021
APCLS RWANDA RCD-G 0.125 0.041 3.060 0.133 0.942
MLC RWANDA UGANDA 0.125 0.035 3.584 0.129 0.972
FNI RCD-K RWANDA 0.125 0.049 2.568 0.128 0.980
FPJC RCD-K RCD-G 0.124 0.066 1.871 0.122 1.020
FRPI RCD-K RCD-G 0.124 0.067 1.851 0.122 1.019
RWANDA RCD-K ADF 0.124 0.044 2.796 0.127 0.975
APCLS RCD-K RWANDA 0.124 0.041 3.025 0.126 0.983
BDK RCD-K RCD-G 0.124 0.062 1.996 0.121 1.022
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Table C.14: Results for 5 groups reconciliation (top 50).
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 −∆RD
Sh. aggr.
Multipl.
Cumul. Multi-
fight. Cong. −∆RD player
troops sep. reconcil. compl.
RWANDA MLC RCD-K RCD-G UGANDA 0.223 0.095 2.344 0.234 0.952
MLC RCD-K RWANDA RCD-G LRA 0.222 0.112 1.983 0.240 0.928
RCD-K RWANDA RCD-G UGANDA LRA 0.218 0.099 2.208 0.237 0.920
RWANDA UPC MLC RCD-K RCD-G 0.217 0.092 2.369 0.226 0.959
RWANDA UPC RCD-K RCD-G UGANDA 0.214 0.078 2.731 0.223 0.957
RWANDA MUTINY MLC RCD-K RCD-G 0.213 0.104 2.044 0.226 0.944
UPC RCD-K RWANDA RCD-G LRA 0.213 0.095 2.234 0.229 0.929
LOBALA MLC RCD-K RWANDA RCD-G 0.211 0.090 2.350 0.220 0.961
MLC CNDP RCD-K RWANDA RCD-G 0.211 0.127 1.657 0.222 0.950
RWANDA FPJC MLC RCD-K RCD-G 0.210 0.096 2.193 0.219 0.959
BDK RWANDA MLC RCD-K RCD-G 0.210 0.091 2.296 0.219 0.961
FRPI MLC RCD-K RWANDA RCD-G 0.210 0.096 2.176 0.219 0.958
MLC RCD-K RWANDA RCD-G FNL 0.210 0.090 2.328 0.218 0.962
ENYELE RWANDA MLC RCD-K RCD-G 0.210 0.090 2.328 0.218 0.961
FRF RWANDA MLC RCD-K RCD-G 0.210 0.090 2.332 0.218 0.962
UPPS RWANDA MLC RCD-K RCD-G 0.210 0.090 2.336 0.218 0.962
MLC RCD-K RWANDA RCD-G ADF 0.209 0.093 2.241 0.218 0.961
RWANDA FNI MLC RCD-K RCD-G 0.209 0.098 2.141 0.218 0.960
APCLS RWANDA MLC RCD-K RCD-G 0.208 0.090 2.315 0.217 0.962
MUTINY RCD-K RWANDA RCD-G LRA 0.208 0.108 1.931 0.228 0.912
MUTINY RCD-K RWANDA RCD-G UGANDA 0.208 0.091 2.288 0.223 0.933
RWANDA MRC MLC RCD-K RCD-G 0.207 0.094 2.198 0.215 0.963
NALU MLC RCD-K RWANDA RCD-G 0.207 0.092 2.244 0.215 0.962
LOBALA RCD-K RWANDA RCD-G LRA 0.207 0.093 2.211 0.222 0.929
RWANDA CNDP RCD-K RCD-G LRA 0.206 0.131 1.578 0.225 0.919
CNDP RCD-K RWANDA RCD-G UGANDA 0.206 0.114 1.809 0.219 0.940
LOBALA RCD-K RWANDA RCD-G UGANDA 0.206 0.076 2.696 0.217 0.950
FPJC RCD-K RWANDA RCD-G LRA 0.206 0.099 2.068 0.222 0.927
RWANDA RCD-K RCD-G FNL LRA 0.205 0.094 2.191 0.221 0.930
BDK RWANDA RCD-K RCD-G LRA 0.205 0.095 2.161 0.221 0.929
ENYELE RWANDA RCD-K RCD-G LRA 0.205 0.094 2.191 0.221 0.929
RWANDA FRPI RCD-K RCD-G LRA 0.205 0.100 2.052 0.222 0.926
FRF RWANDA RCD-K RCD-G LRA 0.205 0.094 2.194 0.221 0.930
UPPS RCD-K RWANDA RCD-G LRA 0.205 0.093 2.198 0.221 0.930
RWANDA FPJC RCD-K RCD-G UGANDA 0.205 0.082 2.488 0.216 0.948
RCD-K RWANDA RCD-G FNL UGANDA 0.205 0.077 2.670 0.215 0.952
RCD-K RWANDA RCD-G ADF UGANDA 0.205 0.080 2.561 0.215 0.954
BDK RWANDA RCD-K RCD-G UGANDA 0.205 0.078 2.625 0.215 0.950
RWANDA FRPI RCD-K RCD-G UGANDA 0.205 0.083 2.466 0.216 0.947
ENYELE RWANDA RCD-K RCD-G UGANDA 0.205 0.077 2.669 0.215 0.951
FRF RWANDA RCD-K RCD-G UGANDA 0.205 0.077 2.674 0.215 0.951
UPPS RWANDA RCD-K RCD-G UGANDA 0.205 0.076 2.680 0.215 0.951
RWANDA RCD-K RCD-G ADF LRA 0.205 0.097 2.110 0.220 0.929
RWANDA FNI RCD-K RCD-G LRA 0.204 0.101 2.020 0.220 0.928
MUTINY UPC RCD-K RWANDA RCD-G 0.204 0.087 2.334 0.215 0.948
APCLS RCD-K RWANDA RCD-G LRA 0.204 0.094 2.179 0.219 0.930
FNI RCD-K RWANDA RCD-G UGANDA 0.204 0.084 2.422 0.215 0.949
APCLS RWANDA RCD-K RCD-G UGANDA 0.203 0.077 2.655 0.214 0.952
MRC RCD-K RWANDA RCD-G LRA 0.203 0.098 2.072 0.218 0.931
RWANDA NALU RCD-K RCD-G LRA 0.203 0.096 2.114 0.218 0.930
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C.7.1 Appendix to Section 6 (Random Utility Model)
Table C.15 shows the effect of removing one or more groups from the conflict when endogenous network
adjustments are allowed.
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Table C.15: Complete list of group removal with rewiring.
Group
Sh.
−∆RD Multiplier
−∆RD −∆RD New New
aggr. rewiring rewiring enmities alliances
fight. (median) (M.A.D) at median at median
RCD-G 0.087 0.151 1.740 0.138 0.025 0 0
RCD-K 0.060 0.094 1.587 0.079 0.027 0 0
RWANDA 0.053 0.066 1.232 0.103 0.040 -5 0
LRA 0.041 0.056 1.365 0.051 0.005 0 -1
FDLR 0.066 0.055 0.822 0.059 0.008 -1 1
MM 0.057 0.046 0.814 0.081 0.024 -2 1
UGANDA 0.043 0.043 0.996 0.065 0.034 -4 4
CNDP 0.043 0.041 0.946 0.041 0.011 0 0
MLC 0.031 0.039 1.254 0.053 0.018 -2 1
UPC 0.022 0.030 1.406 0.011 0.020 0 -1
LENDU 0.024 0.022 0.912 0.046 0.020 0 0
MUTINY 0.016 0.016 0.979 0.016 0.000 0 0
INTERAH 0.014 0.014 1.013 0.029 0.024 0 -1
ADF 0.013 0.012 0.939 0.036 0.012 -2 1
FRPI 0.009 0.010 1.107 0.010 0.000 0 0
HEMA 0.009 0.009 0.975 0.003 0.012 1 0
FNI 0.008 0.009 1.033 0.009 0.000 0 0
CNDD 0.007 0.008 1.173 0.008 0.000 0 0
FPJC 0.006 0.007 1.146 0.007 0.000 0 0
SPLA 0.007 0.007 0.961 0.007 0.000 0 0
HUTU 0.005 0.006 1.163 0.006 0.000 0 0
ZIMBABWE 0.007 0.005 0.699 0.022 0.010 -3 0
MRC 0.005 0.004 0.878 0.004 0.000 0 0
ALIR 0.004 0.004 1.081 0.004 0.000 0 0
ANGOLA 0.004 0.004 1.044 0.009 0.014 -1 2
PUSIC 0.003 0.003 1.177 0.003 0.000 0 0
NAMIBIA 0.003 0.003 0.940 0.011 0.009 -1 1
SAF 0.003 0.003 1.009 0.003 0.000 0 0
NALU 0.003 0.002 0.905 0.035 0.000 -1 1
BURUNDI 0.003 0.002 0.811 0.002 0.000 0 0
RWA73 0.002 0.002 0.956 0.007 0.016 0 0
BDK 0.002 0.002 1.136 0.002 0.000 0 0
MM-P 0.004 0.002 0.564 0.014 0.012 0 1
SUDAN 0.002 0.002 0.749 0.031 0.024 -2 0
FLC 0.002 0.002 1.112 0.002 0.000 0 0
MUNZ 0.001 0.001 1.126 0.001 0.000 0 0
ENYELE 0.001 0.001 1.126 0.001 0.000 0 0
PPRD 0.001 0.001 0.979 0.001 0.000 0 0
LOBALA 0.001 0.001 1.201 0.001 0.000 0 0
UNITA 0.001 0.001 0.779 0.002 0.001 -1 -1
FNL 0.001 0.001 1.098 0.001 0.000 0 0
BOMBO 0.001 0.001 1.060 0.001 0.000 0 0
MM-Y 0.001 0.001 0.582 0.001 0.000 0 0
MINEM 0.001 0.001 1.108 0.001 0.000 0 0
ADFL 0.001 0.001 1.078 0.001 0.007 0 0
LENDU-U 0.001 0.001 1.035 0.001 0.000 0 0
APCLS 0.001 0.001 0.995 0.001 0.000 0 0
UELE 0.001 0.001 0.924 0.001 0.000 0 0
FRF 0.000 0.001 1.094 0.001 0.000 0 0
WAGE 0.000 0.000 1.013 0.000 0.000 0 0
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Table C.15 cont.: Complete list of group removal with rewiring.
Group
Sh.
−∆RD Multiplier
−∆RD −∆RD New New
aggr. rewiring rewiring enmities alliances
fight. (median) (M.A.D) at median at median
ZAMBIA 0.000 0.000 1.006 0.000 0.000 0 0
RUD 0.000 0.000 1.005 0.000 0.000 0 0
MM-L 0.001 0.000 0.707 0.000 0.000 0 0
MM-J 0.001 0.000 0.707 0.000 0.000 0 0
RCD-M 0.000 0.000 0.902 0.000 0.000 0 0
CHAD 0.000 0.000 0.801 0.000 0.000 0 0
UPPS 0.000 0.000 1.066 0.000 0.000 0 0
CNDD-N 0.000 0.000 1.006 0.000 0.000 0 0
BANYA 0.000 0.000 0.916 0.000 0.000 0 0
G47 0.000 0.000 0.914 0.000 0.000 0 0
MBINGI 0.000 0.000 0.914 0.000 0.000 0 0
ALUR 0.000 0.000 0.786 0.000 0.000 0 0
NGITI 0.000 0.000 0.647 0.000 0.000 0 0
MM-K 0.000 0.000 0.613 0.000 0.000 0 0
HUTU-R 0.000 0.000 0.829 0.000 0.000 0 0
FAP 0.000 0.000 0.829 0.000 0.000 0 0
PRA 0.000 0.000 0.829 0.000 0.000 0 0
MUTLRA 0.000 0.000 0.829 0.000 0.000 0 0
PYGMY 0.000 0.000 0.829 0.000 0.000 0 0
WANGI 0.000 0.000 0.829 0.000 0.000 0 0
DSP 0.000 0.000 0.738 0.000 0.000 0 0
ADC 0.000 0.000 0.727 0.000 0.000 0 0
MM-M 0.000 0.000 0.519 0.000 0.000 0 0
RCD-N 0.000 0.000 0.036 0.032 0.018 -2 1
RCD 0.018 -0.002 0.142 0.079 0.029 -6 6
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